Letter dated 8 August 2018 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Coordinator of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali, I have the honour to submit, after discussion with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali on 7 August 2018, the Panel’s final report, in accordance with paragraph 11 (c) of Council resolution 2374 (2017).

I would be grateful if the present letter and the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ruben de Koning
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)

(Signed) Marc-André Boisvert
Expert

(Signed) Aurélien Llorca
Expert

(Signed) Holo Makwaia
Expert

* Reissued for technical reasons on 24 August 2018.
Summary

Ahead of the presidential elections of 29 July 2018, the signatory parties of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali have shown renewed commitment to advance on several priority activities agreed in January and March. The Government and the signatory armed groups coalitions — the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger and the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) — reached agreement on the appointment of interim authorities at the subregional level and jointly established mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal and Timbuktu.

Progression on such interim measures can build the necessary trust among the parties to either advance on or finalize more fundamental institutional and security provisions of the Agreement after the presidential elections. The Panel notes that limited participation of representatives of the signatory armed groups in the legislative process concerning decentralization generated an atmosphere of distrust and a tendency to not be forthcoming on security commitments on the part of the signatory armed groups.

Optimistic planning, along with negotiation strategies and insufficient coordination within signatory parties, partly explain the delays already incurred on the priority actions by both the armed groups and the Government. In addition, the demands of splinter groups to be included in the roll-out of provisions under the Agreement is complicating the implementation of priority actions, particularly the long overdue disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process started in March.

While the Panel has observed various delays, it has not identified implementing individuals or entities deliberately obstructing the Agreement. Rather than direct obstructions, the Panel has identified individual members of the signatory armed groups and splinter groups involved in attacks against Malian security and armed forces and in organized crime, and who threaten to use violence in order to be included in the Agreement, thereby indirectly threatening its implementation.

Notably, splinter groups united under the Coordination des mouvements de l’entente (CME) have threatened to use violence and boycott presidential elections in order to be further included in the Agreement and its different mechanisms.

Terrorism and organized crime are the drivers of insecurity in northern and central Mali today, leading to a dire humanitarian situation. Intercommunal violence in the Mopti and Ménaka regions further aggravates the situation, generating a new wave of refugees and internally displaced persons. Return or repatriation has not been possible in 2018 owing to the constant threat of kidnapping, extortion, murder and summary execution by armed and terrorist groups, as well as drought, famine and a lack of basic services in areas of return.

At the same time, antiterrorist operations conducted by the Malian army in northern and central Mali, as well as by “compliant” armed groups — those who are part of the Plateforme or CMA or have declared that they will observe the Agreement — have led to civilian killings and amplified intercommunal violence. Operations in the north were interpreted by CMA as a cover for the redeployment of the Malian army in violation of the Agreement. In the central Mopti region, the Malian army faces strong allegations and the Government has recognized soldiers implicated in human rights violations in Nantaka and Kobaka. In the Ménaka region, a large number of civilians have been killed in terrorist attacks since February 2018, and some civilians have also been killed in retaliatory counterattacks by the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés and the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad of the Daoussak.
Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali

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** The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
I. Background

Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution 2374 (2017) the Security Council established a sanctions regime, consisting of a travel ban and an asset freeze, applying to individuals and/or entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali as being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali. To date, the Committee has not designated any individuals or entities.

2. Resolution 2374 (2017) requested that the Secretary-General create a group of up to five experts to provide the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities. That includes information regarding (a) violations of and obstructions and threats to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali by signatory parties; (b) attacks against entities referenced in the Agreement, including Malian security and defence forces, but also United Nations peacekeepers and other international security presences; (c) the financing of individuals and entities who undermine the Agreement, including through organized crime; and (d) violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Although the sanctions criteria in resolution 2374 (2017) pertaining to human rights and humanitarian law (para. 8 (e)–(g)) do not refer to the Agreement, violations perpetrated by entities referenced in the Agreement and those seeking inclusion would damage their credibility as implementing partners.

3. On 12 December 2017, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed four members of the Panel (see S/2017/1047). No fifth expert was appointed.

4. The Panel began its work on 1 February 2018. During the reporting period (February to June 2018) the Panel visited Mali on four occasions and travelled to the northern regions of Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu and Ménaka and the central region of Mopti. During its visits to Mali, the Panel engaged with a wide range of stakeholders, including Government officials, security and defence forces, signatory and compliant armed group representatives, displaced populations, civil society and community representatives, regional organizations, diplomatic delegations in Bamako, various sections and contingents of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), as well as other international security presences and United Nations bodies.

5. In addition to its visits to Mali, the Panel also visited Belgium, Burkina Faso, France, Mauritania, the Netherlands and the Niger. Visits proposed by the Panel to Algeria in April and June were not accommodated.

6. On 26 and 27 March 2018, the Panel accompanied a visit to Mali of the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017). The Chair and several members of the Committee met with key counterparts in Mali to obtain first-hand information on Mali and engage with all Malian parties on how the sanctions regime put in place by resolution 2374 (2017) could support peace and stability in Mali, including through the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation.

Cooperation

7. The Panel would like to express its sincere appreciation to the Governments of Belgium, Burkina Faso, France, Mali, Mauritania, the Netherlands and the Niger for accommodating its visits and notes, in particular, the efforts of its focal points within the respective ministries of foreign affairs and defence (in the case of the Niger) for
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arranging meetings with relevant ministries and specialized government services during its visits.

8. The Panel is further thankful for the support of the Department of Safety and Security for its security arrangements and MINUSMA for its logistical support and exchange of information, noting with special appreciation the endeavours of staff of the Joint Mission Analysis Cell as the Panel’s focal point within MINUSMA.

9. As requested and directed in resolution 2374 (2017) the Panel cooperated with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) through its office in Dakar and a representative in Bamako. The Panel also shared information with the Panel of Experts on Libya regarding possible arms exports and with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities regarding violent acts of those operating in Mali.

10. The Panel avoids overlap between its mandate and that of the Monitoring Team by focusing on the collusive relationships between signatory and non-signatory armed groups and terrorist armed groups in Mali, as well as on the spirals of violence during antiterrorist operations involving the signatory armed groups and splinter groups — together referred to as “compliant” armed groups — that seek inclusion in the Agreement.

11. During the course of its mandate, the Panel addressed 23 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities, receiving various levels of response to its requests.¹ Ten communications concerned the tracing of requests sent to known producers/exporters and importers of arms, ammunition and other military hardware that are possessed illegally in Mali. The requests are meant to identify possible active trafficking networks further down the supply line. The Panel is thankful for the responses received thus far from Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Morocco, the Netherlands Romania and the United States of America.

Methodology

12. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (see S/2006/997, annex). While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks the Panel intends to withhold identifying information.

13. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited for their review, comment and response within a specified deadline.

14. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text, conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus prior to its transmission to the President of the Security Council.

¹ See annex 1.
II. Political context of the conflict

A. Conflict overview

15. The current Malian conflict started in January 2012 when rebels of the Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) launched combats in northern Mali in pursuit of independence from the central Government in Bamako. Following several military setbacks, and a few weeks prior to the presidential elections scheduled for April that year, members of the armed forces staged a coup d’état. After international condemnation of the coup and regional sanctions, the junta backed down, leaving the power to an interim government.

16. Meanwhile, all the major northern cities had fallen into the control of the rebels who were first aided but then partly replaced by three terrorist armed groups: Ansar Eddine, Mouvement pour l’unification et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).²

17. To stop Islamic militants from progressing southward, the French-led Operation Serval intervened in January 2013. The Operation expelled terrorist groups from the main urban centres and paved the way for MINUSMA deployment pursuant to resolution 2100 (2013). Peacekeeping deployments allowed presidential elections to take place in July 2013. The new Government continued facing challenges with regard to re-establishing its authority over the north, accommodating rebel groups and containing Islamist militancy.

B. Peace negotiations leading to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

18. In 2012, under the auspices of the Government of Burkina Faso, mediation efforts were undertaken between the Malian transitional government and MNLA. The Preliminary Agreement to the Presidential Election and the Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali, signed in Ouagadougou on 18 June 2013, laid the ground for the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali of 2015 in terms of armed group adherence, (pre-)cantonment and ceasefire monitoring.³

19. In January 2014, a new round of negotiations was initiated in Algiers between the Government of Mali and armed groups from northern Mali. On 1 March 2014, the Government and the armed groups agreed on a mediation plan under the auspices of the Government of Algeria. On 17 May 2014, violence erupted in the Kidal region between Government forces and pro-Azawad independence armed groups (MNLA, the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) and the Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (MAA-CMA) faction), following a visit of the Prime Minister of Mali at the time, Moussa Mara.

20. Despite violent combat, the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali was negotiated in 2015 in Algiers. The Agreement was signed in two stages. The first was on 15 May between the Malian Government and the pro-Government umbrella armed group known as the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger, and the second at a ceremony with the leader of MAA-CMA, Sidi Ibrahim Ould Sidatti, on behalf of the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), on 20 June 2014 — with the interim measures to be implemented during a period of 18 to 24 months. Unlike the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, the Agreement on Peace and

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² Listed respectively under QDe.135, 134 and 014 in the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list.
³ Confidential report, 27 January 2018.
Reconciliation in Mali entrenches a joint commitment to fight terrorism and its connections with organized crime.

III. Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali: violations, delays and progress

A. Ceasefire violations before and after Security Council resolution 2374 (2017)

21. Significant violations of the ceasefire in the Kidal region occurred during June and July 2017. CMA clashed with the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés (GATIA), the main component of the Plateforme, near Aguelhoc and Anéfis. Mixed monitoring and verification teams, set out in the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, conducted coordinated missions with MINUSMA military observers in Kidal region, but did not find conclusive evidence. Those violations triggered the letter sent by the Government of Mali to the President of the Security Council on 9 August 2017 calling for the establishment, without delays, of a sanctions regime targeting those obstructing the Agreement.

22. While no ceasefire violations had been mentioned by MINUSMA or other reporting bodies since September 2017, the Panel obtained information about a confrontation between GATIA and CMA near Amassin, in the Kidal region, on 13 April 2018, relating to a convoy allegedly transporting drugs (see section V below).

B. General observations on implementation

23. By June 2017, the interim period of a maximum of two years set by the Agreement had already lapsed. During a meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee on 20 May 2017, the Government announced the extension of the mandate of the interim authorities, and therefore of the interim period, beyond 20 June 2017, in order to honour the minimum duration of six months for which the interim authorities were to be established. Regional and local elections that would have replaced interim measures were scheduled for December 2017 and April 2018, but both were postponed. A revised road map of actions adopted by signatory parties on 22 March 2018 has not provided a date for those elections but rather puts them after a revision of the decentralization legislation, which is to take place in 2019.

24. Though it confirms the extension of the interim period until sometime in 2019, or even beyond, international mediation team members have generally welcomed the March road map. Several of them mentioned to the Panel that the engaged role of the Prime Minister, Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, as well as the start of the work of the independent observer and the Mali sanctions regime — both mechanisms envisaged in, respectively, articles 63 and 64 and article 54 of the Agreement — have given new impetus to the Agreement.

25. During the period under review, the Panel noted progress on security and defence in terms of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration registration and...
deployments of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal and Timbuktu. However, major issues with regard to army integration and reintegration (i.e., quotas and grades) remain unresolved, as does the issue of heavy weapons contributions by signatory armed groups (see para. 44 below). Pending army reforms and the deployment of a reconstituted army in the north, the signatory armed groups frequently blame either each other or the Malian armed forces for intruding on their respective areas of control (see para. 181 below).

26. In addition, claims for inclusion in the Agreement by splinter groups pose challenges to its implementation. United under the Coordination des mouvements de l’entente (CME), splinter groups have in their public discourse alluded to the possibility of resorting to violence if their demands are not met. After accepting splinter groups in the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Gao in January 2017, following military pressure by CME armed elements, the Government also opened up the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration registration to them in April, inflating the numbers of combatants beyond expectation (see para. 49 below). The Government also unofficially ceded presidency of interim authorities at the cercle (district) level interim authorities (see paras. 36 and 37 below) to CME. However, one of the CME members has publicly called for a boycott of the elections to augment pressure on the Government.

27. Meanwhile, CMA has conditioned its commitment to secure elections upon the effective installation of interim authorities at the subregional level even before the deadline of December 2018 included in the March road map. After initial opposition from the Plateforme during the twenty-sixth session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee in June, parties reached agreement over the distribution of interim authorities at the cercle level on 2 July.

28. The agreement on cercle-level interim authorities signifies progress on the institutional and technical areas of the Agreement, but the finalization of more fundamental institutional reforms concerning decentralization is still in progress. Delays regarding institutional aspects provided armed groups with an argument to postpone their own commitments on security matters.

29. The social, economic and cultural development theme and justice, reconciliation and humanitarian matters set out in the Agreement are rarely mentioned in the road map and timeline; however, important legal texts have been either developed or adopted. The following sections provide more detailed analysis of actions under the four different components of the Agreement.

C. Procedural issues and implementation of the political and institutional component

Procedural issues

30. The four subcommittees of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, and the Technical Commission on Security, are the main oversight mechanisms for ensuring

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8 The Operational Coordination Mechanism is a unified command and control structure combining the signatory armed groups and Government military forces aimed at securing the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal and Ménaka, notably through planning and conducting mixed patrols, with assistance from MINUSMA and international forces, if possible and necessary.


10 See CPA social media post in annex III.

11 Meeting with the signatory armed groups, Bamako, 16 February 2018.
the implementation of the Agreement. The four subcommittees are mandated to oversee political and institutional questions; defence and security; economic, social and cultural development; and reconciliation, justice and humanitarian questions. The Technical Commission on Security is a commission created by the Agreement that answers to the defence and security subcommittee and is mandated to address security issues, monitor the ceasefire and implement trust-building measures among signatories. Splinter groups have been included as observers in the Technical Commission on Security, but not in the other organs of the Agreement Monitoring Committee.

31. Since the adoption of resolution 2374 (2017), seven sessions of the Agreement Monitoring Committee have been held. Concerns from the signatory armed groups about their remuneration paralyzed two meetings. During the twenty-third session of the Committee, on 15 and 16 January 2018, a new timetable setting out priority actions was agreed between signatory parties. The timetable was reworked in a more comprehensive revised road map, which was signed on March 22 and endorsed at the twenty-fourth session of the Committee. The timetable was further defined on 5 April in a document outlining tasks indicated by the road map. The road map added important actions and more clearly defined outcomes, but also moved forward deadlines for existing actions. The Panel took note of delays with regard to the security and defence and institutional components, in particular the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration registration, the heavy weapons contributions to the Operational Coordination Mechanism and the finalization of discussions on decentralization.

32. The delays are partly due to short deadlines, but more fundamental issues are also involved. The Government, through its various ministries, is responsible for implementing priority actions defined in the January timetable and the March road map. The independent observer has already noted that the signatory armed groups are generally awaiting and scrutinizing proposals by the Government, showing little ownership over the process. From its discussions with members of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, the Panel concluded that the mandated roles of participants from all parties in the Technical Commission on Security and the subcommittee meetings often do not allow them to truly negotiate and make commitments.

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12 The Agreement Monitoring Committee’s mandate is defined by chapter 18, article 60, of the Agreement.
13 This concerned the twentieth session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee (11 September 2017), and the twenty-first session of the Committee (25 October 2017). The signatory armed groups requested a clarification on their status as civil servants or employees, notably concerning possible health benefits, as well as demands for salary arrears. The issue was resolved during the twenty-second session of the Committee held on 5 December 2017 when the Government offered to pay the second half of their overall allocation (1,050,000 CFA francs, $2,100), while the first half (525,000 CFA francs, $1,050) was taken care of by the international community. Meeting with Committee participants, Bamako, 15 June 2018.
15 “Feuille de route pour la mise en œuvre du chronogramme d’actions prioritaires et endossé par la 23ème session du Comité de suivi de l’Accord”, 22 March 2018, see annex II.
16 “Tâches induites par la feuille de route pour la mise en œuvre du chronogramme d’actions prioritaires et endossé par la 23ème session du Comité de suivi de l’Accord”, 5 April 2018, archived at the Secretariat.
17 Notably cantonment of troops and establishing interim authorities at the cercle level.
19 Meetings with participants of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, Bamako, 14 and 16 February 2018.
result, the role of the Agreement Monitoring Committee in steering negotiations by resolving differences has been limited.

Political and institutional component

33. A law laying down conditions for the self-administration of territories and a law implementing a new Code des collectivités territoriales were adopted on 14 September 2017 by the National Assembly. On 20 September, CMA expressed its disagreement. On 27 September, armed group representatives met with responsible ministers and understood from the meeting that the laws could still be amended following discussions on difficult elements. However, they were promulgated by the President of Mali several days later, on 2 October 2017.

34. Although the two laws were promulgated, the Government ultimately decided to suspend their application. The adoption of the laws contradicted at least two provisions of the Agreement: the order of precedence between the representatives of the State and the presidents of the executive organs of the collectivités territoriales and the creation of the territorial police force. Concerns over the law led to a meeting in Kati, from 15 to 17 December 2017, during which the Government explained the new laws and agreed to reopen the legislative texts for discussion on the two litigious issues. The issue was included in the March road map and discussions are scheduled to take place in 2019.

35. Several observers told the Panel that the Government’s precipitate actions had led to distrust and confusion, so that the signatory armed groups continued to cling to their position and insist on the rapid implementation of other political and institutional issues, as outlined below.

Interim authorities

36. In the tasks indicated in the road map of 5 April, the Government announced that it would set a date for regional elections terminating the mandate of regional interim authorities. At the time of writing, no dates had been proposed, and the interim period is likely to be extended again, the mandate expiring in August. So far, interim authorities have remained very limited in their abilities to perform their tasks as a result of capacity and budget issues (see also para. 60).

