Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), by which the Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and requested me to periodically update it on the situation in Mali and the implementation of the Mission’s mandate. The present report covers the period from 24 March 2014 to 26 May 2014.

II. Political process

2. Efforts to advance the political process during the reporting period were seriously disrupted when armed clashes between the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF) and the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) together with associated armed groups took place in Kidal between 16 and 21 May. The resumption of hostilities between the Malian authorities, and armed groups — all signatories to the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement of 18 June 2013 — called into serious question the measures taken to date to bring about inclusive talks. At the same time, the origins and aftermath of the recent fighting point to the implementation of the preliminary agreement as the necessary path out of the crisis. The ceasefire agreement reached on 23 May between the parties through the mediation of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, President of Mauritania and Chair of the African Union, and my Special Representative commits the parties to return to the preliminary agreement and an immediate resumption of negotiations with the support of the international partners.

3. The armed confrontation in Kidal broke out as Prime Minister Moussa Mara was visiting the city. Prior to the Prime Minister’s visit, my Special Representative and other international partners had cautions the Government that the success of such a visit would necessitate thorough political and security preparation. At the Government’s request, MINUSMA supported the visit by airlifting Malian gendarmes to Kidal and reinforcing the presence of MINUSMA formed police units and military units. The Mission coordinated security preparations with the Malian authorities and the French forces of Operation Serval. Demonstrations against the planned visit started in Kidal on the eve of the Prime Minister’s arrival. On the morning of 17 May, sporadic shots were fired between elements of MDSF and MNLA in the vicinity of the Governorate of Kidal. The Prime Minister visited the
MDSF camp and proceeded to the Governorate, where the security situation deteriorated further. The Governorate was set on fire and MNLA and the Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) took MDSF elements and Government authorities prisoner. The Prime Minister returned to the MDSF camp in Kidal, with support from MINUSMA uniformed personnel, and was transported by MINUSMA helicopter to Gao on the morning of 18 May. A Government statement issued on the evening of 17 May described the events in Kidal as “a declaration of war” and promised that “the appropriate response will follow”. The Government condemned the killing of eight civilians at the Governorate, including six civil servants, and called for an international commission of inquiry to establish the facts. For its part, MNLA issued statements claiming that MDSF troops had provoked the fighting and that the group was acting in self-defence.

4. During the night of 17 to 18 May, MINUSMA and Operation Serval mediated a ceasefire between the two parties. However, both sides proceeded to mobilize reinforcements and on 21 May, MDSF launched an assault on Kidal using heavy weapons. The armed groups repulsed the Government troops, which took heavy casualties and retreated. As at 26 May, MDSF had withdrawn from Kidal and several other north-eastern towns. MNLA assumed control of the MDSF camp in Kidal and seized large quantities of abandoned MDSF equipment. MINUSMA evacuated and provided medical care to wounded MDSF personnel and civilians and worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to arrange the release of prisoners. MDSF soldiers sought refuge at MINUSMA bases in Kidal and other cities in the north.

5. The casualty toll following these confrontations remains uncertain, but MINUSMA was able to confirm 41 persons killed, including 8 civilians, 6 of whom were civil servants, and 33 members of MDSF.

6. The international community immediately condemned the violence. The various démarches and statements demonstrated the international consensus regarding support for the full restoration of State authority and sovereignty over the entire territory of Mali. At the same time, all international actors emphasized the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return to the political process. Through the intervention of the Chair of the African Union with the support of my Special Representative, a formal ceasefire agreement was reached between the parties on 23 May.

7. Major political developments prior to the events in Kidal included the resignation on 5 April of Prime Minister Oumar Tata Ly. In his resignation letter, published in the media, Mr. Ly pointed to what he characterized as deficiencies in the work of the Government that inhibited his ability to address the core challenges facing the country and fast-track reforms urgently needed to improve government performance. The President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, immediately appointed Moussa Mara, a former presidential candidate and member of the minority Yelema party, as Prime Minister.

8. On 11 April, Prime Minister Mara formed a Government of 31 ministers, 5 of whom are women and 23 of whom are members of the political party of the President, the Rassemblement pour le Mali. A number of ministers maintained their previous positions, including the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior and Security. Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation under the previous Government, was named Minister of National
Reconciliation and Abdoulaye Diop was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, African Integration and International Cooperation.

9. On 29 April, Prime Minister Mara delivered his inaugural address to the National Assembly and presented his Government’s plan of action for 2013-2018. On 2 May, members of Parliament adopted the action plan following a parliamentary debate. Prime Minister Mara identified the revival of the peace process, national reconciliation and the status of opposition parties as priority issues. He announced the Government’s intention to reflect on territorial reorganization.

Dialogue and reconciliation

10. On 22 April, President Keïta appointed former Prime Minister Modibo Keïta as his High Representative for Inter-Malian Inclusive Dialogue, with responsibility for overseeing the peace talks between the Government and the armed movements based on a road map that would need to be developed and agreed by all parties. Since his appointment, High Representative Keïta has consulted with national and international actors on the peace process. During the reporting period, no significant progress, however, was achieved on establishing a draft road map for an inclusive dialogue, as had been planned during the informal workshops held in February and March with the facilitation of MINUSMA and the involvement of the Government, local authorities, civil society and armed groups.

