

Service Contract IFS/2014/330-792

Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support (CORMS)

Mali and Niger Mission Report 2 - 11 February 2016



A European Union Project
implemented by the Royal United
Services Institute



EUROPEAN COMMISSION
EuropeAid Co-operation Office
Instrument for Stability/Contract no. No. IFS/2014/330-792

Submitted to:
Valérie Miranda
Programme Manager
European Commission
EuropeAid
Unit B5 – Instrument for Stability – Trans-regional threats
J- 59, 04/078, B-1049 Brussels/Belgium

Contract no. No. IFS/2014/330-792

2016

Authors: Axel Klein, Laurent Guillame

Contents

Abbreviations	4
Executive Summary	5
Recommendations	7
Introduction	12
Situation in Mali and Niger	17
<i>Locating drug trafficking in wider security challenges</i>	17
<i>The relevance of Mali and Niger for Cocaine Route Programme</i>	18
CORMS mission (02 -06/02 Mali, 02 – 11/02 Niger)	20
ROM report: WAPIS	23
AIRCOP Assessment	32
Annex 1: Law enforcement at Niamey airport loses access to I-24/7 after the introduction of PISCES	37
Annex 2: Passenger Search - Case study 1 at Niamey and 2 at Bamako airports	39
Annex 3: Training/mentoring Event	42
Annex 4: Seizures of psychotropic drugs in Mali	44
Annex 5: Questionnaire	45
Annex 6: Mission Schedule	47

Abbreviations

AIRCOP	Airport Communication Programme
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb
CENcomm	Customs Enforcement Network Communication Platform
CFA franc	Franc of the Communauté Financière Africaine
CORMS	Cocaine Route Monitoring and Support
CRP	Cocaine Route Programme
CVE	Counter Violent Extremism
DACORE	Data Collection and Registration Centre
DG	Directorate General / Direction General
DGNP	Directorate General of the National Police
DPT	Direction de la Police Technique/ Directorate of Technical Police
DST	Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire/ Directorate of Territorial Surveillance
DoA	Declaration of Acceptance
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
EUCAP	European Union's Capacity
EUD	European Union Delegation
FAED	Fichier Automatisé des Empreintes Digitales/ Automatic Fingerprint File
HQ	Headquarter
I-24/7	INTERPOL's Global Police Communication System
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation
JAITF	Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MS	Member State
MUJAO	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NCB	National Central Bureau
OCS	Office Central des Stupéfiants/ Central Bureau of Narcotics
OCTRIS	Office Central de Répression du Trafic Illicite des Stupéfiants / Central Bureau for the Repression of Illicit Drug Trafficking
PAJET	Project Action Judicial Police
PISCES	Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
PJ	Judicial Police
PTS	Police Technique et Scientifique/ Technical and Scientific Police
QSG	Quality Systems Group
ROM	Results oriented monitoring
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US	United States
WAPIS	West Africa Police System

Executive Summary

1. **WAPIS** - The West African Police Information System has developed considerable momentum in Niger, with a purpose-built DACORE centre up and running. For several months officers from different agencies have been systematically uploading documents onto the system. Over 4,000 case files had been entered at the time of visit. The aim is to digitise the paper records stretching back decades and then make the data available to police forces, gendarmerie, Customs services and the Eaux et Forêts agency all over the country. For the time being, officers need to visit the centre in person, but it is hoped that the next project phase will provide computer terminals and cabling to link police stations around the capital, before the staged extension to other parts of the country. It is planned to make the system operational, that is provide access to officers conducting investigations, in the next three to six months.

2. The project has not registered the same rate of success in Mali. The process of uploading documents has been much slower with only 600 case files reported uploaded, the facilities have been deemed inadequate by the WAPIS experts and the Customs service does not appear to be participating in the project at the moment.

3. One factor that can be clearly identified leading to the different performance of the two countries is the leadership. In Niger there has been a very strong steer from a senior police officer who has built a coalition of stakeholders, communicated the objectives of the project, and motivated the teams. Projects are best positioned to succeed when there is a local champion to drive it.