37. Finding an equilibrium between the signatory armed groups has been cumbersome at the cercle level, revealing ongoing tensions particularly in Kidal. During the twenty-sixth session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee on 25 and 26 June, the Plateforme opposed a proposed plan for the distribution of interim authorities at the cercle level. The opposition was partly based on a perceived bias in favour of CMA with regard to the appointment of prefects and subprefects in the Kidal

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21 See letter from CMA to the President of the Agreement Monitoring Committee in annex IV.
22 Correspondence with diplomatic source, 12 June 2018.
23 See Agreement, chapter 3, article 6.
24 See Agreement, chapter 10, article 27.
26 Meeting with participants of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, Bamako, 23 June 2018.
27 Interim Authorities were named for 6 months, with the possibility of a 12-month extension. “Décret n°2016-0781 à 0790/P-RM du 14 Octobre 2016”, 14 October 2018, archived at the Secretariat.
28 Meeting with Government representative, Bamako, 16 June 2018.
region. A resolution was reached after the Committee met on 2 July.\textsuperscript{29} The Plateforme opposition to the plan followed earlier expressions of discontent by the Plateforme and other compliant armed groups over the perceived exclusive control of Kidal by the Ifoghas Tuareg, as represented by HCUA. On 23 April, the armed groups issued a communiqué and addressed a letter to the President of the Agreement Monitoring Committee to that effect.\textsuperscript{30}

**New regions of Taoudenni and Ménaka**

38. On 28 February 2018, the Government adopted a draft law operationalizing the regions of Ménaka and Taoudenni, but the law has not been sent to the National Assembly. At the time of writing, the Ministry of Territorial Administration was still working on the delimitations of the two regions and their respective cercles and communes. However, community leaders in Ménaka were already expressing discontent because existing communities would not be properly recognized in the suggested communal divisions.\textsuperscript{31}

**D. Security and defence component**

39. In terms of defence and security, the Panel has looked at the level of progress of the Operational Coordination Mechanism, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform, as included in the January timetable and the March road map, as well as the observance of rules decided by the Technical Commission on Security. The provision in the Agreement regarding the creation of special units to fight terrorism and transnational organized crime has not been a priority activity.\textsuperscript{32}

**Trust-building measures: joint observation and verification teams and the Operational Coordination Mechanism**

40. The joint observation and verification teams (équipes mixtes d’observation et de vérification)\textsuperscript{33} are meant to observe and investigate alleged ceasefire violations once they are notified by the Technical Commission on Security. Since the mission to verify ceasefire violations in Kidal in September 2017 (see para. 21 above), no such missions have been undertaken.\textsuperscript{34}

41. Composed of combatants of the three signatory parties, the Operational Coordination Mechanism is meant to conduct joint patrols under a single command. Three units of 600 soldiers were intended to be implemented in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal as a temporary step towards the cantonment of all armed groups. In January 2017 splinter groups were included in the Mechanism in Gao, but the groups still demand better representation, including in Timbuktu.\textsuperscript{35}

42. The Operational Coordination Mechanism in Gao, established in December 2016, faced several problems. Members of the Mechanism, as well as those of the joint observation and verification teams, went on a two-month strike in January 2018,\textsuperscript{36}
when shortfalls in the budget led to the reduction of the monthly allocation for Mechanism officers and the joint observation and verification team members from 1,050,000 CFA francs ($2,100) to 525,000 CFA francs ($1,050) per month, as their assignment exceeded international donors’ budgetary commitments. Current budget arrangements end in June 2018, and remain uncertain.

43. After three years of delays, the Operational Coordination Mechanisms in Timbuktu and Kidal were established on 4 May 2018. Those Mechanisms are not yet fully operational, as compliant armed groups have yet to provide complete lists of combatants despite a deadline of April 2018. At the time of writing, CMA had refused biometric identification cards because they did not mention ranks, as agreed by the Technical Commission on Security.

44. In addition, armed groups have not yet provided heavy weapons and vehicles to the Operational Coordination Mechanism, as agreed during a meeting of the Technical Commission on Security on 11 April 2018. The Government has, so far, provided four heavy weapons to the Mechanism in Gao. CMA representatives justify their non-compliance by stating that heavy weapons and vehicles are personally owned by members, and therefore CMA cannot donate them to the Operational Coordination Mechanism.

45. Moreover, lack of resources, including food and office supplies, which are the responsibility of the Government, delayed the implementation on several occasions. Meanwhile, items, including 400 uniforms and several tents, dedicated to the Operational Coordination Mechanism have been stolen. The Panel was also informed that several vehicles have been stolen from the Mechanism, in some cases allegedly by members of the signatory armed groups, although perpetrators were not identified. The Mechanism needs to be fully implemented before launching the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, as its members will be responsible, with the Technical Commission on Security, for securing cantonment.

Measures of weapons control

46. During the meetings of the Technical Commission on Security on 17 and 30 August 2017, CMA and the Plateforme agreed to stop conducting patrols with heavy weapons and not to circulate in convoys of more than five vehicles without providing notification to MINUSMA. In addition, they agreed that all vehicles carrying weapons should be clearly identified and members should carry a mission order signed by their leadership, and that they would notify the Technical Commission on Security prior to any movements.

47. Armed groups from both coalitions have, on at least one occasion each, moved heavily armed convoys without prior notification to the Technical Commission on Security (see para. 85 below). The Commission does not perceive those movements as a violation of the Agreement but rather as a breach of measures of trust.

37 Meeting with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Bamako, 7 June 2018.
38 Meeting with the Technical Commission on Security participants, Bamako, 15 June 2018.
40 Meeting with United Nations officials, Bamako, 15 June 2018.
41 Meeting with United Nations officials, Bamako, 15 June 2018.
42 Meeting with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Bamako, 7 June 2018.
43 See annex II of the Agreement.
44 Confidential report, 17 August 2017.
45 Confidential reports, 13 January, 9 February, and 12 February 2018.
46 Meeting with Technical Commission on Security participants, Bamako, 22 June 2018.
48. For their part, the signatory armed groups in Gao have argued that weapons seizures in December 2017 by the Malian armed forces from individual armed group members, following a decision by the region’s Governor,\footnote{Décision n. 0649-2017-CAB-GRG portant règlement de la circulation”, Gao, 27 November 2017, archived at the Secretariat.} goes against the spirit of the Agreement because the seizures preceded the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.\footnote{Meeting with representatives of the signatory armed groups, Gao, 21 March 2018.}

**Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform process**

49. The registration process for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration started in March 2018 and was initially planned to be concluded by the end of April. Registries were distributed to the signatory armed groups and other compliant armed groups. Armed groups asked for an extension of the deadline to the end of May. By June, most had not returned the registries.\footnote{Ibid.} Registration was first expected to encompass up to 15,000 combatants.\footnote{Meeting with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Bamako, 30 March 2018.} A representative from the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission expects at least double that number.\footnote{Meeting with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Bamako, 7 June 2018.}

50. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration registration went ahead before an agreement was reached with regard to a quota of armed groups for integration into security and defence forces. Integration is supposed to be gradual, follow established criteria and take place after a common vision on reconstituted army and territorial police is elaborated.\footnote{Deadline: September 2018.} To that end a high-level workshop on security sector reform was held from 27 to 29 March but, according to the independent observer, no concrete measures were taken and key decisions were postponed to a future date.\footnote{The Carter Center, “Report of the Independent Observer”.} In the absence of a common vision, no progress has been achieved on either the identification or redeployment of former members of the Malian Defence and Security forces.\footnote{Deadline: April 2018. Meeting with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Bamako, 7 June 2018.} Some 900 combatants are estimated to fall into that category.\footnote{Meeting with the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Bamako, 30 March 2018.} An additional difficulty is the fact that armed group representatives demand that rank progression and privileges during desertion be considered.\footnote{Meeting with signatory armed groups, Gao, 20 June 2018; meetings with MINUSMA, Gao and Bamako, 20 and 22 June 2018.}

**E. Financing the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and its economic, social and cultural development component**

51. The Government declares that it has mobilized and spent a total of 143 billion CFA francs ($286 million) on the implementation of the Agreement from 2015 to June 2018.\footnote{Mali, Ministry of Economy and Finance, “Note technique relative au point sur la mise en œuvre de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation”, 6 July 2018, archived at the Secretariat.} That amount has covered items mentioned in the Agreement under the economic development area, such as emergency plans for the north, as well as...
as items under other areas, including the creation of the new regions of Taoudenni and Ménaka and the financing of the Operational Coordination Mechanism.

52. The budget forecasted for implementation in 2018 is 50 per cent higher compared with 2017, but actual spending represents 74 per cent of what was budgeted for 2015–2017.\(^{58}\) Foreseen expenditures under the Fonds pour le développement durable (sustainable development fund) are mostly responsible for the projected increase.

**Development zone for the northern regions**

53. The single priority action under the economic development component of the Agreement concerns the creation of a development zone for the northern regions. According to the Agreement, the development zone is based on a development strategy and financed through the sustainable development fund.\(^{59}\) A concept note for the development zone has been drafted by the Government and transmitted to the signatory armed groups, but at the time of a meeting of a subcommittee of the Agreement Monitoring Committee on 21 June a formal response was still pending.\(^{60}\) A legislative text is foreseen by November 2018, as indicated in the March road map.

54. While the development zone has yet to be created, the legislative text establishing the sustainable development fund was adopted in Parliament and promulgated by the President on 12 February 2018.\(^{61}\) The Council of Ministers also signed the implementing decree establishing the modalities organizing and managing the fund. However, those modalities have not yet been elaborated. Therefore, at the time of writing, the decree had not been published in the official journal.

55. The sustainable development fund was initially intended to help finance regional development projects in the north, but the focus of the fund was changed in Parliament to facilitate equal development of all regions in Mali.\(^{62}\) The fund is to be partly financed through Government subsidies and partly through revenues generated from compulsory levies and taxes on airline tickets, cotton exports and tobacco sales.

56. In July 2017, the International Monetary Fund had advised against new export taxes and levies targeting specific sectors\(^{63}\) such as cotton. Though the budget for the sustainable development fund was initially set at 100 billion CFA francs

\(^{58}\) Calculated from Mali, Ministry of Economy and Finance, “Note technique relative au point sur la mise en œuvre de l’Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation”, 23 October 2017, archived at the Secretariat.

\(^{59}\) See S/2015/364, annex, chap. 2, art. 5 (Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali emanating from the Algiers process).

\(^{60}\) “Compte-rendu du Sous-comité pour le développement économique, social et culturel (SC-DESC)”, 21 June 2018, archived at the Secretariat.


\(^{62}\) Meeting with parliamentarians, Bamako, 18 March 2018.

($200 million), the amount was reduced to 40 billion CFA francs in the 2018 budget.  

57. Although the financing mechanism was only created in early 2018, during the 2015–2017 period the Government had already budgeted 73 billion CFA francs ($146 million) earmarked for the sustainable development fund, representing 43 per cent of the Government budget dedicated to implementing the Agreement. However, 13.4 billion CFA francs ($28.8 million) was eventually spent on dam construction, electricity and drinking water projects. Those projects were considered as advances from the fund, pending the legislation creating it. The budgeted but not mobilized fund is mostly responsible for the difference between the forecasted and spent total budget for implementing the Agreement during the 2015–2017 period.

58. CMA has expressed dissatisfaction over the peace dividends for the north emanating from the Agreement, referring to the amounts budgeted for the sustainable development fund that were never mobilized. The Government dedicated large amounts under the fund on paper, but that was before the fund was created, thereby raising expectations that could not be met. Considering that implementing modalities for the fund have not been developed, there is a real risk that the larger part of the 40 billion CFA francs budgeted for 2018 will, once again, not be mobilized.

**Financing of interim authorities**

59. Assuring the effective functioning of interim authorities for the two regions being created, specifically Taoudenni and Ménaka, has been a priority under the January timeline and March road map under the institutional component of the Agreement. For 2018, close to 9 billion CFA francs ($18 million) is reserved for the interim authorities in the Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Taoudenni and Ménaka regions as part of a national fund for support to territorial administrations. The operationalization of the new regions of Taoudenni and Ménaka, budgeted at 3.6 billion CFA francs ($7.2 million) was largely financed through the fund. More

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66 Mali, Ministry of Economy and Finance, “Note technique relative au point sur la mise en œuvre de l’Accord”. Calculated across different categories of expenditures and for the entire 2015–2017 period, 74 per cent of the budgeted amount for implementation of the Agreement was actually spent.

67 Mali, Ministry of Economy and Finance, “Note technique relative au point sur la mise en œuvre de l’Accord”.

68 Meeting with the Director General of Budget of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Bamako, 22 June 2018.

69 Meeting with CMA representatives, Bamako, 15 February 2018.

than 1 billion CFA francs, mostly for project funding in the five regions, was allocated from the national fund but not mobilized.\textsuperscript{71}

60. Part of the difficulty of mobilizing finances dedicated to support interim authorities is the absence of public accounting officers assigned by the central treasury at the level of the regional administrations. The President of the interim authority in Gao told the Panel that by March 2018 there was no accounting officer assigned to withdraw funds and that no donations had been allocated to the interim authority.\textsuperscript{72} According to the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Gao did not apply for project funding from the fund.\textsuperscript{73} Other regions had applied for project funds, which were allocated but not mobilized. Only funds allocated for a project in Timbuktu were mobilized.\textsuperscript{74}

\section*{F. Reconciliation, justice and humanitarian component}

\textbf{Draft law for national reconciliation}

61. In line with the Agreement\textsuperscript{75} and recommendations arising from the Conférence d'entente nationale,\textsuperscript{76} subsequently outlined in the Charter for Peace, Unity and National Reconciliation,\textsuperscript{77} the Government has put forward a draft law on national reconciliation.\textsuperscript{78} The draft proposal of the law has drawn criticism and concerns from human rights organizations in the country, which are mainly of the view that the Government is paving the way towards exonerating alleged perpetrators of serious crimes.\textsuperscript{79} The Panel was informed that the Government would hear concerns on the draft law before it was promulgated into law.\textsuperscript{80} The Agreement is categorical in that it does not provide amnesty for the authors of war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious violations of human rights. In that sense, article 4 of the draft law is equally clear that alleged perpetrators of those crimes are excluded from any amnesty.

\section*{IV. Armed groups and attacks against the Malian army}

62. As outlined on 9 February 2018, during the presentation of its programme of work to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali, the Panel researched alleged connections between compliant armed groups with terrorist armed groups listed under the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list in accordance with the Panel’s mandate.

63. The Panel investigated several incidents and collected information indicating that some individual members of compliant armed groups had been involved in terrorist activities, notably in one attack against Malian Defence and Security Forces which was later claimed by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Those

\textsuperscript{71} Mali, Ministry of Territorial Administration, “Synthèse de la rencontre du Ministre des collectivités territoriales avec les autorités intérimaires sur le point de la mobilisation des ressources financières mises à disposition”, archived at the Secretariat.
\textsuperscript{72} Meeting with interim authorities in Gao, 20 March 2018.
\textsuperscript{73} Mali, Ministry of Territorial Administration, “Synthèse de la rencontre du Ministre des collectivités territoriales avec les autorités”.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} The Agreement, article 47.
\textsuperscript{76} Bamako, 27 March–2 April 2017.
\textsuperscript{77} Of 20 June 2017.
\textsuperscript{78} Mali, “Loi d’Entente Nationale”.
\textsuperscript{79} Meeting and correspondence with human right organizations, Bamako, 12 and 19 June 2018.
\textsuperscript{80} Meeting at Ministry of Justice, Bamako, 22 June 2018.
case studies are presented below in the context of armed groups dynamics and geopolitics, at the regional and local levels.

A. Ménaka region and east of Ansongo cercle of the Gao region

64. The situations in the region of Ménaka and in the eastern areas of the Ansongo cercle of the Gao region remain very tense. Conflicts centre either on tribe or fraction (infratribe) affiliation and local geopolitics, such as control of political positions (armed groups, formal institutions, community leadership, etc.) and geography (trade and smuggling routes, transhumance tracks, checkpoints, grazing lands, wells, etc.). The conflicts are increasingly polarized between the two sides of the ongoing offensive on État islamique du Grand Sahara (EIGS), a local branch of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), led by international forces (Operation Barkhane and Operation Sabre).

65. The dominant tribe in the Ménaka region is the Daoussak, and the main minority groups are the Tuaregs Imghad, Chamanamas and Ichadinharen, and the Iskakna fraction of Tilemsi Arabs. The Bellah — among whom the Iboguilitane represent a large group — the Fulani and the sédentaires (mostly Haoussas and few Songhai) compose most of the black and mixed (black/Tuareg) population. Conflicts between the Daoussak and the Tuaregs, the Daoussak and the Iboguilitane, and the Daoussak/Tuareg tribes and the Fulani have been frequent in the Ménaka region for the past 30 years.

66. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons since the second Tuareg rebellion, which started in Ménaka in 1990, has progressively aggravated the intensity of such conflicts and the number of casualties has consequently increased in recent years, in parallel with the exploitation of ethnic-based conflicts by armed groups.

67. The Daoussak tribe is currently rigidly divided among lines defined by fractions and armed group affiliations. While some significant fractions are still supporting the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad of the Daoussak (MSA-D) led by former MNLA spokesperson Moussa Ag Acharatoumane since its inception as a splinter group of MNLA on 2 September 2016, other fractions either remained with MNLA — notably in the Talataye area (Daoussaks from Ansongo) — or have more recently joined HCUA, in a context of increasing pressure from EIGS and following the visit of Alghabass Ag Intalla to the Ménaka region in December 2017, as in the case of the Idoguiritane fraction led by Siguidi Ag Madit and of Almahmoud Ag Hamataha, Mayor of Inékar, from the Agokan fraction.

68. Many Daoussaks are also known to be holding key military positions within EIGS leadership, such as its deputy leader, Al Mahmoud Ag Baye, also known as Ikaray; Mohamed Ag Almounier, also known as Tinka; and Almahmoud Ag...
Akawkaw, also known as Royal, or have been simply recruited as foot soldiers. Arabs from the Tilemsi community are also present in the EIGS katiba Salah Eddine of Ahmed Ould Badi, also known as Sultan Ould Badi, operating in eastern Gao (communes rurales of Djebok and Anchawadj) and Indelimane areas, and his deputy Boubacar Ould Abidine, also known as Bouba, who is more active in the Talatayye area.