11. From 29 April to 2 May, MNLA held its congress in Kidal. In its final communiqué, it expressed concern about the slow pace of implementation of the preliminary agreement but reiterated its commitment to the agreement, reaffirming its readiness to participate in political dialogue under the auspices of the international community. The group also stated its willingness to collaborate with other movements and organizations. The HCUA congress, held in Kidal on 12 and 13 May to review options for the resolution of the crisis, endorsed a final communiqué in which it reaffirmed its attachment to the preliminary agreement and called upon the Government to initiate a dialogue without preconditions. HCUA also expressed confidence in the international community regarding the choice of a mediator and a neutral ground for the dialogue.

12. On 24 April, ministers from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger met in Algeria to discuss regional stability and security, including the full implementation of the preliminary agreement. During the meeting, the Malian authorities stressed the need to create, without delay, the conditions to begin dialogue among Malians and reiterated their request to the Government of Algeria to continue to play a key role in that respect. The final communiqué of the meeting welcomed and supported Algeria’s initiative aimed at creating coherence among and between the armed groups prior to negotiations with the Government. Participants also agreed to continue their efforts to pave the way to inclusive talks.

13. Following the Parliament’s adoption on 20 March of a bill establishing the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Ministry of National Reconciliation committed to appoint the future commissioners through a procedure that will ensure geographical and ethnic representation. However, the Commission has not yet been formed and concrete proposals regarding the selection procedure have yet to be put forward.
III. Security and stabilization

A. Security situation

14. The events described in paragraphs 2 to 5 above compounded an already deteriorated security situation in Mali. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Kidal, the continuing influence of groups such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’ouest had resulted in a substantial increase in asymmetric attacks targeting the Malian security forces, MINUSMA and Operation Serval. The Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu regions experienced improvised explosive device attacks and indirect rocket fire targeting Operation Serval, Malian and MINUSMA personnel and contingents. Six rocket attacks and 11 improvised explosive device attacks were recorded during the reporting period. Seven MDSF were wounded in the attacks, while one Operation Serval soldier was killed and three others were injured in attacks on 12 April and 7 May. Seven MINUSMA peacekeepers were injured during separate incidents on 30 March, 23 April and 13 May.

15. Threats of retaliation against civilians for cooperating with the international community were reported during the reporting period, along with targeted assassinations of alleged MDSF informants. On 8 and 9 April, alleged Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb fighters distributed leaflets in Arabic to the Zouera and Dhouya populations in the Timbuktu region, warning them of the consequences of cooperating with “France and its allies”. On 20 April, suspected Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb elements reportedly attacked a position held by MNLA in the Talhandak area, Kidal region. On 2 May, a 60-year-old man was shot in Kidal town, reportedly because of his alleged cooperation with Operation Serval and Malian forces. Supporters of rival armed groups in northern Mali, and especially MNLA members, were subject to similar hostile acts.

16. On 22 April, the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’ouest announced the death of the French hostage Gilberto Rodriguez Leal, who had been abducted in November 2012, without specifying the circumstances of his death. On 17 April, four ICRC staff members and a fifth aid worker, whom the Mouvement claimed to have kidnapped on 8 February, were released during an Operation Serval operation in the Timbuktu region. The threat of kidnapping remains significant, especially in the northern regions and along the Mauritanian border.

17. Terrorist and armed groups continue to circulate and operate in the north, with an increasing footprint in the mountainous area north of Kidal, the Adrar des Ifoghas, posing a significant threat to civilians, mandate implementation and humanitarian operations by threatening MINUSMA and humanitarian personnel and hampering movements. On 30 March, a MINUSMA logistics convoy hit an improvised explosive device on the road connecting Ansongo and Menaka in the Gao region. On 7 April, an improvised explosive device exploded in Menaka in the vicinity of the MINUSMA camp. The device was remote-controlled, demonstrating the insurgents’ improved tactics and underscoring the vulnerability of United Nations and humanitarian personnel.

18. On 23 April, a landmine explosion in the vicinity of the Kidal airstrip seriously injured a MINUSMA peacekeeper and damaged his vehicle. United Nations aircraft temporarily suspended flights to Kidal, seriously hindering direct support and
access. On 30 April, a remote-controlled device was found 300 metres outside the MINUSMA camp in Kidal. Improvised explosive device attacks also resulted in civilian casualties. Two civilians were killed on 3 May when an improvised explosive device destroyed their vehicle near Aguelhok. Rockets did not cause casualties during the reporting period but have landed in and near MINUSMA and civilian locations, including an empty school compound south of Gao town on 8 May and in the centre of Gao town on 14 April.

19. MINUSMA received reliable reports of armed clashes between and within armed groups during the reporting period. Elements of the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad clashed on 29 and 30 April in an area located between Léré and Lerneb, near the Mauritanian border, reportedly killing at least three members of the Mouvement. Clashes also reportedly took place between elements of Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad and MNLA east of Bourem in the Gao region.