4. **AIRCOP** - The control of incoming passengers and air freight for drugs and other illicit commodities has considerably improved at both Bamako and Niamey airports by the establishment of Joint Airport Interdiction Task Forces. In both countries the teams were well motivated and willing to learn. The JAITF leaders provided strong leadership and good role models. Their role is critical in guaranteeing the success of the units. This should not be measured simply in drug seizures. The most important long term objective should be deterrence which is achieved through the professionalism and integrity of the team.

5. The operational performance in both locations leaves room for improvement, but the commitment of the teams combined with the training and backstopping provided by AIRCOP are working towards continual improvement. There are perennial issues with resources and facilities (office space, access to passenger manifests, communication equipment) which again, are being addressed by AIRCOP's continuing engagement, both with policy makers and operational managers at the airport. Training, mentoring and monitoring remain critical for ensuring that projects meet their objectives.

6. It needs to be underlined that the project is designed to protect beneficiaries from exploitation by drug couriers and the shipment of drugs through airfreight. The bulk of drug cargos entering Mali by air on clandestine flights to uncontrolled airstrips in the north of the country will continue and require different counter measures. In its current form AIRCOP has little impact on cocaine trafficking by air into Western Africa as flights by drug cargo planes from South America (Venezuela, Brazil) to northern Mali reportedly continue.

7. Drug control is being de-prioritized – It is evident from discussions with OCS in Mali and OCTRIS in Niger that the issue of drug control is no longer considered of major importance by national government and international donors. Resources are now flowing into counter extremism and fighting the insurgency. This has affected the morale of these inter-ministerial agencies, where some officers complain about it being a ‘punishment post’. This may have negative effects on the performance of JAIFs and will also undermine the sustainability of these units after the project ends. There is a strong case to be made, though, that the work of JAIFs has cross cutting benefits on other security issues. It should also be considered to broaden the brief of drug control agencies to address all forms of organised crime.

8. The focus on seizures and lack of investigations – The preoccupation with security in the region has to be considered next to the slow evolution of an investigative law enforcement culture. The concern of both the JAIFs and the inter-ministerial agencies where they are based is with drug seizures. It is a perennial challenge for all CRP projects to extend the interest of the agencies to investigating networks and organisations behind the trade. There have, however, been examples of controlled deliveries promising a change in policing style. The WAPIS project of course holds the promise of facilitating an intelligence-led approach to law enforcement.

9. Need for improving donor coordination – The CORMS team was disturbed to find how law enforcement agencies in both Bamako and Niamey airports had been disconnected from the INTERPOL I-24/7 systems after the installation of the US-funded PISCES system. Not only does this mean that beneficiary law enforcement agencies can no longer access INTERPOL’s criminal databases and alert notices but, in Niger at least, senior law enforcement officers were unaware that this had happened. Neither the EU officials nor the US embassy staff interviewed knew about the consequences of the PISCES installation. It is clear that there is a real need for closer donor cooperation and for better assessments of the costs and benefits of each input.

10. Mentorship and engagement - The mission was timed to coincide with a training/mentoring event organised by AIRCOP. Observing the interaction between trainer and the Niamey JAIF confirmed the invaluable benefit of a ‘hands on approach close as the positive results went well beyond the skill transfer. EU security sector reform projects should move beyond the ‘train and equip’ approach and look at developing more long term relationships by embedding officers in beneficiary organisations and working towards structural and organisational change.