69. The main political actors in the newly created region of Ménaka are: the aménokal (traditional leader) of the Oulemiden (Iwllemmeden) and Member of Parliament Bajan Ag Hamatou, traditionally close to the fraction Idoguiritane of the Daoussaks; the Governor, Daouda Maïga, who originates from Tidermene and was instrumental in the constitution of the GATIA/MSA-D alliance and the return of GATIA in Ménaka on 27 October 2017 (Daouda Maïga is reportedly close to GATIA General Gamou, also born in Tidermene); and Abdoul Wahab Ag Ahmed Mohamed, President of the interim authority, known to be close to Moussa Ag Acharatoumane of MSA-D.

Conflict between the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad and the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs allies/Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad of the Daoussak in Tidermene

70. In the new cercle of Tidermene (north of the Ménaka region), international forces reported to the Panel the presence of a high density of cattle and nomadic peoples, with many Tuareg camps concentrated around wells at the end of the période de soudure (the “hunger gap” or lean season), and significant commercial traffic of pickup and dump trucks carrying passengers and commercial goods from the Niger and the Ménaka region to the Kidal region.

71. Tidermene, a strategic hub on the road from the Niger to Algeria, located between Ménaka and the Kidal region, was the first stop of the leader of HCUA, Alghabass Ag Intalla, on his mission to the Ménaka area in December 2017. Most of the population hails from the Tuareg Ichadinharen tribe, led by chef de fraction Hamma Ag Mahaha, and includes some Chamanamas, Daoussaks and Imghads, among others. The Mayor, Midoua Ag Houda, and the local representative since 10 April 2016 of HCUA, Mohamed Lamine Ag Tambaraye, are also Ichadinharen.

72. International forces observed intense activity by compliant armed groups in the area (mainly MSA-D and MNLA), including numerous checkpoints and frequent movements of three-vehicle convoys, in a region that has experienced fierce fighting

85 Ag Akawkaw was arrested on 4 June 2018 in Indiatafène (commune d’Akabar, on the border with the Niger) during the Koufra 4 operation (formed with units from MSA-D, GATIA, the Malian armed forces, the armed forces of the Niger and Barkhane/Sabre); both Ikaray and Royal are from the Idoguiritane faction.
86 His brothers Aman and Baye would also be members of his katiba; the family is a mix of Arab Ahel Taleb and Tuareg Taghat Mellet.
87 Also known as Ould Awebidine, Abwidine, Ould Waididine or Abouba Ag Amidine, from the Ahel Taleb faction.
88 During a meeting in Kidal with the Panel on 12 May 2018, Bilal Ag Chérif stated that CMA did not have forces in Ménaka.
89 The hunger gap — période de soudure — defines the end of the dry season, after the supplies from the previous harvest are exhausted but before the next harvest.
between GATIA/MSA-D and HCUA since early 2017. The presence of a terrorist armed group (EIGS) was also reported by the population.

73. Following the agreement signed on 1 July 2018 in Bamako, the presidency of the interim authorities for the cercle was given to CMA. However, the killing in Ikadéouane (25 kilometres south-west of Tidermene) of Mohamed Ag Baka, an MSA-D officer known as Intawdoute, on 15 April 2018, indicate that tensions remain high in the area.

Alleged involvement of an individual affiliated with the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad in the assassination of members of the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs allies and the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad in Ménaka and Anderamboukane

74. On 15 October 2017, MSA-D commander Adim Ag Albachar was killed in his house in Ménaka town alongside two other fighters, allegedly by an EIGS commando led by Ikaray. On 18 December 2017, Operation Barkhane arrested Amyata Ag Iddine and Hima Ag Seydaha on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities. The same day, CMA issued a communiqué stating that the two youths were relatives of CMA coordinator Siguidi Ag Madit and that their arrest was the result of a manipulation by “people in need of popularity”.

75. On 6 January 2018, a GATIA position in Anderamboukane was attacked around 5 a.m. by assailants in three vehicles and on several motorbikes, killing four GATIA members and taking their weapons. Prior to the attack, the attackers had destroyed the mobile network antenna, interrupting mobile communications. Eyewitnesses then accused Mohamed Ag Siguidi of being the commander leading the attack.

76. Mohamed Ag Siguidi is the son of Siguidi Ag Madit, CMA coordinator for Ménaka, HCUA representative, chef de fraction of the Idoguiritane of the Daoussak and conseiller communal of Ménaka, who has been historically close to Bajan Ag Hamatou.

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90 A United Nations report from 10 February 2017 indicates that GATIA commander Alhamdi Ag Lengach raided Tidermene several times, with the aim of forcing the Ichadinharen community to withdraw their support to HCUA. In a communiqué, CMA also denounced MSA operations in the region. Despite the handover by General Gamou himself to Hamma Ag Mahaha, during a filmed ceremony, of the eight vehicles stolen by Ag Lengach (available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=GTV1_YKvPS8&index=2&list=PLPFvgGojmbTmXbBmavT6LjkI-UrhshD&t=101s), the latter was nevertheless later assassinated in Ménaka town on 17 March 2017.

91 Meeting with international forces commander, Kidal, 13 May 2018, returning from a long-range patrol in the area April–May 2018.

92 Meeting with international forces, Ménaka, 21 March 2018; meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 25 April 2018; telephone conversation with a GATIA commander, 8 July 2018. According to those sources, Mohamed Ag Siguidi provided assistance to the EIGS commando and participated in the operation.

93 CMA implicitly accuses Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, leader of MSA-D, of manipulating Operation Barkhane for its own interests and agenda; see annex VI for copy of the communiqué. Conflicting communiqués between CMA and MSA are common; see, e.g., the reported abduction of Siguidi Ag Madit by MSA, that was denied by the MSA, which presented the case as a family matter; on this topic, see Niarela, “CMA et MSA-GATIA: la guerre des mots”, available at https://niarela.net/nord-mali/cma-et-msa-gatia-la-guerre-des-mots.

94 Confidential report dated 10 January 2018; a media article accessed at http://bamada.net/premiere-attaque-2 lists three of the victims as Alhassane Ag Issidaye, Adim Ag Hamzata and Almoktar Ag Khammidi; a GATIA press communiqué published on Twitter and accessed at https://twitter.com/maboulmaaly/status/95008656818582528 dates the attack to the night of 4 and 5 January 2018.

95 Meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 7 June 2018.
On 11 January 2018 at 3 a.m., Operation Barkhane arrested Mohamed Ag Siguidi in his father’s compound in Ménaka town. Two AK-type assault rifles were found in his possession. He was arrested alongside a member of the national guard of Mali named Hadacheq Ag Hadalhassane, who was later released. Mohamed Ag Siguidi is suspected of having taken part in the attack on GATIA in Anderamboukane and of actively cooperating with EIGS. According to a statement from Operation Barkhane, equipment and documents were also seized and transferred to Bamako. Members of his family have denied publicly that he could be involved with terrorism.

As of early July, Mohamed Ag Siguidi was still jailed in Bamako. His case file, investigated by the prosecution services of the Specialized Judicial Unit to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime, was not yet finalized.

The commune rurale of Talataye (Gao region, cercle of Ansongo), mostly populated by Daoussak, is also an important commercial hub for nomads, known for its weekly market days (foire) and as a stronghold for terrorist armed groups. Its Mayor, a Daoussak named Salah Ag Ahmed, was presented to the Panel by several independent sources as a prominent member of HCUA, close to Iyad Ag Ghali, listed under QDe.316 in the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list and a liaison officer with Ansar Eddine and EIGS. He should now be in Kidal.

During his detention from 23 January to 11 February 2018, the Mayor of Tarkint, Baba Ould Cheikh, from the Arab community of the Tilemsi valley, was held in the region of Talataye by EIGS, and Boubacar Ould Abidine, also known as Boub, would have been the jailer. The EIGS branch in Talataye is composed of Arabs from the Tilemsi region, Fulanis and some Sahrawis, including the brother of Lehbib Ould Ali Ould Said Ould Joumani, known as Adnan Abu Walid Al Sahrawi.

Confidential reports also indicate that, on 17 and 18 November 2017, Salah Ag Ahmed met with Abdallah Ag Albakaye, a senior Ansar Eddine commander based in the cercle of Tessalit in charge of the liaison and coordination between JNIM and

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96 The first weapon is a T-56 assault rifle, registration No. 3767600, and originates from the Malian Defence and Security Forces stockpiles. The second weapon is an AKMS assault rifle, registration No. H39877, also possibly originating from Malian stocks.


98 A media article quotes Ag Siguidi’s cousin, Moustapha Ag Mohamed, who stated that his cousin was not a terrorist, see “Mali: Barkhane capture des membres présumés de groupes armés”, Le Figaro, 11 January 2018, available at www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2018/01/11/97001-20180111FILWWW00333-mali-barkhane-capture-des-membres-presumes-de-groupes-armes.php.

99 Meeting with confidential source, 7 March 2018; meeting with regional authorities, Ménaka, 21 March 2018; meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 25 April 2018; a video posted on Facebook of an Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision du Mali report in Talataye on 6 May 2017 interviews the First Deputy Mayor, Farok Ag Fakana, introducing him as the Mayor.

100 Meeting with confidential source personally involved in the abduction case; according to Mohamed Lamin El Bouhali, former Defence Minister of the self-proclaimed Sahrawi republic (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic), in a statement to Spanish newspaper ABC España, 11 August 2018, available at https://www.abc.es/20120811/espana/abci-polisario-alqaida-201208111729.html.
The same reports indicate that the Talataye mosque preaches a very rigorous vision of Islam, influencing social behaviours in the entire commune, as observed by international forces. On 1 March 2018, Alhader Ag Aguidid, an officer from MSA-D, was killed in Talataye market by Ikaray. The MSA-D issued a communiqué denouncing the assassination, and then CMA issued a communiqué a few hours later stating that Aguidid had been killed by CMA elements while attacking their positions at Talataye market, giving credence to a second MSA-D communiqué stating that CMA was responsible for the killing.

On 2 February 2018, in Inouélane, 20 kilometres east of Talataye, the village was attacked by two vehicles and several motorbikes reportedly led by Boubà, from EIGS. Five civilians were killed, including a well-known Daoussak marabout named Tidjit. However, Salah Ag Ahmed, in an interview to local media, declared that it was a revenge killing following the assassination of a Fulani by Daoussaks from Inouélane, and not a terrorist act.

The Talataye area is known for incidents related to the use of improvised explosive devices on attacks involving vehicles owned by compliant armed groups, an asymmetrical military technique usually only used against international forces. On 8 May 2018, one GATIA commander was killed in his vehicle by the explosion of an improvised explosive device in Ahina, a commune in Anchawadj. On 1 July 2018, a MSA-D vehicle hit an improvised explosive device in the centre of Talataye village, killing four combatants and wounding three. The village of Ahina, located 40 kilometres east of Djebok, a GATIA stronghold under the command of Habib Ag Talahit, was attacked twice in December 2017.

Confidential reports dated 24 November 2017 and 22 December 2017 indicate that Malian armed forces defector Colonel Malick Ag Wanansate, the Ansar Eddine katiba leader for Ménaka also known as Abou Tayib, was also in charge of liaising with EIGS, notably Sultan Ould Badi in the Indelimane area, and met for the last time with Salah Ag Ahmed in December 2017 during Alghabass’s visit to Talataye and Ménaka. Ag Wanansate was killed on 14 February 2018 during a Sabre operation in Tinzawaten, during which about 20 alleged members of JNIM were neutralized; France, Ministry of Defence, “Barkhane: mise hors de combat d’une vingtaine de terroristes au Nord Mali”, press communiqué, 14 February 2018, available at www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/sahel/actualites/barkhane-mise-hors-de-combat-d-une-vingtaine-de-terroristes-au-nord-mali; a JNIM communiqué published following a complex attack in Ouagadougou on 2 March 2018 indicated that other JNIM military commanders killed during the French operation included Mohamed Ould Nouini, also known as Hassan Al Ansari, leader of Al Mourabitoun; Abdallah Ag Oufata, also known as Abou Oumar, former Mayor of Boughessa; Sidi Mohamed Ag Ougana, also known as Abou Habib; Cheikh Abou Ahmad al-Fullani, Macina katiba commander; and Tariq Al-Soufi, an Algerian national, according to Menastream (see https://twitter.com/menastream/status/970255650138869761?lang=fr).

Meeting with international forces, Kidal, 13 May 2018.

See annex VII for copies of the three communiqués.

Only one occurrence was reported of such a tactic, technique or procedure being used in recent conflicts between terrorist armed groups and compliant armed groups: on 10 January 2018, in Kidal, where an improvised explosive device targeted the vehicle of Asseda Ag Almostapha, a senior commander of the Coordination sécuritaire des mouvements de l’Azawad à Kidal and member of the MNLA counter-terrorism task force, whose name is included alongside 11 other MNLA members in a kill-list flyer put up in Kidal town on 10 December 2017 by Ansar Eddine (a first list was already put up on 22 October 2017); a copy of the flyer is archived at the Secretariat.

According to two videos posted on social media by the Salah Eddine of EIGS on 23 and 24 June 2018, the attacks on 10 and 22 December 2017 against GATIA in Ahina were conducted in response to GATIA/MSA counter-terrorism operations; see Menastream post available at http://menastream.com/katiba-salaheddine-response-to-aggression/.

103 Confidential reports dated 24 November 2017 and 22 December 2017 indicate that Malian armed forces defector Colonel Malick Ag Wanansate, the Ansar Eddine katiba leader for Ménaka also known as Abou Tayib, was also in charge of liaising with EIGS, notably Sultan Ould Badi in the Indelimane area, and met for the last time with Salah Ag Ahmed in December 2017 during Alghabass’s visit to Talataye and Ménaka. Ag Wanansate was killed on 14 February 2018 during a Sabre operation in Tinzawaten, during which about 20 alleged members of JNIM were neutralized; France, Ministry of Defence, “Barkhane: mise hors de combat d’une vingtaine de terroristes au Nord Mali”, press communiqué, 14 February 2018, available at www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/operations/sahel/actualites/barkhane-mise-hors-de-combat-d-une-vingtaine-de-terroristes-au-nord-mali; a JNIM communiqué published following a complex attack in Ouagadougou on 2 March 2018 indicated that other JNIM military commanders killed during the French operation included Mohamed Ould Nouini, also known as Hassan Al Ansari, leader of Al Mourabitoun; Abdallah Ag Oufata, also known as Abou Oumar, former Mayor of Boughessa; Sidi Mohamed Ag Ougana, also known as Abou Habib; Cheikh Abou Ahmad al-Fullani, Macina katiba commander; and Tariq Al-Soufi, an Algerian national, according to Menastream (see https://twitter.com/menastream/status/970255650138869761?lang=fr).

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108 According to two videos posted on social media by the Salah Eddine of EIGS on 23 and 24 June 2018, the attacks on 10 and 22 December 2017 against GATIA in Ahina were conducted in response to GATIA/MSA counter-terrorism operations; see Menastream post available at http://menastream.com/katiba-salaheddine-response-to-aggression/.
forces in Djebok observed GATIA preparing some 20 armed pickup trucks to conduct a counteroffensive.109

Visit of Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad leader to Tidermene, Talataye and Ménaka in December 2017

85. According to detailed confidential reports,110 Alghabass Ag Intalla left Kidal on 5 December 2017 in a convoy consisting of 23 vehicles, with some pickup trucks mounted with heavy-machine guns. The convoy was not announced to international forces in Kidal, as required by the rules of the Technical Commission on Security on heavy weapons and convoys (see para. 47 above).

86. The Secretary-General of HCUA first stopped in Tidermene on 6 December and then in Talataye on 7 December, to meet in both locations with local authorities, representatives of armed groups and members of terrorist armed groups, according to those same reports.

87. On 8 December 2017, the convoy eventually reached the vicinity of Ménaka town with roughly 65 vehicles. The additional vehicles, presumably those of Daoussaks from various groups opposed to MSA-D, would likely have joined the convoy in Talataye and Tidermene.

88. Alghabass entered Ménaka town with a convoy of 23 vehicles, leaving around 40 vehicles in the outskirts of the town, which GATIA and MSA-D perceived as an attempt to intimidate their respective constituencies.111 In response, both General Gamou and Moussa Ag Acharatoumane did not attend the meeting of local authorities convened, including the Governor, the Minister of Parliament for Ménaka and the President of the interim authority. On its way back to Kidal, the convoy stopped again in Talataye. It reached Kidal on 12 December with 38 vehicles, including some mounted with 12.7-mm calibre machine guns, without informing MINUSMA of the movement.

89. Despite allegations that a shared strategy was being implemented following Alghabass’s visit to the Ménaka region in December 2017 and reported meetings with members of terrorist armed groups, the Panel found no evidence documenting a connection between CMA and terrorist armed groups in the Ménaka and Gao regions.

B. Timbuktu and Taoudenni regions

90. The Timbuktu and Taoudenni regions are populated by Kel Antessar Tuareg tribes (plus Imghads and Imouchagh in the Gourma region and in Ber), Arabs from the Bérabiche community — plus a minority of Kounta Arabs — Bellah, Fulani and sédentaires mainly from the Songhai community. The latter live predominantly on the banks of the Niger river and in the main urban centres.

Taoudenni

91. The region of Taoudenni is a land settled by the Arabs, with the presence of some Tuareg tribes in the south, and the seasonal presence of Songhai, who extract salt in Taoudenni itself.112 The geopolitics of the Taoudenni region concern mainly the control of trade routes with Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, traditionally

109 Confidential report, undated.
110 Confidential reports dated 11 December 2017 and 13 January 2018.
111 Meetings with MSA and GATIA representatives, Bamako, 15 June 2018.
112 The salt mines of Taoudenni are located 650 kilometres north of Timbuktu, and have been exploited since 1585, according to J. Clauzel, L’exploitation des salines de Taoudenni (Algiers, Institut de Recherches Sahariennes, Université d’Alger, 1960).
controlled by the Bérabiche. Sahrawi traders are also reported in northern Taoudenni, notably during the salt extraction season.