20. Banditry and harassment by armed groups and unidentified gunmen, including, reportedly, self-defence militias, remain a serious concern in northern Mali and in the larger Niger Delta region. Recurrent break-ins in Kidal town led local businessmen to organize a vigilante group of 12 unarmed guards to secure the market. Road banditry also affected MINUSMA, in particular in the Kidal region. On 21 April, armed individuals attacked a MINUSMA-contracted truck on the Anefis-Kidal road and on 22 April, armed individuals attacked trucks transporting provisions for MINUSMA 50 kilometres south of Tessalit, stealing goods, food and water without causing injury or damage.

B. Mine action

21. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) continued to survey, clear and mark priority contaminated areas in central and northern Mali in order to minimize explosive hazards for returnees and conflict-affected communities. As at May 2014, 843 villages had been surveyed. Eighty-three dangerous areas have been identified and 1,250 items of unexploded ordnance and 45,270 items of small arms ammunition have been destroyed. Risk education was also provided to 17 humanitarian workers working in contaminated areas. UNMAS continued to deliver explosive awareness training to MINUSMA military, police and civilians, including explosive ordnance disposal units, and to MDSF personnel. In response to a request from the Malian Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior and Security, UNMAS is disposing of a stockpile of 60 tons of obsolete and expired ammunition, including 85 surface-to-air missiles, at risk of accidental explosion.

C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

22. On 14 March, the Government and armed groups, with the exception of MNLA, agreed on ways to implement the operational modalities for cantonment established on 18 February 2014. As a first step, all participating armed groups designated representatives for the site reconnaissance teams and the operations coordination cell. On 3 April, the site reconnaissance teams began the process of identifying priority cantonment sites in the Kidal and Gao regions. In addition to the Aghareous Keyone site (42 kilometres outside of Kidal), where construction under the $3 million Peacebuilding Fund project has started, 8 of the 15 additional
potential sites proposed by armed groups have been surveyed based on legal, logistic and security considerations. A report will be submitted to the Mixed Technical Commission on Security for final validation of sites once the identification process is completed. However, owing to the resumption of fighting between MNLA-led armed groups and MDSF, food deliveries to the pre-cantonment sites were suspended pending a decision by the Mixed Technical Commission on Security to resume. Following the recent fighting in Kidal, where the MNLA and HCUA fighters included those participating in pre-cantonment and receiving food assistance from MINUSMA, the Mission intends to proceed with the construction of the additional cantonment sites after the parties have renewed their commitment to cantonment, including a technical plan. MINUSMA continues to engage with the Government on the next steps for the cantonment process, the establishment of a national commission for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the development of a comprehensive national programme before inclusive talks begin.

IV. Re-establishment of State authority

23. Prior to the resumption of hostilities in the north, a total of 161 prefects and sub-prefects had returned to the Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu regions. In Mopti, 99 per cent of State officials have been redeployed; in Gao and Timbuktu, the level is 50 per cent; in Kidal, until recent events, redeployment was estimated at 20 per cent. Few officials, gendarmes or police officers have taken up posts outside the principal towns owing to lack of security, infrastructure and resources and the slow pace of socioeconomic activities. Six members of the corps préfectoral were killed in the recent incidents in Kidal and reports have been received that representatives of the administration have left their posts in the north.

A. Security sector reform

24. During the reporting period, the Government, with support from the United Nations and key partners, made progress in framing a national security sector reform vision, setting up a coordination mechanism and assessing fundraising opportunities through the security sector reform multidisciplinary working group established earlier in 2014. Proposals for the reform process framework and for the coordination mechanism are being reviewed by the Government with the objective of organizing two restitution workshops for national authorities and civil society and a national convention on security sector reform in the coming months.

25. Meanwhile, international partners, including the European Union Training Mission in Mali, key bilateral actors and MINUSMA, are discussing ways to strengthen the coordination of international efforts in support of security sector reform. MINUSMA has consulted with the Parliament and main civil society organizations on issues pertaining to the strengthening of national ownership of security sector reform and democratic oversight of security institutions.

26. Coordination mechanisms with national and international stakeholders on small arms and light weapons control and border strengthening have been initiated at the request of the Malian Ministry of Interior and Security. Along with MINUSMA, the Malian border police and gendarmerie conducted a border security
assessment in Labbezanga, on the border with the Niger, and in Léré, on the Mauritanian border, from 27 to 29 April 2014.

B. Law enforcement, justice and corrections institutions

27. Prior to the recent developments in the north, the redeployment of judicial authorities and the rehabilitation of judicial and prison facilities in the north continued. The tribunals in Bourem, Gao, Gourma-Rarhous, Niafunké and Timbuktu and the prisons in Douentza, Gao, Gourma-Rarhous, Timbuktu and Youwarou were operational; however, the impact of recent hostilities remains to be assessed.

28. The reopening of additional courts and prisons, as well as the operations of those already open, remain impaired by insecurity and the lack of adequate infrastructure, inadequately trained personnel and insufficient financial and administrative capacities. While fundraising for a $17 million project proposal is under way, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and MINUSMA have begun several activities to rehabilitate the Timbuktu court, the Niafunké court, préfecture and sous-préfecture and the Kidal préfecture and sous-préfecture. On 7 May, the Ministry of Justice, UNDP and the Netherlands signed an agreement to rehabilitate 11 courts and judges’ residences. The Mission supported the operationalization of courts in the north through training, advice and quick-impact projects. Prior to the recent developments in Kidal, MNLA control of justice and corrections institutions hindered the reopening of the Justice of Peace Tribunal and the prison.