Recommendations

Macro level

- Coordination with strategic partners – In both countries the capacity of airport based law enforcement to access INTERPOL databases and receive alerts was debilitated by US projects that installed new systems. While the PISCES system introduced by US agencies is of potential value this depends entirely on the databases against which names and biometric details of travellers can be checked. At present neither country has that capacity. At the same time the existing facility allowing border services to check with INTERPOL has been severed. Interestingly this had taken place over one year ago but information on the process or the consequences were not shared with either the EUD or the security officers based at the French embassy. While the US remains committed to working with European partners at political level, the agencies appear to be working to different priorities. This can be addressed through closer and better coordination and information exchange. Most interesting, perhaps, was that the Nigerien Director General of Police himself was unaware that the airport I-24/7 system had been made dysfunctional.
- Long term presence on the ground - It is increasingly apparent that projects performance improves when training or mentoring staff are present. It lifts morale, directs purpose and provides a direct skill transfer by working together. It is also the best guarantee for projects staying on course and avoiding abuses and corruption. The EU should therefore consider to appoint regional representatives who work across a number of projects, supporting training, following up on deliveries.
- Shift from train and equip to institutional change – At present the CRP is providing training and equipment. While the JAIFs (and JMU) are new units, they have been formed out of existing agencies and at times replace existing arrangements to combat trafficking. There is an urgent need to consider working with the major law enforcement agencies and conduct institutional changes in conjunction with other donors. Both WAPIS and AIRCOP are already providing valuable inputs. It should be considered to support institutional changes in the main partner agencies and commit to support over the long term.
- Checks on importation of currency - In Niamey incoming travellers have to be given the opportunity to make currency declarations by providing them with Customs forms together with immigration forms. These forms should clearly show the limit of foreign currency that can be brought into the country. Customs officers should be trained in what that amount is and not have discretion to apply different interpretations of the law.
- Mali – A different locale for DACORE should be considered (the present one is not big enough).
- Nurturing of the FP and National Committee - There should be an awareness raising of service users / personnel resource – people who are at the critical to the actual

implementation of the project. There should also an involvement of the commissaries. They should identify the resource people with criteria provided by the project, i.e. computer literacy, educational qualifications.

- EDF – Continued investment in pilot countries to continue working with pilot countries before rolling out across ECOWAS.
- Longer mentoring periods – The WAPIS regional coordinator should be spending more time inside the DACORE centres working with the teams when uploading documents and helping to organise the meetings of the national committee. The visits should coincide with these meetings and take place cyclically so that when the regional representative returns he can follow up on the recommendations and resolutions of the last meeting.

Project Level

AIRCOP

- Bonuses for JAIF staff - Governments should be asked to honour their promises to officers transferred to the JAIFs and pay out 'premiums'. Alternative forms of revenue generation, such as the recycling of seized assets, need to be considered carefully as they open dangerous cycles of 'policing for profit' and are liable to be abused. The advantages of working on a JAIF lie in the training, the possibility of taking part in international operations, and the general professionalism of the teams, all of which should be conducive to career progression. It is also recommended that officers are asked to apply to join the JAIFs to ensure better understanding of the role.
- Rights to search baggage - The situation at the Bamako JAIF should be reviewed and the legal authority of officers from services other than Customs checked. If it is correct that they have no legal right to search passengers' luggage, this needs to be rectified. As legislative change seems difficult, a re-organisation of the JAIF should be considered, with a MoU that ensures the participation of all agencies, and establishes competencies and procedures. The Bamako JAIF should not be conducting searches for which it has no legal mandate.
- Recording activities - AIRCOP should provide a template for recording information from each search – this should include details of the passengers' journey and the reason why s/he was stopped, the grounds for suspicion and the results of the search. The recording is part of the training, it provides a stream of data for analysis and can provide officers with a defence should they get challenged.
- Practical improvements for conducting searches - In Mali there should be designated desks for placing items from cases that are being searched to avoid them being scattered over different desktops in the crowded offices. When items of luggage are searched close to scanning machines, the officers should walk away from the actual machine. The background noise can drown out some of the responses of the passenger, and the movement of passengers and officials creates confusion that can result in mistakes.