92. In terms of the influence of compliant armed groups, the region is mostly divided between three groups:

- The MAA-Plateforme of Mohamed Taher Ould Elhadj, an Arab from the Oulad Bouhanda fraction known as Tahar, Mayor of the commune rurale of Salam and Second Vice-President of the Taoudenni interim authority, is based in the village of Atila (13 kilometres north of Timbuktu);
- The MAA-Plateforme of Ahmed Ould Sidi Ahmed, known as Boda or Bouda, is based in Likrarar (20 kilometres north of Timbuktu);
- The MAA-CMA of Hussein Ould Al Moctar, a Malian army defector known as Colonel Goulam, based in Ber, holds the administrative seat of the commune of Salam, in the Agouni region.

93. MNLA is officially represented in Taoudenni by Ahmad Ag Gheria (Imghad tribe) and Mohamed Abdurahmane, a Tuareg Sherifen.

**Timbuktu**

94. The dynamics of armed groups in Timbuktu have a very complex history, characterized by division, shifting alliances and fragmentation. The current landscape is as follows:

- MAA-CMA: based in Ber, under the political leadership of Ould Sidatti and the military command of Goulam
- MAA-Plateforme: limited presence in Lerneb under the command of Colonel Mahmoud Ould Jeyid, Léré and Hassi-Labia (border with Mauritania), and in northern Gourma
- HCUA-CMA: based in Koygouma, under the leadership of Ahmedou Ag Abdallah, who served as cadi (Islamic judge) of Goundam during the jihadist rule in Timbuktu, now a member of the interim authority of Timbuktu; commanded by Abdallah Ag Ahmedou, known as Amma, with other bases reported in Fatakara and Ebang Malén
- Congrès pour la justice dans l’Azawad (CJA)-CMA: based in Gargando, with presences in Farach and Raz el Ma, under the command of Alghabass Ag Mohamed Ahmed, a Kel Antessar known as Colonel Abass; CJA was originally a splinter group from HCUA, which reintegrated CMA on 31 March 2018 following a community meeting in Zahro led by the aménokal of the Kel Antessar, Abdoul Majid Ag Mohamed Ahmed, known as Nasser

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113 In addition to the salt trade from Taoudenni, for which the Kounta, allied with the Tormoz, and the Bérabiche, have been fighting since the 18th century, one of the most lucrative trades was tobacco from Morocco; Rita Aouad-Badoual “Réseaux d’échange des maures bérabishs de l’azawad a l’époque coloniale”, in Institut de recherches et d’études sur le monde arabe et musulman, *Touaregs et autres sahariens entre plusieurs mondes* (Aix-en-Provence, 1996).

114 Designated in 2015 following the death of his uncle Mohamed El-Mehdi Ag Attaher El-Ansari, the new aménokal of the Kel Antessar has been trying since his nomination to reinforce his authority over different communities in the Timbuktu region. Nasser is also the brother of Colonel Abass of CJA.
• CJA-CME: splinter group from CJA, led from Mauritania by former Minister Hama Ag Mahmoud, with some elements in Er Entéguéf (70 kilometres east of Timbuktu)

• Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad (CPA)-CME: splinter group from MNLA led by Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune, under the military command of Alkassoum Ag Abdoulaye, officially based in Soumpi, but with a sizeable base in Echel, and with presences in Acharane and Zouara

• GATIA-Plateforme: was the main armed group in the Gourma region, under the leadership of Mohamed Issouf Ag Gallesse, president of the council of the cercle of Gourma Rharous

• Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance II: a splinter group of the Plateforme, mostly composed of sédentaires and Fulanis; armed elements are manning checkpoints in villages located on the banks of the Niger river; they also have bases in Mbouna (25 kilometres west of Bintagoungou), and Léré; under the overall command of former Ganda Izo leader Mohamed Atayoub Sidibé; largely aligned with the Kel Razzaf of CPA and HCUA Koygouma

95. The main terrorist armed group operating in the regions of Timbuktu and Taoudenni is the Al-Furqan katiba of AQIM. It is reportedly mainly based in the Alwasra area north of Lake Fagibina. Since the 1990s, the Arab fraction of the Alwasra has been connected to Algerian jihadists, although Oulad Idriss also hosted some prominent AQIM members such as Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who married a woman from Lerneb. Its units are very mobile, and it is feared and influential throughout the regions of Timbuktu and Taoudenni.

96. In the Gourma region, the terrorist armed group of Almansour Ag Alkassoum, known as AAA katiba, is mainly composed of former MUJAO Arab, Fulani and Tuareg Imouchagh and Imghad. He is believed to originate from Mandiakoy (located 40 kilometres west of Rharous in the commune urbaine of Séréré). The group could be pivotal with regard to connecting the different components of JNIM in central Mali and the regions of Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal and Ménaka.

The rise of the Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad-Coordination des mouvements de l’entente

97. Following his signature of the Agreement on 15 May 2015, Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune, a Tuareg Kel Razzaf, took leadership of CPA, a splinter group of...
MNLA in Ber. First based in Acharane, CPA then set up its official main base in Soumpi, occupying buildings located next to the sous-préfet office, at the eastern entrance of the village, and manning all access checkpoints.

98. Mohamed Ousmane, who is also engaged in politics as a representative of the Convergence pour le développement du Mali political party in Timbuktu, has been very active in delaying the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in the Timbuktu and Gao regions, where he forged an alliance with the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad of the Chamanamas tribe (MSA-C). He was successful in imposing CME in the different mechanisms established by the Agreement, in particular the Operational Coordination Mechanism of Gao and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (see para. 26). CMA representatives denounced the situation to the Panel as a manoeuvre to introduce a fourth party into the Agreement and weaken the relevance of CMA even further.

99. In Timbuktu, Mohamed Ousmane facilitated the rehabilitation of Houka Ag Alhousseini, known as Houka, the former cadi of Timbuktu during the jihadist reign, from the Kel Tet faction. Houka is based in Zouara, officially as a teacher. Zouara is well known in the Timbuktu region for its weekly market days (foire), frequently used by AQIM as a platform to intimidate the population by displaying decapitated heads and distributing threatening leaflets, mainly against the leadership of CJA-CMA from neighbouring Gargando and Farach. Houka also took part in the founding congress of CME in Timaouker from 28 to 30 April 2018, to which he gave his blessing.

100. From 27 May to 10 June 2018, CPA positioned some 50 combatants and eight vehicles in a former Mouvement populaire pour le salut de l’Azawad base in Nebkit, located 20 kilometres south-west of Timbuktu on the main road to Goundam, to force its integration into the newly established Operational Coordination Mechanism of Timbuktu. At the time of writing, their demand had not been met.

Assassinations and death threats involving members of the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés

101. Several local leaders and representatives of the Government of Mali or members of the Malian Defence and Security Forces have been killed during the Panel’s mandate:

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119 Meeting with Mohamed Ousmane, Bamako, 19 February 2018.
121 Several CMA interlocutors accused Mohamed Ousmane of being manipulated by Malian State security; meetings with a CMA high official, Bamako, 12 February and 4 May 2018; meeting with local authorities, Timbuktu, 2 April 2018; meetings with CMA leadership, Kidal, 12 and 13 June 2018.
122 Confidential report, 4 March 2018.
123 On 10 December 2017, Abou Ag Oubeïda, also known as Aba Houbaydata Ag Amalou, the CJA chef de poste in Farac'h, was killed alongside three other CJA combatants and four civilians (forrains) during an attack claimed by JNIM. The terrorist armed group alleged in its communiqué that Oubeïda was cooperating closely with international forces (the mountains east of Farac'h were likely being used by AQIM as a hideout). CJA leadership in Farac'h and Gargando have been targeted by AQIM since at least 11 May 2016 with varying intensity, which peaked on 23 August 2016 when AQIM took over Farac'h for one evening and on 8 April 2017 when AQIM attacked the CJA main base in Gargando, killing the chef de village and five CJA combatants.
124 Meeting with representatives of CME, Gao, 20 June 2018.
125 See photographs of CPA forces in annex VIII.
126 Email communication with MINUSMA official, 10 July 2018.

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• Five members of the national guard of Mali, including four in Gossi (one named Ziyad Ag Ibrahim, who was reportedly close to GATIA, on 16 September 2017, one on 6 November 2017 and two others at the Gossi market on 4 February 2018) and a fifth, Mama Ould Moulay Gouba, in Inadiatafane on 8 November 2017

• Hamada Ag Mohamed, a member of the Imouchagh community, on 16 May 2018 at his home in Tinhabou (50 kilometres north-east of Douentza)

• Youssouf Ag Noh, a GATIA commander known as Akhalchoch, on 15 April 2018 in a mechanic’s garage in Gossi

• Alhassane Ag Ibrahim, sous-préfet of Ouinerden, at his home in Gossi on 29 April 2018

102. Those killings took place within the very specific context of the withdrawal in early 2018 of all checkpoints manned by MAA-Plateforme and GATIA in northern Gourma, which were mainly located on the road from Aglal to Rharous and in Inadiatafane.127 Although a handwritten communiqué circulated on a social network claims that EIGS carried out some of the assassinations,128 most of the military pressure on compliant armed groups in northern Gourma is attributed to AAA katiba.

103. The two sons of GATIA leader Mohamed Issouf Ag Gallesse, Atta and Alnasser, have left Gossi during the past months to allegedly prevent the possibility of assassination.129 Death threats addressed to individuals collaborating with the Malian Defence and Security Forces and international forces are received on a regular basis by GATIA leadership in the Gourma region. Many of them are circulated through messaging applications by a preacher of Touareg origin (Ifoghas/Kel Ireyakkan), Hamala Ag Azbay, based in Timeiaouine, Algeria.130

104. The Panel also obtained video footage showing how a tribesman affiliated with a senior GATIA representative from the Gourma region was physically threatened by three armed men, presented to the Panel as members of the AAA katiba, whose faces were concealed by a tagelmust (a traditional garment worn by Tuareg men as a turban or veil). A few weeks later, the official reportedly announced publicly that he had left GATIA for HCUA.131

Defections from the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés to the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad in the Gourma region

105. In addition to the defections in Ménaka, as reported in paragraph 67 above, HCUA proudly communicated information regarding new defections in the Gourma

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127 It was also reported that the GATIA armed elements who left the Gourma region were actually redeployed first in the Ménaka region. They are, however, officially not engaged in the “Bani Fonda” operations that have been conducted in the Gourma region by Malian armed forces and Operation Barkhane since June 2018; meeting with a representative of Operation Barkhane, Bamako, 13 June 2018.


129 Meeting with a confidential source, Bamako, 7 June 2018.

130 The Panel intended twice to travel to Algeria to discuss, among other topics, this case (see para. 5). Audio messages from Hamala are archived at the Secretariat.

131 The Panel is of the opinion that more details on this case may endanger its confidential source; meeting with a confidential source, Bamako, 7 June 2018. The video footage and contact record of the meeting are archived at the Secretariat.
region in April and May 2018, mainly from GATIA, in addition to the one reported in paragraph 104 above.132

106. The Panel was provided with signed documents announcing a total of 22 defections from GATIA to HCUA, as follows:

- Thirteen in the commune rurale of Séréré on 24 April 2018, including the Mayor of Séré, Mohamed Ahmed Alhousseini, and the chef de village of Almansour’s reported birthplace, Madiakoye
- Two GATIA leaders in Aglal on 15 May 2018, including Abdoul Malick Ag Rhima, known as Ababa, second deputy to the Mayor of Lafia, and Mohamed Alher Ag Mohamedine
- Seven others, also on 15 May 2018, including the Mayors of Gossi, Mossa Ag Almouner, and Haribomo, Mohamed Elmedi Ag Rhissa, known as Infonia133

107. Those defections might be connected to the blockades at the Agreement Monitoring Committee related to the appointment of interim authorities in the Gourma region.

Participation of the chef d’état-major of the Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad in terrorist attacks against the Malian armed forces in Soumpi

108. On 24 October 2017, around 11.30 p.m., the Malian armed forces temporary military camp known as “the quarry” (la carrière), located 2,200 metres north of Soumpi to protect the construction of lot No. 2 of the road connecting Timbuktu to Niono, was attacked by a small group of assailants coming from south of the camp (from Soumpi).134 Two Malian armed forces soldiers from the Groupements tactiques interarmes (GTIA) 6 “Al Farouk”,135 based in Timbuktu, were killed, one was seriously injured, and 21 trucks contracted by the construction company Sogea-Satom to a local contractor were destroyed.136 The incident caused the interruption of the road construction, one of the main European Union-funded infrastructure projects aimed at improving access to northern Mali,137 which at the time of writing had not yet resumed, and resulted in the dismissal of all local employees.138
On 27 January 2018, during the morning prayer at around 5.30 a.m., the same camp was attacked again by a larger group of assailants, evaluated at about 30, coming from two directions (north and south). They rapidly took over the defensive positions surrounding the camp, in particular the watch towers mounted with 12.7-mm machine guns protected with sand bags. Some 17 Malian armed forces soldiers, of roughly 70 theoretically on duty, were killed, and 20 were wounded. A large quantity of weapons, military equipment and vehicles were seized — including six Malian armed forces trucks. The assailants fled towards the Attara area, 20 kilometres south of Soumpi, after being engaged by attack helicopters from Operation Barkhane.

Both attacks were claimed by JNIM. It also claimed that four of its soldiers were killed during the second attack, and released a long propaganda video which included footage of the Soumpi attack by AQIM military commander known as Haydara Al-Maghribi, killed by Operation Sabre on 31 March 2018 in the Alwasra area. A military commander of Ansar Eddine and a close aide of Iyad Ag Ghali, Colonel Ba Ag Moussa, a defector from the Malian armed forces, would have planned the operation. He was reportedly very active in late 2017 and January 2018 in the areas of the Ouagadou forest and Nampala, on the border with Mauritania, and in Niafounké.

The Panel collected credible information from several independent sources indicating that the military commander of CPA, Alkassoum Ag Abdoulaye, also personally participated in the two attacks against the Malian armed forces camp on 24 October 2017 and 27 January 2018.

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140 JNIM issued a communiqué on 26 October 2017 claiming responsibility for the attack on Soumpi camp on 24 October, among others; the JNIM al-Zallaqa Media Foundation posted six communiqués on Telegram on 29 January 2018 claiming responsibility for the Soumpi attack on 27 January and displaying photographs of seized weapons, equipment and vehicles.

141 Two of Arab origin, one Tuareg and one Fulani. A confidential source reported that four additional attackers were killed by Operation Barkhane while retreating to their hideout north of Soumpi, towards Echel; meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 19 June 2018. One of the four additional attackers hailed from Soumpi; meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 21 June 2018 (as cited in footnote 136).

142 For screenshots extracted from the video footage of Soumpi attack, see annex X.

143 Qutayba al-Ansari and Sheikh Abu Abdullah Ahmed al-Shinqiti were also killed during the same French operation, according to a JNIM communiqué released on 20 April 2018 claiming responsibility for the complex attack on the MINUSMA supercamp on 14 April 2018.

144 Meeting with confidential source, Mopti, 29 March 2018; confidential report dated 12 March 2017; meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 30 March 2018; meeting with former rebel commander, Timbuktu, 30 March 2018; meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 19 June 2018; Ba Ag Moussa, who is of mixed origin (Fulani and Tuareg Ifogha), would have been acting as liaison between Ansar Eddine and the Fulani katiba operating in the Mopti region and the Ouagadou forest (north of Ségou region), recruiting Fulani and passing instructions from Iyad Ag Ghali, and both would have also participated in the second attack on Soumpi, after a failed attack on the Malian armed forces camp in Youwarou (Mopti region, 50 kilometres south of Soumpi) on 25 January 2018.

145 Ba Ag Moussa was injured during a Sabre operation in Tinzawaten on 14 February 2018 and his presence has not been reported in the Timbuktu area since; meeting with confidential source, Kidal, 12 May 2018.

146 Meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 30 March 2018; meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 1 April 2018; meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 19 June 2018; meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 21 June 2018; confidential report, undated; confidential report, 19 July 2018.
112. Alkassoum Ag Abdoulaye\(^\text{147}\) is a Malian armed forces defector, with the rank of \textit{caporal}, from the village of Kassoum, located 8 kilometres east of Soumpi. He was reappointed on 22 September 2016 as CPA \textit{chef d’état-major},\(^\text{148}\) and was also designated second deputy of the military Chief of Staff of CME, Intalla Ag Assayid (MSA-C), during its founding congress organized in Tinaouker from 28 to 30 April 2018. He is likely to be close to CPA military commander Tanto Ag Hattaye, also known as Haman Taye, in the \textit{commune} of Adermalane.\(^\text{149}\)

113. Alkassoum would have been instrumental in coordinating with the katibas in the Mopti region, in particular those of Hamed Ahmed Ag Abdoulaye, based in the Nampala area, and of Hassan Diallo, active in the area of Attara (located 20 kilometres south of Soumpi and 30 kilometres north of Youwarou, on the bank of the Niger river), where attackers retreated after both assaults on the Malian armed forces camp near Soumpi. Diallo’s katiba would be protecting cattle owned by the Kel Razzaf,\(^\text{150}\) grazing mainly in \textit{bourgoutières} located in Mopti region and owned by the family of Ag Abdallah (HCUA Koygouma). Most of the transhumance has been handled in 2017 by the various katibas active in the northern region of Mopti, at a cost almost two times lower than the price previously paid to Government officials and \textit{dioros}, who traditionally manage grazing lands in Fulani society.\(^\text{151}\)

114. The area of Soumpi also experienced three improvised explosive device incidents against the Malian Defence and Security Forces and international forces. On 6 November 2017 at 9:30 a.m., a vehicle of the Malian armed forces that was part of a security detail for the Prime Minister of Mali struck a device on the road between Soumpi and the Malian armed forces camp. The planned route of the official visit. A second device was later discovered nearby and neutralized, delaying by one day the Prime Minister’s visit to the area. On 26 February 2018, a MINUSMA vehicle detonated an improvised explosive device\(^\text{152}\) in the outskirts of Soumpi, at a visible distance of 1,150 metres from the main CPA checkpoint and base.\(^\text{153}\)

115. Those incidents coincided with the reported presence of an improvised explosive device expert in Niafounké area, named Moktar, of Sahrawi origin.\(^\text{154}\) He has been identified as a member of MAA-CMA of Ber, and has been associated with Salem Becki, or Beki, commander of the Operational Coordination Mechanism of Timbuktu.