29. Before 16 May, a total of 2,026 gendarmes and police officers were deployed in the north, compared with 469 before the crisis in 2012, reflecting the Malian authorities’ policy to transfer law and order responsibilities from the armed forces to law enforcement institutions. Twenty-two MINUSMA police trained 897 police officers and gendarmes during the reporting period. The Mission also provided human rights training and is cooperating with the gendarmerie to include human rights training in its curriculum. Ninety additional officers from the national police and gendarmerie were deployed to reinforce security around the Prime Minister’s visit to Kidal.

V. Human rights protection

A. Human rights

30. Following the recent developments, a human rights special investigation team was dispatched to Kidal on 23 May to investigate recent human rights violations linked to the fighting between Government forces and armed groups. On 24 May, the team was provided with access to the 13 detainees held by MNLA and the 32 detainees held by HCUA since 21 May, following the clashes in Kidal with the Malian armed forces. No cases of ill treatment were reported.

31. The human rights situation in Mali remained fragile as MINUSMA continued to document human rights violations and abuses by MDSF and armed groups in the northern regions. On 16 April in Gao, a Tuareg cattle herder was shot and killed by MDSF while grazing his cattle. One soldier has been arrested by Malian authorities
and an investigation is ongoing. In Mopti, a man from the Dogon ethnic group was arrested during the night of 11 to 12 April and died as a result of ill treatment by the Malian police. The Malian authorities have not yet opened an investigation into the case.

32. Progress has been made in the prosecution of the members of the former junta. Twenty-one senior members of the military and security apparatus have been charged and detained and are awaiting trial in relation to the disappearance and summary execution of 25 soldiers following the counter-coup of April 2012. On 22 April, General Amadou Haya Sanago and his lawyers appeared before a judge on charges of complicity in kidnapping. Following interrogation, the charge was amended to complicity in kidnapping and murder. However, less prominent cases have not progressed.

B. Protection of civilians

33. Civilians have not been specifically targeted by the ongoing armed clashes in the northern areas. However, these clashes and the general insecurity in the north have a significant impact on people’s freedom of movement, constrain regular economic opportunities and result, in some cases, in civilian casualties.

34. MINUSMA continues to develop an integrated strategy on the protection of civilians. This strategy is aimed at formalizing responses in close coordination with United Nations agencies, based on comprehensive risk and vulnerability analyses throughout the northern regions. As a result, joint protection teams will be established at the field level, along with coordination mechanisms to link all protection actors of the Mission and the protection cluster.

35. Inter- and intra-ethnic tensions and violence in the northern regions continued. As part of early warning and response, during the reporting period, MINUSMA conducted 14 protection assessment missions in at-risk areas prone to inter-communal violence.

C. Child protection

36. Since my previous report (S/2014/229), no new cases of children detained for alleged association with armed groups have been recorded. Seven children remain in detention in Bamako, while two have been released. The Mission continues to advocate with the Malian authorities for their release.

37. The Mission is seeking the rehabilitation and integration of two boys reportedly associated with armed groups who were arrested by Operation Serval during a military operation in April and handed over to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and ICRC, while nine children in the UNICEF-led transit and care centre are awaiting reunification with their families.

D. Conflict-related sexual violence

38. Community volunteers and focal points in Mopti and Bamako report that victims of sexual- and gender-based violence continue to come forward for services.
However, no free medical or psychosocial support services are available for these victims among the displaced populations in Bamako or Mopti. Services available in the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu are extremely limited. There is an urgent need for medical, psychosocial and legal assistance.

VI. Early recovery and development

39. MINUSMA and the United Nations country team have expanded recovery programming for the northern regions to support recovery and stabilization activities. Efforts continue to finalize quick-impact projects in close cooperation with national and international organizations and cover areas such as the rehabilitation of administrative buildings, support to local cooperatives and improved access to water for populations.

40. In addition to the $3 million project on cantonment in Kidal, on 2 April I approved Mali’s request for eligibility for financing through the Peacebuilding Fund. This frees up an additional $7 million for MINUSMA and the agencies, funds and programmes to support peace consolidation activities in four key areas: national dialogue and reconciliation, security and justice, restoration of State authority and inclusive governance, and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees. A major development in creating an enabling environment for development activities is the construction of a road from Séguo to Kidal, with funding from the European Union, which was inaugurated on 16 May and links areas that previously were very isolated.

41. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) continued its rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in Gao and Timbuktu. On 30 April, reconstruction of the two mausoleums in the Djingareyber mosque in Timbuktu was completed. MINUSMA also supported the Ministry of Culture in establishing an inventory of non-tangible cultural heritage in the four northern regions.