- Inform passengers on process - JAITF officers should have clear guidelines for information to passengers on the reasons for the research and for each stage of the process. In Bamako the office where the search takes place lies in a secluded corner of the airport. For passengers arriving in a strange country or for female passengers this can cause anxiety especially with a team in civilian clothing. Such anxieties can be allayed if officers abide by a clear protocol.
- Piss tests - Urine tests should be conducted in the toilet and it should be avoided to carry samples into a crowded office. There should also be a provision to allow passengers to carry their luggage with them to the toilet.
- Facilities - The JAITFs require adequate facilities for the search of suspicious individuals. It is also important have toilets located nearby, as the task forces have to carry out urine tests on stopped people. It would be convenient to install security devices in these areas in order to store money and drug seizures safely for a short period of time.
- Improve airline cooperation - It was observed that some airlines were reluctant to provide the JAITF with passenger manifests, or did so shortly before arrival, or on paper form. This makes profiling difficult as officers are supposed to check names against databases and exchange information with colleagues in other JAITFs. On the other hand there are concerns over data protection. Some airlines refuse to communicate flights specifications, and the national authorities prefer not to insist rather than terminating contracts with airlines. The CORMS team suggests the organisation of a working meeting with representatives of these companies to attract their interest on cooperating with the local homeland security services.
- Connect the JAITFs to Internet and to I-24/7 – The provision of an I-24/7 terminal is essential, as well as a permanent Internet connection. The CORMS team suggests that these network connections should be wired rather than WiFi, in order to guarantee the confidentiality of the exchanged data. These instruments could be usefully coupled to the WAPIS and, potentially, to the PISCES system in order to create an actual digital synergy.
- Improve cooperation between investigation services - During the mission, it appeared that no extensive investigation was undertaken for most of the seizures of drugs or other illegal goods. The absence of thorough investigations makes every project for the fight against organised crime ineffective. In the two audited countries, the JAITF depends on the Inter-ministerial Office for the Fight against Drug Trafficking (OCS and OCTRIS in Mali and Niger, respectively). Nevertheless, the JAITFs do not actually cooperate with the investigative units of this office, being satisfied enough with the seizure (“prises sèches”), and investing all their energies in the detection of the smugglers. It is impossible to fight against organised crime without conducting extensive investigations. Therefore, the CORMS team recommends the organisation of trainings and awareness actions in this regard.

WAPIS

- Create a synergy with the PISCES system – This device for biometric data collection (finger prints and photographic images) has been installed by the United States to

the detriment of the AIRCOP project, as confirmed by our partners at the airports. The current use of the data in the server is unclear. It appears that the Americans have unlimited access to the collected data, while the Malian and the Nigerien homeland security services have to pass through a long and discouraging procedure to access this strategic database. The CORMS team suggests encouraging our partners to facilitate the access to this system and verify its compatibility with WAPIS in order to create a synergy between the two databases.

- Promote the Nigerien model for WAPIS – One of the main difficulties in the implementation of the WAPIS project is the decentralised management of the project in those countries that have reviewed their priority towards the fundamentalist terrorism threat. In view of this, the differences between Mali and Niger regarding the progress of the projects and the involvement of the local authorities are significant. In Mali, the WAPIS project does not mobilise the security services. Moreover, it is probable that the phase of collection and scanning of the procedures had been initiated in view of the arrival of the audit mission. In Niger, the process is far more advanced. The local authorities underline the progress and the implication of their services in the implementation of WAPIS, which will be undoubtedly operational in Niamey region in a few months. The difference between the two countries definitely hinges on the strong leadership by Aboubacar Daddy of the Nigerien National Police and the participation of EUCAP mission experts in assisting the project on a technical level. CORMS therefore supports INTERPOL in identifying potential champions to lead the project in each country. In addition, it is recommended that the Bamako EUCAP mission provides special support to the Malian services that manage the project.
- Organise awareness operations – The CORMS team realised that the Homeland security operational services in Mali are not sufficiently involved in the WAPIS project. This creates the problem on feeding procedure data into the server. It is worth noting the reluctance of Customs authorities in both countries, which consider the project as an offshoot of the national police. According to the Customs, the National Police would have a control on an information system that the Customs would feed without having any return on their investment. The CORMS team suggest the implementation of a second awareness campaign on the importance and the interest on the active participation to the WAPIS project both in the different directorates (Police – Customs – Gendarmerie – National Guard - Eaux et Forêts).
- Energise and split the function of the WAPIS committees – It is recommended that the committees are encouraged to meet regularly to set in train the process of information sharing and joint planning. Attendance by members of EUCAP (facilitated by CORMS in Niger) or members from the EUD should be considered. It appears that at present the agencies in neither Mali nor Niger are aware of the existence of these committees. In addition to the existing high level committee, a technical committee should be formed to allow the users of the system to discuss issues and improvements.
- Develop optic fibre networks – On WAPIS' national development, the project clashes with the inadequacy of the optic fibre networks, which are present only in the southern areas of both countries. In the north, data on procedures are fed by fax,