116. The information obtained does not indicate that Alkassoum would have acted based on ideology; rather, it is believed that Alkassoum’s main motivation would have been the opportunistic looting of weapons, ammunition and military equipment from the Malian armed forces in return for the facilitation of safe passage and support for

\(^{147}\) Also known as Alkasim or Alkasoum Ag Abdallah or Ag Abdallahi.

\(^{148}\) Alkassoum was introduced by CPA in 2015 as its operations coordinator based in Foïta (on the border with Mauritania, 60 kilometres south-west of Léré), and then as \textit{chef d’état-major}. See annex VIII for photographs of a military parade organised by CPA in Soumpi on this occasion, with around 60 fighters and a dozen vehicles, including some mounted with machine guns.

\(^{149}\) Meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 19 June 2018.

\(^{150}\) Meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 30 March 2018; meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 6 May 2018.

\(^{151}\) Ibid.

\(^{152}\) According to a confidential report dated 26 February 2018, archived at the Secretariat, the improvised explosive device was most likely a PRBM3 A1 mine with a charge of 5 to 10 kilograms.

\(^{153}\) See annex XI for the exact location of the improvised explosive device and the CPA checkpoint. According to local media, a truck contracted by Sogea-Satom also hit an improvised explosive device near Soumpi on 15 May 2017, see Mali-Web, “Tombouctou: un camion saute sur une mine, le chauffeur blessé”, 15 May 2017, available at 


\(^{154}\) Meeting with confidential source, Timbuktu, 19 June 2018; a photograph of Moktar is archived at the Secretariat and was shared with the relevant Member State for identification.
both attacks. Such a strategy would also explain the recurrence of attacks in the Soumpi area, despite the heavy presence of CPA, which included three incidents of improvised explosive devices and two attacks on the Malian armed forces camp in a period of four months.  

V. Organized crime

117. Pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 2374 (2017), the Panel conducted investigations into various forms of organized crime, focusing on the trafficking of narcotics, persons and arms and on the links to those threatening the Agreement. The involvement of armed groups in central and northern Mali in organized crime poses a serious impediment to the implementation of the Agreement, particularly when it involves competition between compliant armed group elements, or leads them to violently challenge Malian State authorities, MINUSMA and other international security presences. Furthermore, organized crime and human rights violations often overlap, particularly in the case of human trafficking.

A. Trafficking of narcotic drugs

Figures and trends

118. Narcotic drug trafficking in Mali involves: hard drugs, such as cocaine and derived products such as crack, and heroin; soft drugs, either cannabis herb (marijuana) or cannabis resin (hashish); synthetic drugs, notably the recreational drug tramadol and some methamphetamine; and counterfeit pharmaceuticals. Much attention has in the past been paid to role of Mali and West Africa in moving cocaine from Latin America to Europe, with the emblematic example of the “Air Cocaine” case in 2009, when a burned-out aircraft believed to have been transporting up to 10 tons of cocaine was found in the desert north of Gao.

119. Going by the quantities of seized cocaine, West Africa remains an important transit point, but is today much less important than it was a decade ago. According to UNODC, seizures of cocaine in West Africa increased from 0.8 tons in 1998 to 5.5 tons in 2007, before falling to 3.4 tons in 2010 and 1.2 tons in 2015.  At the height of cocaine trafficking in West Africa, an estimated 47 tons would have come through the region in 2007–2008, but that amount decreased to an estimated 23 tons from early 2015 to mid-2016.

120. In Mali, authorities seized 5 kilograms of cocaine and 10 kilograms of heroin in 2017 and 56 kilograms of crack in 2018. All were carried by drug mules intercepted in Bamako, who arrived on international flights into Bamako. It is not

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155 In a statement to local media, a Satom employee associated the deterioration of the security situation in 2017 with the deployment of GATIA “Al Farouk”, see Maliactu, “Mali: attaque terroriste de Niafunké–Iyad a-t-il bénéficié d’une complicité interne?”, 30 October 2017, available at http://maliactu.net/mali-attaque-terroriste-de-niafunke-iyad-a-t-il-beneficie-dune-complicite-interne/.


157 Confidential report of a Member State to the Security Council, June 2017, shared with the Panel on 16 May 2018.

158 UNODC also makes reference to 1.8 kilograms of cocaine Malian authorities seized on the road, but the seizure is not retained in data from the Central Office on Narcotics of the National Police, and from the article it is not clear where the seizure happened, see UNODC, “Drug trafficking in Sahel: Mali and Niger make several seizures”, September 2017, available at Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.

159 Someone who personally smuggles contraband across a border.
clear whether those seized drugs were meant for onward transport through northern Mali. Furthermore, there is no demonstrated relationship with any actors involved in the conflict in northern Mali. The same applies to synthetic drugs, most of which have been seized in Bamako. During its operations in northern Mali, Operation Barkhane found narcotics in the possession of enemy combatants but never seized any because the matter fell outside its mandate.

121. Concerning the few seizures of synthetic drugs in Gao, the Panel could not link any to armed groups. The local officer of the Central Office on Narcotics of the National Police in Gao explained to the Panel that he had been conducting only very minor operations targeting local marketing of such drugs and had no force to target trafficking on vehicles owing to consistent intimidation.

122. Cannabis herb, mostly produced in Ghana, is trafficked into Mali by way of Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso and consistently seized by Malian authorities; in 2018, more than 9 tons had been seized by June, compared with 3 tons in 2017. Cannabis herb is mostly destined for local consumption in Mali or onward trafficking to Senegal, but does not pass through northern Mali.

123. In contrast, cannabis resin, mostly produced in Morocco, is trafficked through northern Mali on its way to the Middle East through the Niger, Algeria and onward. In 2010 a third of the production of Morocco was estimated to be trafficked through the Sahel. Moroccan-produced cannabis resin is estimated at about 700 tons annually. Historically, cannabis passes through Mauritania to enter Mali in the region of Taoudenni, or further south into the Timbuktu region, through Lerneb.

124. The north-east corner of Mauritania, bordering Algeria, was declared a military zone in 2010 and controls have been intensifying ever since, arguably decreasing the smuggling of cannabis. In September 2017, Mauritanian authorities arrested cannabis traffickers in the extreme north of Mauritania along the Algerian border, suggesting that smuggling through Mauritania continues to some extent. Mauritanian officials argue that controls have driven the remainder of trafficking to the border zone with Algeria, requiring traffickers to pass on either the Algerian or Mauritanian side of the border, and that some may also pass through Nouadhibou, north of Nouakchott. Cannabis smuggled by way of the latter route may then enter

160 Meeting with Central Office on Narcotics of the National Police, Bamako, 7 June 2018.
161 Meeting with Operation Barkhane officer, Bamako, 21 February 2018.
162 Including 15,500 pills of tramadol, 152 of diazepam and 4,600 of Rivotril in 2017. Data from the Central Office on Narcotics of the National Police, shared with the Panel on 7 June 2018.
163 Meeting with officers of the Central Office on Narcotics of the National Police, Gao, 19 June 2018.
164 According to UNODC, most trafficking of cannabis herb takes place in the region where it was produced. In West Africa the most frequently mentioned country of origin or transit of cannabis herb in the region was Ghana (reported by five countries), followed by Nigeria (three countries), see World Drug Report 2018: Analysis of Drug Markets, booklet 3 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.18.XI.9).
167 Peduzzi, Le Maghreb dans son environnement régional et international; confidential report, 22 March 2015.
168 Meeting with Mauritanian officials, Nouakchott, 22 June 2018.
Mali in Timbuktu, but the Panel has no specific information on the trafficking of cannabis, or drugs in general, through that route. On the Malian side, authorities have not seized any cannabis resin in 2017 or 2018, as the smuggling of cannabis does not reach southern Mali.

125. The price of cannabis resin per kilogram is between $400 and $800 in Morocco, depending on the quality, with a selling price in Europe or the Middle East of between $2,000 and $4,000.170

**Cannabis seizure in the Niger**

126. In the period under review, the only significant seizure of cannabis resin happened in the Niger. On the night of 13 and 14 June 2018 authorities of the Niger seized 2.5 tons, worth at least $5 million, of cannabis resin in Niamey. The bricks had been hidden in fruit boxes and bags of foodstuffs.171

127. Authorities of the Niger had already informed the Panel during its visit to Niamey in May 2018 about a shipment of up to 10 tons of cannabis resin that would have been transported by several vehicles from Morocco to the Niger, likely through Mali.172 Twelve individuals allegedly involved in the case, including citizens of the Niger, Moroccans, Algerians and Malians, were arrested in Niamey in mid-April. According to the authorities of the Niger, five foreigners had come to Niamey from Morocco on 15 and 16 April to try to recover the seven tons that were likely stolen by a competing network.173

128. On 20 June, the National Police of the Niger published a series of photos online showing the seized drugs and the persons arrested.174 Among them was Ahmadou Ag Badi, a suspected fugitive who had led Tuareg militia organized by then-Colonel Gamou in support of the Malian army since 2008,175 and who is currently associated with GATIA.176 Ag Badi, who had settled in Agadez, was arrested upon arrival in Niamey in mid-April.

129. Moroccan authorities informed the Panel that another arrested individual pictured, Abdelali Boutafala, had been sentenced in 2014 to five months imprisonment for drug trafficking. Two arrested individuals from the Niger pictured who had allegedly stolen part of the shipment were involved in a similar case in 2016, as reported by the media in the Niger.177

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170 Meeting with diplomatic source and narcotics specialist, Niamey, 11 May 2018. See also Peduzzi, *Le Maghreb dans son environnement régional et international*.


172 Meeting with the Central Office for the Repression of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Niamey, 9 May 2018.

173 Ibid.


177 Ibid. See Moussa Aksar, “Qui protège Chérif ould Tahar, célèbre narcotrafficant du Sahel?”,
Drug convoy protection in Mali

130. In Mali, the Panel obtained further information about the role of GATIA associates in securing drug (cannabis) convoys. Malian authorities, a diplomatic source and an armed group representative referred to Ahmoudou Ag Asriw of GATIA as having led a convoy transporting cannabis resin in April 2018, together with a member of MAA-Plateforme. 178 The convoy was heading from Tabankort to the Tamesna desert, presumably on its way to the Niger. On 13 April 2018, near Amassin, south of Kidal, it came under attack from MNLA and unidentified armed elements from the Niger. The assailants were reported to have taken part of or the entire 4-ton shipment of cannabis resin north to cross into Algeria at Tinzawaten. The confrontation reportedly claimed three victims. 179

131. Amassin is a GATIA stronghold involved in drug trafficking, and Ag Asriw has been operating there since at least May 2017 under the GATIA flag, intimidating the local population. 180 It is located east of a trafficking route that goes through the Tilemsi valley, where traffickers from the Lehmar Arab community compete with those from the Kounta Arab community and their Ifoghas Tuareg associates. 181 Both communities pragmatically use armed group alliances for security purposes. The Lehmar relied on MUJAO during its occupation of Gao in 2012 and currently relies on members of groups associated with the Plateforme, including GATIA and MAA-Plateforme. The Kounta and Ifoghas tend to rely on members of CMA-associated groups. 182

132. The legitimacy of both the Plateforme and CMA as signatory armed groups has motivated drug traffickers to seek protection from their members rather than members of terrorist armed groups in order to be less exposed. 183 Ag Asriw appears to be a specialist in convoy protection, and has posted several online videos of two transport convoys in 2016 and 2017, one near Aguelhok and one in Tessalit, both in the Kidal region. 184 The Tessalit convoy was driving with GATIA flags and erected the symbol of GATIA using wooden poles. The individual appearing on camera in the convoy near Aguelhok introduced himself as a member of the Plateforme.

133. Experts have suggested that regardless of the drugs changing possession between competing convoy operators and security providers, goods are eventually delivered to the ultimate owners or the next intermediary in the trafficking line after negotiated fees are paid. 185 The Panel was not able to identify the owners of cannabis resin in convoys such as the one Ag Asriw secured. While they occurred during the
same period, there is no indication that the seizure and arrests in the Niger and the clashes over the convoy in Mali are related.

B. Trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

134. The Security Council, in its resolution 2374 (2017), refers both to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants. The two categories overlap, as some smugglers exploit migrants’ vulnerability by forcing them into labour and sexual exploitation. Armed groups profit from migrant smuggling through the levying of security fees and illicit taxes, but armed group members are also directly involved as transporters and organizers, so-called passeurs, who arrange transport, deal with State officials and security forces and provide shelter in so-called foyers and garages.

Figures and trends

135. According to data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) more than 100,000 migrants were observed in Mali between June 2016 and April 2018, a quarter of them incoming and three quarters outgoing.186 Migrants mostly come from within Mali or from Guinea, the Gambia, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, and either stay or cross to Algeria, the Niger and Burkina Faso. Gao and Timbuktu are the main hubs for migrants who travel through northern Mali to reach either Algeria or the Niger. In 2017 more than 7,000 migrants were estimated to have passed through foyers in Gao.187

136. In recent months, both Gao and Timbuktu have also seen an increasing number of returning migrants who were apprehended in and expelled from Algeria. As a result, since March 2018 the trend in Gao and Timbuktu of more outgoing than incoming migrants has been reversed.188 Between 10 April and 8 May 2018, IOM in Gao assisted 1,135 rejected migrants.189 Likewise, in the Niger, IOM rescued more 3,000 migrants rejected from Algeria between January and May 2018. The Panel spoke with several migrants who had been left in the desert between Tamanrasset and In Guezzam in Algeria to walk for days to Assamakka in the Niger. One migrant told the Panel that his brother had perished during the journey.

137. Despite years of insecurity in northern Mali and recent rejections from Algeria, migration through northern Mali and into Algeria is unlikely to die down. Rejected Malian migrants told the Panel they made use of the Algeria route because of visa-free travel between the two countries and their desire to work in Algeria rather than to travel onward and attempt to cross to Europe. Increased controls in the Niger further motivates migrants to travel to Algeria through northern Mali.

Role of armed groups

138. The Panel’s investigations into migrant smuggling focused on Gao, the main hub for smuggling through northern Mali, where migrants arrive on regular road transport to be taken further north on transport trucks and other vehicles operated by migrant smugglers.

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187 Meeting with migration specialist, Bamako, 19 June 2018.
188 IOM, “Flow monitoring”.
139. On 15 February 2018, Malian armed forces apprehended nine individuals suspected to be involved in migrant smuggling. They were rather small facilitators working for or connecting migrants to transporters. They had already been released from custody in Bamako by the time of writing. One was possibly linked to the Ganda Izo local militia. According to local government officials, the arrest of the nine individuals has decreased the level of migrant smuggling through Gao.

140. However, according to migration experts, other actors have taken over and have been conducting smuggling in a more clandestine manner, operating from Gao’s fourth neighbourhood on the north side of town, which provides immediate exit to the north-bound road to Bourem. Government authorities and other organizations have limited visibility with regard to the current levels of migrants, compared to 2017, when foyers were more accessible.

141. Arrests in February did not target the principal passeurs in Gao. One name confirmed by different sources is Baye Coulibaly, who is associated with GATIA and enjoys protection from the Malian Defence and Security Forces through family connections. Coulibaly runs a transport business operating between Gao and Tamanrasset in Algeria and provides fake Malian travelling documents to facilitate the crossing into Algeria of non-Malian migrants. He is further alleged to be holding migrants rejected by Algeria, who are then recruited by GATIA to be inserted into the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in Gao.

142. The Panel also received information from migrants, professionals assisting migrants and United Nations sources about abusive practices and the collaboration and affiliation of passeurs with armed groups in the border towns of Talhandak, Mali, Timeiaouine, Algeria, and In Khalil, Mali. Two of the smugglers could only be identified by their first name or nickname. “Rasta” is a Guinean national in Timeiaouine, who holds migrants against their will, claiming outstanding payments and forcing family members to wire money using Orange Money (a mobile money service) for their release. “Keita” is a Malian national in In Khalil who collaborated with MNLA in 2015, collecting 5,000 CFA francs per migrant for escort across the border.

143. The case of Mahamadou Ag Rhissa, also known as Mohamed Talhandak, best illustrates the connection between migrant smuggling and armed group activity. Ag Rhissa controls migrant passages in Talhandak and has held women captive and facilitated their sexual exploitation, releasing them only after payments of 150,000 to 175,000 CFA francs ($300 to $350). Ag Rhissa is member of HCUA, and on 1 October 2017 Operation Barkhane forces raided two of his houses in the Kidal area on suspicion of having relations with terrorist networks. Ag Rhissa was briefly

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190 Meetings with local authorities in Gao, 19 and 20 March 2018.
191 Meeting with diplomatic source and migration expert, Bamako, 8 June 2018.
192 Confidential report, 20 February 2018.
193 Meetings with local authorities in Gao, 19 and 20 March 2018.
194 Meetings with migration experts in Bamako, 8 and 19 June 2018.
196 Ibid.
197 Meeting with migrants, place and date concealed; correspondence with migration specialist, Bamako, 19 June 2018; meeting with United Nations sources, Bamako, 22 June 2018.
199 Correspondence with migration specialist, Bamako, 19 June 2018.
200 Sahelien, “Kidal”.

18-12105 35/70
arrested. However, in November, Ag Rhissa allegedly participated in a terrorist armed group meeting in the Mali-Algeria border area.\footnote{201}

\section*{C. Arms}

144. As was referred to in paragraph 11 above, the Panel submitted a number of requests for information to exporters/producers and importers of arms that are possessed illegally in Mali, but that has not yet provided leads on potential trafficking networks. Authorities in the Niger referred to a seizure near Agadez of AK-103 rifles destined for Mali but have yet to provide the Panel with the details and circumstances of the seizure.