VII. Humanitarian situation

42. At the end of April, 3.6 million people were food insecure, including 1.5 million who were severely affected (half of whom are in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Timbuktu). National authorities have been proactively addressing the food crisis with the support of humanitarian partners. The authorities have established a monitoring committee on food security comprised of national authorities and humanitarian actors to improve planning and coordination. Malnutrition continues to seriously affect the most vulnerable, with 496,000 children under the age of five facing a threefold to ninefold risk of mortality in 2014. The number of severely food insecure is expected to rise to 1.9 million by June. Through their common strategic response plan, humanitarian actors are seeking $77 million for nutrition interventions and $255 million for food aid and agricultural interventions in 2014. As at 13 May, these two sectors were only 9 and 21 per cent funded, respectively.

43. The number of internally displaced persons in Mali continues to decrease. According to the April 2014 displacement tracking matrix of the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), nearly 138,000 persons were internally displaced, compared with 350,000 at the height of displacement. However, back-and-forth movement and secondary displacements (people returning to urban centres but not to homes in rural areas) are also being recorded. Such factors have implications for security and access to education, land and property rights. As at 8 May, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger continue to host some 140,000 Malian refugees registered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), compared with 177,000 at the height of displacement. A tripartite agreement signed between UNHCR, Mali and the Niger on 3 May lays the ground for the assisted repatriation of refugees.

44. The delivery of basic social services remains limited in areas of return, hindering the sustainability of return and posing a risk of inter-community tensions. This is particularly true for access to water, which is becoming increasingly difficult several months into the dry season and has already been a source of tension. Almost all health centres (90 per cent) are now functioning in the north, but many still depend largely on support from humanitarian partners to deliver services.

45. The recent incidents in Kidal resulted in limited displacement, with approximately 4,215 people fleeing to different areas in the regions of Kidal and Gao. Humanitarian actors responded to the priority needs of these persons in the areas of water, sanitation, hygiene, food, shelter and health care. Contingency stocks, including water bladders, tents and sanitation and hygiene supplies, were pre-positioned in Gao with the support of MINUSMA. Nine World Food Programme (WFP) trucks with 194 tons of food left Gao for Kidal on 25 May. Assistance has also been provided to approximately 60 displaced persons who sought refuge in the MINUSMA camp in Kidal.

46. As at 26 May, only 19.3 per cent of the $568 million needed to fund the strategic response plan for Mali to meet humanitarian and early recovery needs had been received. Humanitarian partners face greater challenges to respond to identified needs and to any sudden-onset crisis.

VIII. Establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

47. As at 26 May, the military strength of MINUSMA stood at 8,280 personnel, including 52 women, representing 74 per cent of the authorized total of 11,200. MINUSMA is revising its force layout to reflect a greater concentration of personnel in northern Mali. During the reporting period, the Mission’s military strength increased with the arrival of 1,837 troops, including an infantry battalion, which has temporarily been deployed in the staging area of Diabaly and will be transferred to Gao as soon as logistic and infrastructural arrangements permit. The headquarters of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit is being established at the Bamako airport, while a special forces unit and All Sources Information Fusion Unit assets are being deployed to Gao. The All Sources Information Fusion Unit will significantly enhance the Mission’s situational awareness capability. Full deployment of a riverine unit and the redeployment of the two explosive ordnance disposal companies from the training area of Kati to their final locations in Gao and Timbuktu will further enhance the MINUSMA Force’s operational capabilities.
48. With respect to medical capability, on 23 April, a level II hospital became operational in Gao, in addition to the level II hospital in Sévaré. Construction of the third level II military hospital in Timbuktu is under way. The Mission is improving its aeromedical evacuation capability through an arrangement with commercial providers.

49. Other critical enabling units that have now been deployed include three engineering companies, two signals companies, an airfield maintenance company and a transportation company. However, one of the engineering companies has been deployed without the majority of its equipment. While MINUSMA has now received four attack helicopters, it still lacks military utility helicopters, seriously hampering its air mobility. An infantry battalion, a reserve battalion, an airfield service unit, additional elements of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit, three utility helicopters units, an armed helicopter unit, a military police company and two force protection companies have all been generated but have not yet been deployed.

50. Efforts to transfer equipment sourced by the Trust Fund in Support of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) continued during the reporting period. To date, a total of 16 vehicles and 108 containers of field defence stores, accommodation units, generators and other supplies have been handed over to former AFISMA units. Many of these units have not yet met either United Nations unit standards or self-sustainment criteria. Eight vehicles and other equipment await distribution, pending acceptance by the troop-contributing countries concerned.

51. Multiple essential engineering and infrastructure projects are under way. These include horizontal works at five main bases (Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Tessalit and Timbuktu); a transit camp at the Bamako Senou airport; the construction of a parallel laterite runway in Gao; and the extension of the Kidal and Tessalit runways. Maintenance of runways in Gao, Kidal and Tessalit is ongoing. These activities are essential both to improve the Mission’s capacity to absorb military, police and civilian personnel and to enhance the delivery of assets where they are required. In order to reduce its presence in Bamako, MINUSMA has relocated many support services from the temporary headquarters in Hotel l’Amitié to an interim logistics base about 5 kilometres away. The Mission is currently consulting with the Government of Mali to identify future Mission headquarters premises.