\section*{D. Other financing}

145. Arms, narcotics and migrant trafficking often coincide with regular trade of licit goods, involving the same operators using the same means of transport. For example, trucks that move migrants to Algeria return with foodstuffs, fuel and consumer goods. In turn, armed groups may control, protect and prey on the transport of those goods in a similar way.

146. Fuel trucks going from the Niger to Gao, for example, pay over 1 million CFA francs ($2,000) in illicit taxes.\footnote{202} No official import duties are paid. Attempts to regulate and impose regular customs duties provoke upheaval. In early October 2017, the Malian Defence and Security Forces stopped 43 tankers at Labézanga on the border of Mali and the Niger at the order of central Government authorities.\footnote{203} An attack by unidentified assailants followed, killing one gendarme.\footnote{204} To keep the peace, the trucks were released at the order of the newly appointed Governor in Gao. In March 2018, freshly arrived customs officials were threatened and intimidated, making it practically impossible to exercise their duties, and fuel transporters were alleged to have incited local youths to protest.\footnote{205}

147. The Panel also made inquiries into the potential role of the exploitation of artisanal gold in the Kidal region with regard to financing armed groups. Since late 2017, artisanal mining has been accelerating in an area 40 kilometres east of Kidal around the villages of Gouzar and Alkite. The area has attracted some 1,000 miners and investors from various African countries, who bring in water pumps, generators and equipment to crush auriferous rock. Malian politicians have portrayed artisanal mining as a blessing for the area, providing jobs for unemployed youths and former combatants.\footnote{206} However, reports also show environmental risks of water pollution associated with the use of mercury, and water scarcity resulting from the washing process.\footnote{207} The same reports also point to the risk of CMA infighting and the infiltration of terrorist armed groups. CMA controls the area where mining takes place but has not established any control system over mining sites. On 6 March 2018, international forces found small quantities of gold in the possession of suspected

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{201}{Confidential report, 28 June 2018.}
\item \footnote{202}{Meeting with MINUSMA and Government officials in Gao, 19 and 20 March 2018.}
\item \footnote{204}{Confidential report, 12 October 2018.}
\item \footnote{205}{Meeting with MINUSMA and Government officials in Gao, 19 and 20 March 2018.}
\item \footnote{206}{Meeting with the President of the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Zahabi Ould Sidi Mohamed, Bamako, 29 March 2018; meeting with the Governor of Ménaka, Daouda Maiga, Bamako, 28 March 2018.}
\item \footnote{207}{Confidential reports, 30 January 2018 and February 2018.}
\end{itemize}
terrorists apprehended in Kidal after they had been to the JNIM stronghold of Tinzawaten.208

VI. Violations of international humanitarian and human rights law

148. Between February and July 2018, there was an increase in violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law in the country. The persistent insecurity in the north and centre and the escalation of intercommunal clashes between Fulani and Dogon militia, as well as attacks by extremists, terrorists and unidentified persons, have given rise to impunity.209

149. The Government is responsible for ensuring that its civilian population is protected from human rights and international humanitarian law violations and has the obligation to prevent such violations and to punish the alleged perpetrators when they occur. The absence of the State in some areas of the country and the lack of functional institutions, such as a fully functional judiciary, and of the implementation of the rule of law throughout Mali have contributed to the rise in human rights violations in the north and centre of the country.

150. The Panel has reviewed information that suggests a worrying pattern of human rights violations against civilians by the security forces during counter-terrorist operations (see para. 161). The presence of armed groups and terrorists among civilians has contributed to violations against civilians.

151. Similarly, there has been a rise in the number of kidnappings and attacks against local administrative officials. Humanitarian and aid workers have also been attacked and some have temporarily suspended activities (see paras. 172–177).

152. In recent months, armed groups and terrorists have continued to launch complex attacks against the Malian Defence and Security Forces, MINUSMA and other international forces.210 The Malian Defence and Security Forces count the highest number of victims from attacks, particularly in the Mopti region.211

153. The upsurge of violence in central Mali and along the border between the Niger and Mali has generated a new wave of internally displaced persons and refugees crossing into the Niger and Burkina Faso (see sect. VII). As at 7 June 2018, 137,764 Malian refugees remained outside the country.212 A total of 61,404 Malians are internally displaced.213

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208 Confidential report, 3 March 2018.
212 Protection Cluster Mali, “Rapport sur les mouvements de populations”, 7 June 2018, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-rapport-sur-les-mouvements-de-populations-07-juin-2018. On 12 June 2018, the Panel met female and male internally displaced persons from Koro cercle at an internally displaced persons camp in Yirimadio, Bamako. The internally displaced persons were all Fulani persons, ranging from infants to 80-year-old women. They informed the Panel that they fled from ethnic Dozo militia, who were killing people, burning villages and stealing cattle. In one attack, men were specifically hunted and killed, while women were spared and later chased away. The Panel obtained a list of names of persons spoken to and some of the names of villages attacked, archived at the Secretariat.
A. Killing of civilians

Mali-Niger border area

154. Violence in the Ménaka region has flared up since February 2018 following a spree of attacks by EIGS, affiliated local militia and unidentified bandits and the ensuing MSA-D and GATIA counter-militancy operations.

155. By early June 2018, MINUSMA had concluded that the latter armed groups had killed at least 143 civilians in various locations on the Malian side of the Mali-Niger border.214 Earlier, in April, the Director of the Human Rights Division of MINUSMA stated that allegations of 95 summary executions carried out during the armed groups’ joint operations south of Ménaka had been received.215 Fulani associations in the Niger have also attributed civilian killings on the Niger side of the border from mid-March to early May 2018 to both armed groups, a third of which are claimed to have taken place near Ekrafane on 27 and 28 April.216

156. MSA-D has publicly contested the methodology and conclusions of MINUSMA.217 MSA-D stated to the Panel that there might have been some civilians caught in the crossfire during battle but that the two armed groups had not targeted any civilians.218 MSA-D contested the claim that any civilians had been killed in the fighting in Ekrafane (see para. 158).219

157. Suspected EIGS or affiliated militants attacked civilians, particularly in late April and early May 2018, primarily from the Daoussak community from which MSA-D draws most of its combatants. MSA-D claims that during consecutive attacks on Aklaz (26 April), Awakassa (27 April) and Tindibawen (1 May), a total of 60 civilians were killed.220 MINUSMA reported 47 civilian killings in the first two locations.221 In Tindibawen, the victims were largely from the Imghad Tuareg community, from which GATIA draws most of its combatants.222

158. Based on information from both MSA-D and Fulani representatives, the Aklaz and Ekrafane attacks appear interrelated.223 According to both, the attack in Aklaz on 26 April was conducted by a Fulani group under the leadership of an individual called Nganai Gnalawdo. According to MSA-D, victims alerted MSA-D combatants, who, on 27 April, pursued the assailants to a water well near Ekrafane across the border in the Niger and killed them. Representatives of the Fulani community also indicated that MSA had killed Nganai. But while MSA-D claims that the group killed

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216 Lists of victims shared with the Panel by Fulani community representatives in Niamey and by email correspondences, May 2018.
218 Meeting with MSA-D representative, Paris, 26 April 2018.
219 Meeting with MSA-D representative, Bamako, 9 June 2018.
221 See S/2018/541, para. 34.
222 Meeting with Daoussak community representative, Niamey, 10 May 2018.
223 Meeting with MSA-D representative, Bamako, 9 June 2018; meeting with Fulani community representatives, Niamey, 9 May 2018.
a total of 13 assailants, Fulani representatives claim that MSA-D killed 3 assailants, but also 55 civilians among whom other assailants were suspected to be hiding. Based on accounts by internally displaced persons, a humanitarian mission report speaks about 47 victims in the same incident, attributing the killings to the Daoussak but without referring to MSA-D or GATIA.224

159. The attack of 1 May on Tindibawen was avenged on 18 May in Hagay in the Niger, where unidentified assailants killed 17 civilians, all of whom were Fulani.225 MSA-D and GATIA deny involvement in the reprisal.226 According to local sources referenced in a humanitarian update, the two incidents were intercommunal.227 In the past, intercommunal tensions over land and water resources have pitted Tuareg communities against Fulani and Arab communities, claiming dozens of victims.228 Depending on their ethnic profile, individuals from besieged communities turn to or accept one or the other armed or terrorist group, whether for protection or revenge purposes, further exacerbating cycles of violence.229

Central Mali

160. Violent clashes between the Dogon and the Fulani broke out most vehemently on 18 and 19 March, leaving eight dead in Sabéré, Koro. Historically predicated on land disputes, clashes have risen owing to ever scarcer resources; this scarcity has also led to a rise in illicit trading of weapons and the presence of armed groups linked to Fulani jihadist Amadou Koufa.230 The volatile security situation brought about by the rising tensions is now spreading to other communes in Koro cercle, such as Bankass and Bandiagara.231 Extremists are using this precarity to their advantage, pitting the Fulani militia against the Dogon militia, whom they perceive to be Government-backed.

161. The Malian Defence and Security Forces have been accused of human rights violations or abuses during the course of operations in Koro cercle and elsewhere in the Mopti and Segou regions. By late April, MINUSMA had investigated serious allegations of violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in the context of counter-terrorism operations undertaken by the Malian Defence and Security Forces in the Mopti and Séguo regions, including allegations of 44 summary executions and three enforced disappearances in Bimbéré-Tama, Diankabou, Dioura, Mondoro, Ouro Guiré and Sokolo communes.232 Thereafter, grave incidents occurred in the Boulkiemdee cattle market in May and in Kobaka and Nantaka in June. On two occasions, the Government of Mali either regretted the killings or admitted that soldiers had been implicated, announcing that investigative steps had been taken in three instances.233

226 Meeting with MSA-D representative, Bamako, 9 June 2018.
227 Confidential humanitarian update, document received by the Panel on 22 May 2018.
228 Meetings with Daoussak and Fulani community representatives, Niamey, 9 and 10 May 2018.
229 Ibid.
230 Confidential report, 9 July 2018.
231 Catholic Relief Service (CRS) Mali Projet, “Rapport d’évaluation rapide de besoins dans la Commune de Baye cercle de Bankass”, April 2018, archived at the Secretariat; meeting minutes of food security cluster, 19 April 2018, archived at the Secretariat.
233 See details of the cases in annex XIII.
B. Violations of the rights of the child and sexual violence

162. Denial of education, death by improvised explosive devices, lack of basic necessities and malnutrition continue to befall children on a daily basis. Between 2012 and 2017, 64 per cent of victims of improvised explosive devices were children. In June 2018, it was reported that 10 children had been killed and 9 children had been maimed in northern regions. On 1 July 2018, five civilians were killed, including three children and a baby, in Gao following the detonation of a vehicle with explosives (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) aimed at international forces. While improvised explosive device attacks are targeted principally at security forces, the number of civilian victims has been increasing steadily, as the threat has moved into the more populated areas of central Mali.

Recruitment of children by signatory parties to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation

163. Despite better relief and protection for children affected by armed conflict, the Panel has received information that armed groups continue to recruit children. Between January and March 2018, the use of 13 boys by armed groups was verified, compared with 7 boys during the previous quarter. Three boys were recruited by CME or the Plateforme. Other children were recruited by terrorist and unidentified groups.

164. The Panel was informed that children associated with armed conflict were, in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, not being prosecuted and were being released to State child protection actors, sometimes in the presence of the United Nations Children’s Fund. The Government of Mali adopted a national policy on child protection and promotion in July 2014.

165. With respect to compliant armed groups, CMA signed an action plan to end and prevent recruitment and the use of sexual violence against children in 2017. CMA informed the Panel that it did not need to recruit children when asked to comment on the existence of child soldiers within its ranks. Despite the designation of 14 focal points by the CMA leadership to oversee the implementation of the action plan, it is yet to be fully implemented.

Denial of access to education and protection for children

166. Three years after the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation and, most recently, of the Safe Schools Declaration by the Government in February 2018, access to education remains a challenge to children in the country.

167. As at April 2018, 750 schools remained closed in areas affected by the security crisis in the centre and north of Mali, affecting 225,000 children. In those areas...
where schools have reopened, there is a lack of teachers, equipment and salaries. Insecurity compounds the other matters as children are denied access to education on a regular basis.

168. A total of 132 and 59 schools closed in Mopti and Gao, respectively, from January to March 2018, following direct threats from armed groups who either sent letters or visited the schools and ordered their closure. Tribal tensions in Kidal have had a negative impact on access to education. Although some of the schools have reopened in Kidal, teachers have fled to Gao. Teachers are paid by members of the communities, affecting the continuous education of children if parents cannot afford to pay.

**Attacks against schools**

169. A total of 18 attacks against schools were reported in the first quarter of 2018: 15 in Mopti, 2 in Gao and 1 in Timbuktu. Armed individuals intimidated community members and school officials and demanded that strict religious practices be followed, causing schools to close. Armed individuals identified as extremist by the local community burned schools and administrative structures in central Mali as part of their campaign to combat State institutions and secular education. About 55,000 children will have to repeat the year owing to the continuous closure or irregular attendance. At the time of reporting, a total of 24 per cent of the 750 schools had been closed for more than four months.

**Commission of sexual and gender-based crimes**

170. Sexual violence and gender-based crimes continue to be perpetrated against women and children, especially in conflict-afflicted areas, where the crimes remain underreported because of cultural taboos, fear of reprisal, fear of stigmatization associated with the act and subsequent ostracization of the victims by society if it is known that they have suffered sexual violence. Furthermore, 55 per cent of areas affected by conflict — Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu and Mopti — remain without or have minimal specialized assistance to victims of sexual violence. Cases of forcible removal from vehicles and subsequent rapes are increasingly being reported on the Timbuktu-Goundam and Mopti-Gao routes, among others.

171. The Panel spoke to some of the victims of sexual and gender-based crimes during the 2012–2013 Islamist occupation and conflict in the north of the country. The victims informed the Panel that they were still waiting for justice five years after the commission of the crime and three years after the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation.

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243 Confidential report dated 14 August 2017, received by email, 10 June 2018.
244 Meeting with United Nations agency, 21 June 2018.
245 Koulouba, “Des terroristes saccagent l’école du village de Saba (Dialloubé)”, 10 April 2018, available at https://koulouba.com/...malienne/des-terroristes-saccagent-lecole-du. On 23 March 2018, a village school in Oualo Debere commune was attacked and set on fire by alleged extremists of JNIM. Another school was burned on 2 April, Saba village, Dialoubé commune, by JNIM. Information received by email on 9 July 2018.
246 Panel meetings with MINUSMA and United Nations agencies, Mopti and Bamako, May and 21 June 2018.
248 Meeting with United Nations specialist, 13 June 2018; see also S/2018/250, paras. 51–52.
249 Meeting with victims, Bamako, 22 June 2018; meeting with human rights activists, Bamako, 12 June 2018.
C. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance

172. The Agreement calls upon the parties to promote and respect the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, which guide humanitarian action.\(^{250}\) Parties shall also prevent any use of humanitarian aid for political, economic or military ends and facilitate access for humanitarian agencies and guarantee the security of their personnel.

173. The signatory parties have made efforts to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the country since the signing of the Agreement. Despite those efforts, the humanitarian situation in Mali remains grave, precarious, dire and volatile. A total of 4.3 million people are likely to be affected by food insecurity during the lean season (June to September), an increase of more than 500,000 people compared with the same period in 2017. Given the increasing number of internally displaced persons, the humanitarian sector is increasingly underfunded.

174. Moreover, the delivery or distribution of humanitarian aid is threatened by criminal attacks with improvised explosive devices and mines planted on roads or areas where humanitarian assistance has to be delivered. Common banditry and other criminal acts are also rampant, impacting the ability of humanitarian aid organizations to deliver assistance.

175. Other factors that affect the delivery of humanitarian aid are the banning of motorcycles and pickups in at least nine cercles, as well as the lack of State authorities and military operations.\(^{251}\)

176. In June 2018, the World Food Programme had nine of its contracted trucks with supplies carjacked and diverted from the intended beneficiaries. Two of the nine trucks were subsequently found by Malian armed forces burned on the Mopti- Kadial road axis. The remaining trucks and supplies are yet to be accounted for.\(^{252}\)

177. Intimidation of humanitarian and aid workers remains high, mainly through criminal attacks and robberies at offices or premises of the humanitarian staff. A total of 94 security incidents have been reported since January.\(^{253}\) In June 2018, Médecins du Monde suspended its activities in the Ménaka region. The decision was taken following a series of attacks targeting the non-governmental organization, with the most recent one being on the night of 7 June, when armed men broke into its offices in Ménaka, brutalized one employee and tied up two others.

VII. Regional political and security developments

178. The Malian crisis has had a significant impact on neighbouring countries, in a context of porous borders facilitating the displacement of people, as well as free movement of terrorist and transnational criminal groups. The Panel of Experts was informed that the lean season has been particularly difficult in the Sahel region in 2018, as water shortfalls the previous year have sparked acute pasture and water shortages, causing food prices to rise significantly and cattle prices to fall.

\(^{250}\) The Agreement, art. 49.
\(^{251}\) Meeting with humanitarian aid workers, Bamako, 22 June 2018.
\(^{252}\) Confidential report, 12 June 2018.
drastically.\textsuperscript{254} This has led to one of the earliest pastoralist transhumance in years, making communities more fragile and adding pressure for resources.\textsuperscript{255}

A. Regional cooperation and the Group of Five for the Sahel

179. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2359 (2017), the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel) was mandated to address the threat of terrorism and transnational organized crime in the region, creating a partnership between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger. Since the deployment of its joint command in March 2017, the G-5 Sahel has conducted three operations in the tri-border area, including armed forces of Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, in collaboration with the French force Operation Barkhane: Operation Hawbi (27 October–11 November 2017), Operation Pagnali (15–18 January 2018) and Operation Ir Goka (15 May–30 June 2018). The operations consisted of joint patrols, with few engagements with belligerents. The G-5 Sahel headquarters were the target of a terrorist attack claimed by JNIM, in which two soldiers and one civilian were killed on 29 June 2018.

180. Members of the G-5 Sahel have also conducted multilateral operations outside the G-5 Sahel framework to combat terrorism. Operation Koufra (November–December 2017), Operation Koufra 2 (February 2018) and Operation Koufra 3 (March 2018) involved armed forces of Mali and the Niger, in cooperation with Operation Barkhane. Operation Koufra 4 was deployed in June 2018.

181. MSA-D and GATIA have been associated with Operation Koufra 3.\textsuperscript{256} CMA considers the deployment of Malian armed forces under the G-5 Sahel umbrella as a violation of the Agreement; it accuses the coalition operations of being a cover for the redeployment of Malian armed forces and demands greater efforts towards a reconstituted army.\textsuperscript{257} The assertion would also apply to the GTIA 8, a Malian army battalion involved in Koufra operations.\textsuperscript{258}

182. Algeria collaborates with Mali, Mauritania and the Niger through the Joint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region created to organize cooperation on counter-terrorism and trafficking. The Committee has not conducted operations since the adoption of resolution 2374 (2017).\textsuperscript{259}

B. Niger

183. From early 2018, the security situation in the Mali-Niger border region has deteriorated. In March 2017, the Niger declared a state of emergency in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions to curb increasing violence following multiple terrorist attacks claimed by EIGS. Since June 2017, the armed forces of the Niger have been conducting a special operation called “Dongo” to secure the regions of Tillabéri and Tahoua, complementing their contributions to international operations. The Panel has been informed that security forces have faced several attacks from terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{260} The Gendarmerie of Goubé was attacked on 12 March 2017, killing three

\textsuperscript{254} Meeting with humanitarian organizations, Niamey, 7 May 2018.
\textsuperscript{255} Meeting with United Nations officials, Nouakchott, 25 June 2018.
\textsuperscript{256} See overview of operations in annex XIV.
\textsuperscript{258} Meeting with MSA-D leadership, Ménaka, 21 March 2018; meeting with MINUSMA personnel, Ménaka, 21 March 2018.
\textsuperscript{259} Communication with a security analyst, Paris, 9 July 2018.
\textsuperscript{260} Meeting with security forces of the Niger, Niamey, 7 May 2018
On 4 October 2017, four American and five soldiers of the Niger were killed during an ambush by EIGS in Tongo Tongo, a few kilometres from the Malian border. On 22 February 2018, 13 soldiers of the Niger were killed during an operation in Ayorou (Tillabéri region).

184. As the Koufra operational zone straddles the border between Mali and the Niger, the armed groups involved in Koufra 3 have moved across the border with the Niger on several occasions. MSA-D speaks about up to three incidents, always accompanied by armed forces of the Niger. Security and defence forces of the Niger have also spoken about “unauthorized incursions” in late April, possibly referring to the MSA-D pursuit in Ekrafa (see para. 158). While security and defence forces of the Niger told the Panel that there was some coordination with armed groups during Operation Koufra 3, on 7 May, the Minister of the Interior publicly denied such collaboration. In early April, following consultations with Fulani communities, the Government of the Niger asked Malian armed groups to leave the territory of the Niger. Since then, forces of the Niger reportedly have not coordinated any operations with Malian armed groups. In June, MSA-D was still claiming that it had handed over stolen animals recovered from bandits to the army of the Niger at Ekrafa.

185. Those operations have contributed to inter-community conflict, as attacks have been perceived as defending one community against another. MSA-D has been accused of supporting Daoussaks over Fulanis, which are two communities competing over land and water resources and clashing in cases of cattle robbery. Both security forces and local Fulani community leaders believe that operations have contributed to the recruitment of Fulanis by EIGS.

186. Operations and intercommunal violence have led to the forced displacement of over 16,000 people of the Niger in the regions of Tillabéri and Tahoua. This is added to the 57,952 Malian refugees in the Niger, an increase of 1,315 refugees since January.

C. Burkina Faso

187. Since the beginning of the Panel’s mandate, there has been an upsurge in terrorist attacks in northern Burkina Faso, along the border between Mali and the Niger, in the area where the G-5 Sahel has been doing most of its patrols. Terrorist

261 Records from the National Gendarmerie of the Niger, 7 May 2018, archived at the Secretariat.
262 See map in annex XV.
263 Meeting with MSA-D leadership, Bamako, 9 June 2018.
264 Meeting with security forces, Niamey, 8 May 2018.
266 Meeting with Fulani community representative, Niamey, 6 May 2018.
267 Meeting with security forces, Niamey, 8 May 2018.
269 Meeting with Fulani community representatives, Niamey, 9 May 2018; confidential report, 1 May 2018.
270 Meeting with security forces, Niamey, 7 May 2018.
271 Confidential report, April–May 2018, archived at the Secretariat.
groups operating in Mali and Burkina Faso have targeted State representatives and civilians.

188. Since October, attacks have spread from the province of Soum to the provinces of Yatenga, Kossi, Bam and Loroum. On 8 April 2018, the Mayor of Koutougou was killed in an attack for which responsibility has not been claimed. On 12 April, a student was killed and a teacher kidnapped in an attack that security forces attributed to EIGS. On 14 May, the Prefect of Oursi was killed by unknown assailants. On 27 March, security forces of Burkina Faso clashed with terrorists in the Forest of Kodjagabeli, on the border between Burkina Faso and the Niger, which is an important rear base for Ansar al-Islam. Several terrorist attacks have followed, leading to the closure of schools, courts and other administrations.

189. The Panel of Experts was informed that violence had caused further internal displacements of population in the northern provinces, particularly in the province of Soum. Intercommunal violence in the Koro region in Mali has led to the arrival of Malian refugees in the province of Yatenga, Burkina Faso, in recent months. In April 2018, the commune of Kain, province of Yatenga, received 2,773 internally displaced people and 1,052 Malian refugees. This is added to the 36,200 refugees who have been recorded in the main refugee camps of Goudoubo and Mentao, as well as outside camps. Multiple attacks have been carried out near refugee camps. On 10 May, the police station at Mentao camp was attacked, the third attack since September 2017. Responsibility for these attacks has not been claimed.

D. Mauritania

190. The Panel has been notified that the Government of Mauritania maintains an important security presence along its borders. Mauritanian armed forces have been deployed in the east of its territory along the Malian borders, and the north-eastern region bordering Algeria has been declared a military zone. The north-eastern region of Mauritania has been described as an important area of trafficking of goods, with sporadic arrests.

191. Mauritanian authorities informed the Panel that Malian armed groups had crossed the border and had agreed to be disarmed by Mauritanian security forces. Since the adoption of resolution 2374 (2017), there have been no attacks or engagements between armed groups and Mauritanian security forces.

192. Of all the neighbouring countries, Mauritania hosts the highest number of Malian refugees, with 56,000 refugees at Mbera camp. An organized repatriation was impossible because of the insecurity in the areas of origin of the refugees. No

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273 Meeting with Ministry of Defence, Ouagadougou, 3 May 2018.
274 Ibid.
275 Confidential source, Paris, 4 June 2018.
276 Meeting with Ministry of Defence, Ouagadougou, 3 May 2018.
277 Meeting with Government officials, Ouagadougou, 2 May 2018.
278 Meeting with a representative of the National Commission for Refugees (CONAREF), Ouagadougou, 2 May 2018.
279 Meeting with security forces, Ouagadougou, 3 May 2018.
280 Meeting with the Minister of Defence, Nouakchott, 27 June 2018.
282 Meeting with the Minister of Defence, Nouakchott, 27 June 2018.
voluntary return was registered in 2018, despite the signing of the tripartite agreement in June 2016 between Mauritania, Mali and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the voluntary repatriation of Malian refugees.\textsuperscript{285} Instead, 321 new refugees were registered in May alone. Since January 2018, a total influx of 5,102 new refugees from Mali has been recorded.\textsuperscript{286} Technical teams within the tripartite agreement have not undertaken assessment visits to areas from where refugees originate because of insecurity.

193. The presence of armed groups in refugee camps has been notified to the Panel.\textsuperscript{287} While there have been no major incidents of violence since the adoption of resolution 2374 (2017), Mauritanian authorities told the Panel that there were tensions among refugees and local populations over basic service delivery.\textsuperscript{288}

**E. Algeria**

194. Algeria has maintained a strong military presence along its northern borders with Libya, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger. The Algerian authorities claimed in the media several weapon seizures in the Bordj Badji Mokhtar area, close to the Malian borders.\textsuperscript{289} The Panel requested to meet with relevant authorities in Algiers to gather more details about these seizures in order to establish possibly linkages to armed groups operating in Mali and/or identify arms trafficking networks. The proposed visits could not be accommodated.

**VIII. Recommendations**

195. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali:

(a) Proceed without delay to consider the designation for targeted measures of individuals and entities engaging in or providing support for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali;

(b) Consider splinter groups’ strategy to be included in the Agreement via blackmail of use of violence and boycotting of elections as a threat to the implementation of the Agreement;

(c) Urge the Government of Mali and the Plateforme and CMA to meet the implementation deadlines of key provisions of the Agreement referenced in the March 2018 road map;

(d) Encourage the Agreement Monitoring Committee subcommittee on justice, reconciliation and humanitarian issues to provide the venue to discuss how to ensure humanitarian access in northern regions as stipulated in the Agreement and prevent attacks against humanitarian workers;

(e) Encourage the Technical Commission on Security to instruct the joint observation and verification teams to systematically investigate ceasefire violations, also when one signatory armed group is involved;

\textsuperscript{285} High-level regional meeting on the voluntary repatriation of Malian refugees, Niamey, 24 February 2018. In 2017, 713 refugees were voluntarily repatriated from Mbera.

\textsuperscript{286} Meeting with an official of the Ministry of Interior, Nouakchott, June 25, 2018.

\textsuperscript{287} Meeting with Mauritanian official, Nouakchott, 25 June 2018; meeting with civil society representative, 27 June 2018.

\textsuperscript{288} Meeting with Government officials, Nouakchott, 27 June 2018.

\textsuperscript{289} See list of seized weapons in annex XVI.
(f) Encourage the Government of Mali, in cooperation with international partners and with the support of MINUSMA, to carry out judiciary investigations in northern Mali and prosecute armed group members suspected to be involved in violent attacks and organized crime;

(g) Encourage regional States to strengthen their cooperation in addressing transnational organized crime, particularly narcotics and arms trafficking and the smuggling of migrants, and to hold those involved accountable, as part of broader efforts to ensure that organized crime is not financing individuals or entities identified as threatening the implementation of the Agreement;

(h) Encourage regional States to report without delay to the Committee cases of seizures and arrests related to organized criminal activity potentially financing individuals or entities identified as threatening the implementation of the Agreement;

(i) Engage with the Government of Algeria to facilitate an official visit by the Panel before the end of its current mandate.
Annex I: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from 1 February to 20 July June 2018

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/entity</th>
<th>Number of letters sent</th>
<th>Information fully supplied</th>
<th>Information partially supplied</th>
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Annex II: 22 March roadmap, document obtained by the Panel from CSA participant on 24 March 2018

FEUILLE DE ROUTE POUR LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DU CHRONOGRAMME D’ACTIONS PRIORITAIRES, ENDOSSÉ PAR LA 23ème SESSION DU COMITÉ DE SUIVI DE L’ACCORD (CSA) :


A cet effet, les parties malien-ne conviennent de la présente feuille de route qui complète le chronogramme d’actions prioritaires endossé par la 23ème session du CSA et réaffirment leur engagement à assurer sa mise en œuvre diligente.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>N°Ordre</th>
<th>Intitulé des actions</th>
<th>Echéances</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Parachever la création des collectivités territoriales des régions de Taoudénit et de Méina</td>
<td>avril 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Diligerer la création des cercles d’Almoussant et d’Achibogho (apres les élections présidentielles et avant les régionales)</td>
<td>août 2018-aout 2019</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Assurer le fonctionnement effectif des Autorités intermédiaires et des Collèges transitoires en les dotant de moyens financiers et matériels, notamment en vue de la fourniture de services sociaux de base et de leur participation dans l’organisation des élections à venir</td>
<td>mars-avril 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Renforcer les capacités de l’opérationnal du Mécanisme Opérationnel de Coordination (MOC) de Gao en le dotant d’armes lourdes</td>
<td>mars-avril 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mettre en place et rendre fonctionnels les Bataillons du MOC de Kidal et Tombouctou en les dotant de moyens logistiques et d’armement (y compris les armes lourdes)</td>
<td>mars-avril 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Saluer des modalités à convenir entre les parties, identifier et redéployer les combattants anciennement membres des forces armées et de sécurité conformément à l’Accord</td>
<td>mars-avril 2018</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Procéder au recensement des combattants éligibles à l’intégration au programme Déarmement-Démobilisation-Réinsertion (DDR)</td>
<td>mars-avril 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Procéder au report de l’élection des conseillers des Collectivités territoriales, l’organiser après les législatives et recommander d’en informer l’ensemble de la classe politique</td>
<td>avril 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Atteindre en Conseil des ministres le projet de décret déterminant les modalités de transfert des services déconcentrés de l’État aux Collectivités territoriales relevant de leurs domaines de compétences (transfert des ressources humaines, financières et matérielles)</td>
<td>avril-mai 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Organiser un atelier de haut niveau sur la Réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité (RSS) y compris les concepts de ’l’armée reconstituée’ et de la “police territoriale”</td>
<td>27-28-29 mars 2018</td>
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<td>Action</td>
<td>Dates</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Prod. au regroupement assisté (appui alimentaire) des combattants rentrés sur les sites de cantonnement réités par la Commission Technique de Sécurité (CTS) en vue des opérations DDR (durée du cantonnement : 45 jours au maximum par combattant).</td>
<td>25 avril-25 août 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Procéder à l’intégration dans les forces armées et de sécurité, les services paramilitaires et les fonctions publiques, des éléments de mouvements signataires suivant les critères retenus et après harmonisation des visions sur le “concept d’armée reconstituée”.</td>
<td>25 avril-15 septembre 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Organiser l’élection dans un climat apaisé avec l’implication des mouvements signataires de l’Accord et faire participer les éléments en cours d’intégration à la sécurisation des opérations électorales selon les modalités à définir entre les parties.</td>
<td>mai-août 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Procéder à la réinsertion socio-économique des éléments des mouvements signataires non intégrés.</td>
<td>août 2018-juillet 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Parachever, sur une base consensuelle, la mise en place des Autorités intérimaires au niveau des cercles et au cas par cas pour les communes, dans les régions du Nord du Mali (Tombouctou, Gao, Kidia, Taoudénit et Ménaka).</td>
<td>avril-décembre 2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Accélérer le retour des réfugiés, avec l’implication des parties signataires, sur les sites visés et procéder à leur enregistrement au RAVEC, s’il y a lieu.</td>
<td>septembre-décembre 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Adopter les projets de textes portant création de la Zone de Développement des régions du Nord du Mali, suite à un atelier de haut niveau qui abordera aussi toutes les questions y afférentes conformément à l’Accord.</td>
<td>octobre-novembre 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Organiser des consultations sur le découplage administratif en vue de la création de nouvelles circonscriptions.</td>
<td>octobre-décembre 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Réactiver et diligenter le processus de révision de la Constitution du 25 février 1992 avec la prise en compte des réformes institutionnelles prévues dans l’Accord, notamment la mise en place de la deuxième chambre du Parlement sous la dénomination de Sénat.</td>
<td>Année 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Procéder à la relecture, après les élections présidentielles et avant les élections régionales et locales, de la Loi sur la libre administration et du Code des collectivités territoriales conformément à l’Accord, notamment en vue de prendre en charge les questions relatives à la dénomination de l’organe délibérant et celle afférente au statut du chef de l’exécutif régional.</td>
<td>Année 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Parachever le processus de la Conférence d’Entente Nationale, conformément aux dispositions de l’Accord</td>
<td>Année 2019</td>
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</table>
Annex III: Coalition Du Peuple Pour l’Azawad social media post against upcoming presidential elections (7 July 2018)¹


Bamako, le mercredi 20 septembre 2017

A Monsieur la Président du CSA

Objet: saisine du CSA, pour non-respect par la partie gouvernementale de la prise en charge dans le Code des Collectivités Territoriales des dispositions politico-institutionnelles prévues par l’Accord.

Monsieur le Président du Comité de Suivi,


L’adoption de ce projet de loi constitue à notre avis une violation flagrante de l’Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation tant dans le processus de concertation inter-parties malien, que dans la prise en charge intégrale des dispositions de fond relatives à la réorganisation territoriale, tels que prévu dans l’article 3 de l’Accord : « Les institutions de l’Etat malien prendront les dispositions requises pour l’adoption des mesures réglementaires, législatives, voire constitutionnelles nécessaires à la mise en œuvre des dispositions du présent Accord, en consultation étroite avec les Parties et avec le soutien du Comité de suivi prévu par le Présent Accord ». 

En effet, le Gouvernement a soumis en Conseil des Ministres, puis à l’Assemblée Nationale un projet de loi portant révision du Code des Collectivités territoriales n’ayant fait ni l’objet d’un consensus entre les parties signataires, ni l’objet d’un examen commun sur la prise en compte des dispositions de l’Accord concernant les collectivités territoriales dans le projet de loi.

La seule réunion entre les parties tenue en juin 2016 concernant le code des collectivités territoriales n’avait pas permis d’aboutir à un consensus et avait mis en exergue la nécessité d’approfondir les concertations avant d’aboutir à une prise en charge des dispositions de l’Accord relatives aux collectivités territoriales.

En dépit des assurances données par le gouvernement à la CMA et à la Plateforme, au cours de la réunion tripartite tenue dans les locaux du Haut Représentant du Président de la République le 11 septembre 2017, quant à la réouverture et la poursuite des concertations, assurances renouvelées juste après, en présence de la Médiation internationale, dans la session du CSA du 11 septembre 2017 et la réunion le jour suivant avec le Ministre de la Décentralisation et de la Fiscalité locale assortie d'un procès-verbal adopté mais non signé, Nous avons appris par voie de presse l'adoption par l'Assemblée Nationale le 15 septembre 2017 d'un projet de loi sur les collectivités territoriales unilatéralement élaboré par la partie gouvernementale.