52. The Mission’s police component has strengthened significantly, with 979 personnel, including 51 female officers, or 69 per cent of the authorized total of 1,440 police personnel having been deployed as at 26 May. The number of deployed individual police officers has risen to 122, or 38 per cent of the authorized 320. Six formed police units (857 personnel or 77 per cent of the authorized 1,120) remain on the ground.

53. As at 27 May, 469 of the authorized 672 civilian international staff have been deployed, 144, or 31 per cent of whom are women. Eighty-four of the authorized 145 United Nations volunteer positions have been filled, of whom 36 (43 per cent) are women. A total of 308 of the authorized 781 national staff members are on board, 78 (25 per cent) of whom are women.
IX. International coordination

54. On 28 and 29 March, my Special Representative attended the forty-fourth ordinary session of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Authority of Heads of State and Government, held in Yamoussoukro. The assembled Heads of State and Government applauded the return to constitutional order in Mali. They welcomed the signing of the modus operandi for the cantonment of armed groups and called for its full implementation by all parties to the preliminary agreement. They urged the Government of Mali to assume full responsibility for the conduct of an inclusive inter-Malian dialogue.

55. The coordination platform for the Sahel held its second meeting on 16 May in Bamako under the two-year rotating chairmanship of Mali. Participants endorsed the road map of the Malian presidency and renewed their commitment to enhance coordination and rationalize the allocation of resources for regional cooperation initiatives.

X. Financial aspects

56. The General Assembly, by its resolution 68/259 of 27 December 2013, appropriated the amount of $602 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, inclusive of the amount of $366.8 million previously authorized for the Mission for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2013 under the terms of its resolution 67/286.

57. The proposed budget for MINUSMA for the period 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015 in the amount of $812.7 million has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration during the second part of its resumed sixty-eighth session.

58. As at 2 June 2014, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for MINUSMA amounted to $132.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $1,216.0 million.

59. As at 2 June 2014, troop/formed police costs had been reimbursed for the period up to 28 February 2014 and the costs of contingent-owned equipment had been reimbursed for the period up to 31 December 2013, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

XI. Strategic review of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

60. In anticipation of the Security Council’s deliberations on the renewal of the mandate of MINUSMA, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations undertook a strategic review of the Mission, which included a visit to Mali from 4 to 9 May by a multidimensional team led by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The purpose of this initiative was to review, one year after the establishment of MINUSMA, the basic assumptions behind the design of the Mission with a view to recommending possible changes to the mandate or to its implementation strategy in the light of significant developments since the authorization of the Mission. The team consulted with the Government, civil society both in Bamako and in the north, the leadership of armed groups signatories to the
preliminary agreement, international partners and many others. Consultations with key international and regional actors as well as troop- and police-contributing countries were also held at Headquarters.

61. The review concluded that the restoration of constitutional order, the sidelining of the junta behind the March 2012 coup and limited progress in the reconciliation process were the most significant political aspects of the evolution in the strategic context since April 2013. Despite these achievements, many important aspects of the stabilization of Mali, including most of the tasks included in the MINUSMA mandate, are yet to be accomplished. These relate, in particular, to the stabilization of the north and support for the restoration of State authority, human rights and the protection of civilians, and national and community reconciliation. Progress in all these areas remains tied to the political negotiations between the Government and armed groups, highlighting the central importance of progress in the political process for the achievement of the Mission’s mandate.

62. The elected authorities have signalled their desire for national leadership of the political process, but limited progress has been made since September 2013. The Government’s appointment of a High Representative for Inclusive Inter-Malian Dialogue may be cause for optimism, but there is no common vision at this time between the Government and armed groups on the way forward in the political process, including on the framework for negotiations, or on the agenda, timeline, participation and links with wider community dialogue. The recent clashes in Kidal and the resulting expansion of areas controlled by armed groups highlight the urgency of making progress in the political process.

63. At the local level, the humanitarian and security situation, including continued tensions between various communities throughout the north remain a significant source of concern. Governance issues such as corruption also remain a major driver of conflict in Mali and need to be addressed as part of a long-term stabilization strategy. Trafficking and transnational organized crime also remain significant enablers of insecurity throughout the north.

64. After initial improvements in 2013, the security situation in northern Mali has deteriorated since the beginning of 2014. The increase in incidents involving improvised explosive devices, mostly targeting Malian and international security forces, contribute to an overall sense of insecurity in the north. Contrary to initial assumptions, however, security risks to the population are mostly related to banditry and inter-communal violence, especially in areas of refugee and internally displaced person returns and along commercial axes. This insecurity impedes the return to normalcy and the resumption of economic and development activities.