De plus, la loi votée par l'Assemblée Nationale ne respecte en aucun cas les dispositions politico-institutionnelles de l'Accord relatives aux collectivités territoriales contenues dans les articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16 et annexe 2 (V, b et c) et qui concernent, entre autres : l'élargissement des compétences des collectivités territoriales, les prérogatives, rôles et mode d'élection du Président de l'Assemblée Régionale, la police territoriale, la répartition des compétences entre les collectivités sur la base du principe de subsidiarité, les relations entre la région et l'État et le rôle du Représentant de l'État.

La violation de l'Accord ci-dessus exposée doit interpeler toutes les parties signataires, en premier lieu le Gouvernement du Mali, ainsi que la Médiation internationale, garant de l'Accord, au risque de son échec.

Rappelant que ces dispositions sur les collectivités territoriales constituent une pierre angulaire de l'Accord pour la Paix et la Réconciliation, nous sollicitons le concours de la Médiation internationale, garant de l'Accord, en vue de rétablir la situation en faveur du respect et de la mise en œuvre intégrale de l'Accord.

Nous vous prions de vous investir pour l'ouverture de consultations inter-parties malien étroites permettant d'aboutir à une interprétation consensuelle des dispositions de l'Accord et à leur entière prise en charge par le code des collectivités territoriales.

Vous assurant de notre attachement à la mise en œuvre intégrale de l'Accord en vue de l'instauration d'une paix définitive, nous renouvons nos remerciements à la Médiation internationale pour son soutien dans la mise en œuvre de l'Accord et vous demandons solennellement de poursuivre les efforts accomplis en faveur de la paix au Mali.
Annex V: Letter to the Governor of Ménaka from community leaders on 6 March 2018. Document obtained by the Panel on 29 March 2018 from confidential source.

A Monsieur Le Gouverneur de la Région de Ménaka

Considérant que l'érection de Ménaka en région est une occasion pour les communautés de mieux s'organiser et s'autogérer,

Considérant la constitution de la République du Mali,
Considérant que le découpage actuel viole les textes en matière de décentralisation,
Considérant que la commission de découpage mise en place ne répond à aucun critère,
Considérant l'accord pour la paix et la réconciliation issu du processus d'Alger qui prévoit que plusieurs entités peuvent s'unit et décider de leur destin dans un Mali Un et indivisible,
Considérant le communiqué du Conseil des Ministres en date du 28 février 2018 relatif à la création des communes dans les régions de Ménaka et Taoudeni,
Considérant que le découpage concernant la région de Ménaka et spécifiquement du Cercle de Ménaka n'a pas été inclusif,
Considérant la lettre de protestation en date du 8 Août 2017 initiée par les chefs de Fractions, de villages et cadres du Cercle de Ménaka relative aux propositions de création des communes de l'actuel Cercle de Ménaka,
Considérant l'avis de réunion sans numéro du Préfet du Cercle de Ménaka en date du 6 juillet 2017,
Considérant que la tâche réunie n'a jamais eu lieu avec la convocation des mêmes acteurs,
Considérant que toutes les communes créées à savoir Tabankort, Infoukaretane, Tinabaw et Inazole sont sélectivement choisies et situées dans la zone sud-ouest du Cercle suivant l'appartenance politique (deux communes pour une même fraction)
Considérant que les communautés vivant dans la zone nord-ouest, nord-est, est, sud-est du Cercle de Ménaka composées de 22 Fractions et sept villages n'ont pas été prises en compte dans le découpage actuel selon leur volonté de vivre ensemble et ce malgré la constitution de dossiers de création des Communes dûment établie et remis au représentant de l'état,
Considérant le caractère sélectif et la volonté manifeste d'exclusion entretenue et soutenue depuis plusieurs décennies,
Considérant que près de 90% du territoire du Cercle de Ménaka et des Communautés a été laissé pour compte dans le découpage actuel,
Considérant les injustices dont sont victimes certaines communautés au profit d'autres,
Considérant qu'un découpage nécessite l'implication de tous,
Considérant que le découpage actuel ne prend en compte qu'une minime partie d'un cercle aussi vaste,
Considérant que le même découpage a été fait sans l'impliquer des responsables des communautés,
Considérant que des correspondances ont été adressées à qui de droit pour attirer l'attention sur l'impérieuse nécessité d'impliquer les responsables de ces communautés,
Nous populations lesées du Cercle de Ménaka,
Informons l'opinion nationale et internationale que le découpage pris en conseil des ministres est contraire à l'esprit de l'accord d'Alger et hypothèque dangereusement les relations inter communautaires et la tenue des élections.

Au moment où les espoirs d'une paix pointent à l'horizon il est inadmissible que l'état décide en lieux et places des communautés sans leur consentement.

Par conséquent nous exigeons que l'ensemble des demandes de créations des communes que nous avons formulées soient prises en compte.

Pour se faire, nous userons de tous les moyens légaux pour que nous soyons dans nos droits
Ménaka le 6 Mars 2018

Ont signé : Nanout Kota Cadre, Sidi Alamine Ag Itiwatass Chef de fraction, Moussa Tiégoum Chef de village, Sidiyana Ag Agaly Chef de fraction, Eglass Ag Barka Chef de fraction, Altanata Ag Tiwara Notable, Houmeidi Ag Winfoud Chef de fraction, Ziliffy Ag Hamma Leader, Salah Ag algameyni Leader, Adoum Ag Ahmadou Chef de fraction, Sidi Mohamed Ag Issiwhar Leader, Sidi Barka Cadre, Issouf Ag Inakiarene Cadre, Issoufisyotar Cadre, Rabah Ag Cadre, Hammam Fateta Notable, Achikourine Ag Idalyallah Cadre, Moussa Mazou Chef Haoussa, Achkourine Ag Bague Leader, Mahamad Ag Ingatane Leader, Baba Oumar Cadre, Hamadou Ag Alhasane Leader, Intibcrene Ag Saloum Cadre, Mohamed Ag Issafeytan Cadre, Alousserini Ag Agaly Cadre, Mohamed Ag Allassane Cadre, Mohamed Ag Intabakatt Cadre, Moussa Ag Amini Leader, Mahamidou Yacoubi Leader, Djibrilla Moussa Cadre, Aliou Tiégoum Cadre, Aly Wadrago Cadre, Harouna Ibatane Yattara Cadre, Issouf Wattara Cadre, Sidi Ag Assoultane Cadre, Almahadi Ag Intabakatt Cadre, Sididam Ag Tarou Leader, Assalim Ag Ehatt Leader, Houssa Ag Awinad Leader, Agouzoum Bogoly Leader, Ibrahim Alakaye Leader, Adou Mazou Leader, Hamani Majiha Notable, Amadou Hamani Cadre, Ingatane Ag Bada Notable, Mohamed Hamma Cadre, Boubacer Ag Hamadimkane Leader, Hilli Ag Bihihi Leader, Billa Ag Abdoulhader chef de fraction, Houssefata Ag Armougada Leader, Hamadhamdou Ag Habaye Leader, Moussa Ag Inamoud Chef de Fraction, Sidi Mohamed Ag Mohamedine Chef de Fraction, Mada Wallet Bihihi Femme Leader, Gaichata Wallet Garab Femme Leader, Amoukoussou Wallet Femme Leader
Annex VI: CMA communiqué related to Barkhane’s arrests in Ménaka²

18 December 2017

COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS DE L’AZAWAD
C.M.A.

COMMUNIQUÉ
N°018/2017/C.O.-CD-CMA

La Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad dénonce une descente musclée opérée ce lundi 18 décembre 2017 par la force Barkhane sous instrumentalisation dans le village de Tin-Abaw situé à 20 km au Sud de Ménaka.

Après une fouille de la plus part des habitations du village, les hommes de Barkhane ont arrêté et emmené deux jeunes gens proches d’un noble local Sagdii Ag Madit ayant récemment rejoint la CMA. Il s’agit de :
1. Anmeta Ag Iodine
2. Hirra Ag Seydaha

La Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad condamne l’instrumentalisation de Barkhane par des personnes en mal de popularité et l’invite à ne plus s’impliquer dans les dynamiques communautaires au risque de perdre toute crédibilité aux yeux des populations.

La CMA appelle également Barkhane à libérer les jeunes arbitrairement arrêtés afin de faire baisser la tension des populations de Tin-Abaw.

Ces populations qui ont reconnu des membres d’un groupe armé local accompagnant Barkhane lors de cette opération, perçoivent cette incursion comme une tentative d’humiliation de leurs leaders afin de les discréditer en faveur des leaders de ce groupe qui les tiennent de quitter pour rejoindre la CMA.

Enfin, la Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad invite tous les partnaires à préserver les équilibres communautaires locaux fortement fragilisés par la crise qui dure depuis près de six ans.

Kidal le 18 Décembre 2017

Pour la CMA:
Almei Ag Mohamed

Annex VII: MSA\(^3\) and CMA\(^4\) communiqués related to the assassination of Alhader Ag Aguidi

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La Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA)
Comité Directeur
-cellule de Communication-
Communiqué N°004/2018/CC-CD-CMA

La Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA)
informe l’opinion nationale et internationale, que son
poste situé près du marché de Talatayte a été la cible
d’une attaque armée menée par des hommes de
Mossa AG ACHANTMANE ce jour 1er mars 2018 vers
17 heures.
Cette attaque, opérée par plusieurs motocyclistes
armés conduits par le nommé Alhader AG AGUIDID , a
été repoussée.
Les assaillants ont abandonné sur les lieux le corps
de leur chef, des armes, de munitions et des motos.

La CMA condamne cette violence et invite ses
instigateurs à privilégier la voie du dialogue pour
régler leurs différends au lieu d’exaspé rer un conflit
entre des populations déjà éprouvées par plusieurs
années de difficultés.

Enfin, la CMA appelle les organes de l’accord chargés
des mesures sécuritaires notamment la CTS et les
EMOV à jouer pleinement leurs rôles conformément
aux dispositions dudit accord.
Kidal, le 1er mars 2018
Le porte parole
Ilad Ag Mohamed.
Communiqué de démenti du MSA suite au communiqué numéro 004/2018/CC-CD-CMA du 01 mars 2018

Le Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad (MSA) porte à la connaissance de l’opinion publique nationale et internationale, qu’il a appris par voie de communiqué numéro 004/2018/CC-CD-CMA du 01 mars 2018, signé de Ilad AG Mohamed de la CMA qu’un soi-disant poste de ladite organisation a été attaqué à Talataye.

Devant sa consternation le MSA, fait remarquer son étonnement et sa surprise lorsqu’une partie à l’accord d’Alger en l’occurrence la CMA reconnaît à la face du monde un crime commis par des criminels à son nom.

Face à ce mensonge le MSA se doit d’apporter un démenti formel.

En effet Alhader Ag Aguidid de retour d’une mission à la frontière du Niger s’est rendu dans sa famille à Talataye en compagnie de Sidimam Ag Almaka un autre officier du MSA.

Pendant que les intéressés prenaient leurs provisions dans des boutiques de la place, des criminels venus du nord de la commune de Talataye opérant sous le fanion du Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad l’ont froidement abattu et son compagnon n’a dû son salut qu’au fait que son compagnon n’a dû son salut qu’au fait qu’il n’était pas avec Alhader Ag Aguidid ce qu’il lui a permis de fuir.

Le MSA dément l’existence de tout poste de quelques mouvements que ce soit au marché de Talataye y compris le MSA.

Le MSA informe l’opinion publique nationale et internationale que l’attaque du village d’Inwelane le vendredi 02 février 2018 au cours de laquelle meurtre de civils, saccages de biens matériels mobiliers et immobiliers, calcination du Coran et des livres religieux, était dirigé par un bandit se réclamant du HCMA mouvement membre de la CMA.

Le Mouvement pour le Salut de l’Azawad condamne avec la dernière rigueur ce crime crapuleux tout comme il condamne vigoureusement un mensonge d’une partie signataire de l’accord d’Alger motivé par le souci de l’amalgame pour faire croire qu’il existe un poste de la CMA à Talataye.

Le MSA rappelle qu’aucune barbarie ne viendrait à bout de sa détermination dans la lutte pour la paix et la cohésion sociale.

Le MSA appelle la MINUSMA à travers ses organes compétents en la matière à situer toutes les responsabilités.
Annex VIII: Photographs of CPA forces in Nebkit posted on the CPA Facebook page on 28 May 2018.\(^5\)

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Annex IX: Satellite imagery of Soumpi village and FAMA/SATOM camp

FAMA/SATOM camp is located 2200 meters away from Soumpi village and CPA base

Close-up of satellite imagery of FAMA/SATOM camp acquired on 27 October 2017
Annex X: Screenshots from JNIM video called “Deterring Tyrants – Episode 2”, released via social media on 21 March 2018, showing footages of Soumni attack on 27 January 2018

Screenshot extracted from a video footage taken from the northern defensive towers of the camp

Screenshot taken from a video footage taken from outside the eastern defensive wall of the camp
Screenshot taken from a video footage taken from the eastern defensive wall of the camp, from where an assailant fires at FAMa soldiers fleeing the camp by foot

Apart from Haydara Al Maghribi and another AQMI francophone fighter, all other faces of assailants taking part in the attack are blurred
Annex XI: Location of IED attack against MINUSMA convoy on 26 February 2018 near Soumpi
Annex VII: Ahmoudou Ag Asriw online video posts showing convoys near Tessalit and Aguelock⁶

⁶Accessed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SMAf11BITX0&t=65s, and Error! Hyperlink reference not valid, on 20 July 2018.
Annex XIII: MDSF alleged targeting of civilians in central Mali

- On 21 February, FAMa elements arrested nine men, during a search and reconnaissance operation “operation Dambe.” The arrested men were attending a baptismal ceremony in Nangarabakan village, seven were Fulani and two Bambara, who were released. The seven Fulani have never been heard from since. Allegations have been made that a mass grave with the bodies exists in Sokolo, Segou. On 27 February 2018, the Government acknowledged the unfortunate killing of civilians during the course of this operation. Findings on the investigation mounted and action taken against the perpetrator(s) is not available to the Panel at this point.

- In May 2018, MDSF elements “neutralized” 12 civilians in Boulkessy cattle market, Mopti region, after one of its soldiers was killed on 19 May 2018 during a patrol under the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Initially categorized as killings of terrorists by the Government, this statement was later retracted, following uproar from relatives of the killed civilians. An investigation has been opened by the Government, but the findings are yet to be made public yet.

- On 13 June 2018, MDSF allegedly killed 25 Fulani civilians. The civilians were arrested in Kobaka and Nantaka, Mopti. It is alleged that the army did a sweep from house to house and arrested a number of civilians, subsequently releasing those from the Songhai, Bozo, and black Tuareg ethnicities, but keeping the Fulani, whose bodies were later found buried in three separate mass graves. On 19 June 2018, the Government acknowledged the existence of the mass graves, that soldiers were implicated, and has launched an investigation into the alleged summary executions of the civilians committed by some elements of the MDSF. The findings of the investigation are yet to be published.

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8 Meeting with confidential source, Bamako, 6 July 2018
13 Correspondence with confidential sources, 5 July 2018. The Panel received names of those allegedly killed.

OPERATIONS MENEES EN TERRITOIRE NIGERIEN DEPUIS LA RESOLUTION 2374


- Participation à L’OPERATION KOUFFRA du 16 Novembre au 20 Décembre 2017.

- Participation à L’OPERATION KOUFFRA 3 (FAN, FAMa, MSA, GATIA, BARKHANE) du 1er au 29 Mars 2018.

Les éléments de Dongo qui participent à KOUFFRA 3 ont obtenus les résultats suivants à la date du 12 mars 2018:

- Cinq (05) terroristes tués ;
- Vingt Deux (22) prisonniers remis au SCLCT/C'TO ;
- Cinq (05) AK 47, Six (06) MAS 36 et Deux (02) fusils de chasse récupérés ;
- Une importante quantité de munitions saisies ;
- Quatorze (14) motos détruites ;
- Plusieurs THURAYA et téléphones portables récupérés ;
- Des documents et des pièces détachées de moto récupérés.
Annex XV: Map of area of Koufra operation, produced by Niger armed forces (Niger-Mali border indicated in green). Photograph taken with permission by the panel on 7 June 2018.
Annex XVI: Summary of weapons seizures in Algeria along the Mali border\textsuperscript{15}

Seizures include:
- on 31 May 2018, 2 Rocket-launcher (RPG7), 1 heavy machine gun (PKT), 1 machinegun (FMPK), 3 Kalashnikovs, 6 semi-automatic rifles (Simonov), 3 rifles, 2 rockets (RPG-7), 2 grenades, 2 propellants for rocket launcher (RPG-7), 7 Kalashnikov chargers, 1 chain of ammunitions, ammunitions (1,437);
- on 26 May 2018, 3 Kalashnikovs, 5 semi-automatic rifles (Simonov), 8 rifles, 1 G3 rifle, 10 grenades, 4 rockets SPG-9, 3 SGP-9 recoilless rifles, 8 chargers, ammunitions (1,432);
- on 14 May 2018, 1 heavy machine gun (14,5 mm), 1 FMPK machine gun, 2 Kalashnikovs, 1 rifle, 21 propellants for rocket launcher (RPG-7), 11 rockets (RPG-7), 16 chains of ammunitions (14,5mm), ammunitions (3,300);
- on 16 November 2017, 1 rifle FMPK, 9 Kalashnikovs, 1 rocket launcher (RPG-7), 4 semi-automatic rifles (Simonov), 1 rifle, other weapons and ammunitions;
- on 28 October 2017, a 14,5-mm heavy machine gun, PKT machine PKT and ammunitions;
- on 30 September 2017, 6 semi-automatic rifles (Simonov), 5 Kalashnikovs, 1 grenade launcher, 3 rifles, 4 grenades.

\textit{Weapons from 31 May 2018 seizure}