65. Despite increasing its presence in the north in the past year, the review found that MDSF remains hampered by serious capacity gaps and will continue to require international assistance for the foreseeable future. MINUSMA may be called upon to play a larger role in this area, in particular as Operation Serval draws down in Mali and shifts to a regional posture. Until MDSF is able to assume counter-terrorism tasks, initial assumptions on the need for a parallel force to address the continued presence of terrorist groups in northern Mali will remain valid. Operation Serval appears to be intent on continuing to play this role, albeit in a new configuration.
66. To date, the Mission’s strategy in support of security and stabilization has focused on a static presence in main population centres in line with Security Council resolution 2100 (2013). The current situation requires adjustments so that the Malian security forces and MINUSMA progressively dominate areas adjacent to population centres, including commercial axes, in order to deny access to terrorist groups and criminals. The Mission’s insufficient mobility and air cover hamper these efforts. The Mission is developing a revised force laydown that proposes the gradual redeployment of most MINUSMA assets and may extend the Mission to a number of additional locations north of the Niger River belt. Plans in that regard, however, exceed the Mission’s current construction and support capacity, which is focused on developing bases in the major deployment locations in accordance with early planning. Staff safety and security also remain major concerns given the sustained threat to United Nations personnel and others from asymmetric attacks, improvised explosive devices and kidnappings. Consequently, the Mission’s ability to deploy civilian staff, including support personnel, and to build, staff and maintain additional deployment locations in remote areas will be severely constrained. Should the parties demonstrate a concrete commitment to the cantonment process, which will be essential for the success of the political process, the Mission must also be prepared to fully support cantonment. This will, however, have additional support implications.

67. During discussions with the review team, Government officials proposed to enhance coordination systems between MDSF and MINUSMA and requested that MINUSMA provide operational support to MDSF in northern Mali. Noting that increased MDSF capacity to secure Mali’s territory remains at the centre of the Mission’s projected end-state in the security area, the team endorsed proposals for enhanced coordination and duly noted the request for operational support. Further analysis of risks and opportunities, in particular with regard to the potential impact of providing operational support to MDSF on the political process, would be required before making a detailed recommendation to the Security Council on this issue.

68. Redeployment of the administration and State services remains relatively weak throughout the northern regions, undermining the legitimacy of the State among the local population and fuelling continued instability. During the strategic review, all interlocutors emphasized the need for increased emphasis on such stabilization priorities as improved security at the subregional level, restoration of the penal chain and increased access to basic services as critical for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and the resumption of normal economic activity.

69. As Mali enters the next phase of the stabilization process, the need for the Mission and national authorities to synchronize their activities more closely will become increasingly important. All aspects of the Mission’s mandate require coordinated action by Government actors, highlighting the need for closer cooperation on the basis of a joint vision.

70. On the basis of this assessment, the strategic review resulted in the following recommendations for adjustments to the Mission’s mandate:

(a) The Security Council should reiterate that the political process, as agreed to by the parties in the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement of 18 June 2013, remains the cornerstone of the implementation of the mandate, and reframe the
Mission’s political role as one that includes “good offices and facilitation support” for the process, including coordination of regional and international initiatives;

(b) The Malian authorities should develop a shared vision for the way forward with MINUSMA, outlining their respective responsibilities with regard to all aspects of mandate implementation, and formulate “benchmarks” to be approved by the Security Council;

(c) The Mission’s current troop and police ceiling should be maintained and the Mission should expand its static and mobile presence in the north, within its means and capabilities, as part of an integrated stabilization strategy in the context of asymmetric threats, to be coordinated with the expansion of the presence of national institutions and partners and synchronized with progress in the political process;

(d) MINUSMA should be authorized, in response to the request of the Malian authorities, to provide support for the organization and conduct of local elections and electoral reform in the context of decentralization, as well as support for transitional and military justice and capacity-building of Malian law enforcement agencies in counter-trafficking. The Security Council may also wish to consider requesting MINUSMA to explore means of enhancing coordination with MDSF, subject to an assessment of risks and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy.

71. The review also recommended continuing efforts to transfer the Mission’s centre of gravity to the north while acknowledging that the expansion of the Mission’s footprint in the north would need to be planned and sequenced in full consideration of the financial, support and security constraints faced by MINUSMA.

XII. Observations

72. I am deeply concerned at the dramatic turn of events in Mali since 17 May. The resumption of hostilities and the situation in the northern part of the country constitute a clear and unacceptable violation of the letter and spirit of the preliminary agreement of 18 June 2013. The continued occupation of parts of the north by armed groups is also a serious breach of the preliminary agreement.

73. I welcome the ceasefire agreement signed by the Government of Mali and the armed groups, facilitated by the Chair of the African Union, President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania, and my Special Representative, Albert Gerard Koenders. I call upon all parties to strictly respect its terms. The hostilities have resulted in an altered security landscape in the north of Mali, with risks for international security. This situation cannot endure. The United Nations remains firmly committed to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali and to active support for the implementation of the preliminary agreement, including the holding of an inclusive dialogue.

74. As an immediate priority, the ceasefire agreement must be fully respected and the institutions of the preliminary agreement, in particular the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and the Mixed Technical Commission on Security, reinstalled without delay and accepted by all parties concerned. I trust that the revival of this machinery will help to elaborate the modalities for the ceasefire and the way forward. My Special Representative and MINUSMA stand ready to support the
implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the relaunch of the peace process in line with the preliminary agreement.

75. There can be no durable solution to the security challenges in the north without a political process that paves the way for the full restoration of law and order, equal access by all Malians to public services, and reconciliation between communities. All parties must act on their recommitment to uphold the preliminary agreement as the framework for discussions leading to the launching, in earnest, of a formal, inclusive political dialogue without delay. I am deeply concerned that in the absence of a political process, terrorist groups will seize opportunities to target Malian and international forces and threaten civilians in the north. Even before the recent resumption of hostilities, rocket and improvised explosive device attacks spread fear and slowed the reconciliation process.

76. I condemn the atrocities committed in the course of the recent hostilities, in particular the killing of eight civilians, including six civil servants, by armed groups in Kidal. I express my condolences to the families of the victims. The perpetrators of these heinous crimes should be identified and brought to justice. An international commission of inquiry, as agreed by the parties to the ceasefire agreement, should be put in place as soon as possible to establish the facts. The United Nations is prepared to provide the expertise and technical support needed to establish such a commission.

77. The Government of Mali, under the leadership of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, has primary responsibility for resolving the challenges facing Mali and protecting civilians throughout the country. As an essential first step, the parties to the conflict must abandon the logic of war and commit to the peace process. Only when this process is “Malian-owned” will durable solutions to the conflict be possible. I urge the Government, the armed groups and all civil society actors to redouble their efforts to work together in earnest, in close cooperation with my Special Representative, to bring about a process that delivers on the hopes of the Malian people. The status quo is not acceptable. The achievements made since 2013, including the successful presidential and legislative elections and a gradual return of State administration to the north, demonstrate the desire of all Malians to re-establish a strong and vibrant nation. Recent tragic events make it all the more important to proceed without delay towards an inclusive dialogue process that brings all Malians together around a set of collectively agreed issues that need to be addressed to achieve a final peace settlement. I hope that the appointment by President Keïta of a High Representative to facilitate peace discussions will give fresh impetus to such efforts.

78. The multiple initiatives by countries in the region to support the political process, under the impulse of the Malian authorities and their partners, clearly demonstrate the region’s concern about continued instability in Mali. I urge all actors engaged in such initiatives to seek greater coherence in these efforts in close coordination with the United Nations. My Special Representative will continue to use his good offices to proactively assist the reconciliation and negotiation processes.

79. The armed groups must negotiate in good faith and without delay. I welcome all efforts, including by regional actors, aimed at creating synergies and coherence among and between the armed movements in order to bring about meaningful, effective negotiations with the Government. All Malians participating in this process
must do so in full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Mali. A consensus among all parties on the parameters and timeline for peace talks is required in order to put in place an effective cantonment process, which remains their responsibility. These efforts will require the sustained support of the international community.

80. In my previous report, I welcomed the establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. I reiterate my call for the Government to ensure the neutral, impartial and independent functioning of this body. I am also encouraged by the ongoing judicial investigations and hearings on a number of high-profile cases, including the case of the red berets and the mutiny in Kati. These efforts — provided they are sustained — are important positive steps in the fight against impunity. Yet, I am concerned that despite some initial progress, the re-establishment of the presence and functioning of the judiciary and of State administration throughout the country suffered a significant blow following the recent resumption of hostilities.

81. I am also troubled by the continued food insecurity and malnutrition in Mali. I call upon the international partners of Mali to fund the shortfall in the humanitarian appeal.

82. I would encourage the Security Council, in its deliberations on the renewal of the Mission’s mandate, to consider the results of the strategic review and related recommendations, outlined in paragraphs 70 and 71 above, regarding the need to:
(a) adjust the Mission’s political role, while ensuring that the political process remains the cornerstone of mandate implementation;
(b) develop joint benchmarks for mandate implementation as part of efforts to improve the synchronization of activities;
(c) maintain the current troop and police ceiling, while expanding the Mission’s footprint in the north beyond major population centres as part of an integrated stabilization strategy, subject to security and logistical constraints and;
(d) add mandated tasks for support to local elections, transitional justice, capacity-building for counter-trafficking and, subject to an assessment of risks and in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, enhanced coordination with MDSF.

I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of MINUSMA at its current authorized uniformed strength of up to 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 police personnel for a period of one year, until 1 July 2015. In the meantime, I urge all States that have pledged uniformed personnel and assets to MINUSMA or are providing support to troop- and police-contributing countries to accelerate the arrival in the Mission of personnel and materiel still awaiting deployment.

83. Implementation of the adjustments to the mandate suggested above will be extremely challenging for the Mission, given the serious support and security constraints it faces. In that regard, the Mission’s support and construction capacities will need to be strengthened. It will be necessary to prioritize efforts and recognize that extended timelines for the completion of existing and new projects will be needed and that implementation will be costly.

84. Sustained political engagement by the Security Council remains essential to rapidly advance the political process. A coherent approach by Mali’s bilateral partners and international financial institutions to achieve progress in areas that are critical to the stabilization of the country, in particular with regard to governance and political negotiations, will also be essential for successful mandate implementation.
85. Lastly, I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative for Mali, Albert Gerard Koenders, and the uniformed personnel and civilian staff of MINUSMA for their continued hard work under extremely difficult circumstances. I also thank all troop- and police-contributing countries, the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and bilateral partners, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their important contributions to supporting the peace process in Mali.
Annex I

MINUSMA deployment map
### Annex II

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali: military and police strength as at 31 May 2014**

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