which is unsatisfactory. Since the areas with the highest crime rate are in the north, the CORMS team urges for decentralised services in the north to feed data into WAPIS and submit requests, if needed. It should be noted that the Malian Customs allegedly have at their disposal an actual and performing optic fibre network covering the entire country, and said that they were willing to share it.

- Address sensibilities of the Mali Customs service – WAPIS computers were initially given to the Customs service, then removed and installed at the DACORE once the centre was opened. Customs consider that they have been deprived. WAPIS would do well to thank the service for helping the project by keeping safe this valuable equipment in the early phase of the project. Perception is everything.

Introduction

Fighting crime against the backdrop of insurgency

Summary

11. Both projects meet important national needs. WAPIS is assisting law enforcement in digitizing paper records and facilitating cross-border cooperation. AIRCOP is making an important contribution to securing national borders and defending sovereignty by making the international airports non permissive environments for drug traffickers. Foreseeable managerial and technical challenges arising in the implementation of both projects have been compounded by political events across the region.

Key Issues

12. The dramatic deterioration in the security situation over recent years has led to the de-prioritisation of drug control and the fight against organised crime, as governments are overwhelmingly concerned with violent extremism. In both countries governments have lost control over large sections of national territory. In the face of such existential threats only very limited resources are being made available to drug control agencies. Both the OCS in Mali and the OCTRIS in Niger are dealing with budget cuts and low in morale. They are looking for external support at the very time that the interest of the donor community is shifting to CVE and migration. According to the head of the unit in Niger, a posting with OCTRIS is considered a punishment post.

13. This withdrawal of support fails to recognise the role played by the trade in high value commodities like drugs in the funding of armed groups and conflict actors. It also fails to take account of how rivalry over controlling this trade exacerbates violence. There is little recognition and understanding among law enforcement agencies about the role of transnational organised crime. Not even the specialised drug agencies, OCS and OCTRIS have an understanding of local drug markets. This lack of analysis impedes strategic threat assessments.

14. The potential of both projects in supporting the fight against violent extremism should be communicated to national and international stakeholders. AIRCOP is adding a further layer for screening passengers while the electronic information retrieval and exchange facilitated by WAPIS can support the identification of suspects and vehicles sought in connection with the conflict.

Points for further consideration

15. Projects are not merely adding resource and capacity but are changing the way and method of policing. WAPIS is in the process of delivering exponential benefits and transformational changes towards investigative and intelligence led policing. In Niamey, where a purpose-built and Nigerien government-funded DACORE centre is up and running, the project is fully in line with national policing objectives and close to becoming operational.

16. There are also clear limitations owing to incongruities between project design and trafficking flows. While AIRCOP tightens security at international airports, this will impact only on the relatively minor amounts of drugs moved by couriers or in airfreight. It was reported that planes with multi ton cocaine cargoes continue to land on airstrips in northern Mali. Moreover, the JAITFs but also the drug control agencies in which they are embedded are principally concerned with drug seizures. The dismantling of trafficking networks is yet to become a policing priority.

Actions

17. The inter-agency cooperation realised by the Joint Action Task Forces at the airports is creating new partnerships with greater effectiveness and efficiency. At Bamako airport the team is making use of the technical equipment provided to improve the rigour of controls at the main international point of entry, while in Niamey the unit has created a network of working relationships to utilise the specialist skills and competencies of different agencies. This has benefits across a range of security concerns. Beneficiaries should be encouraged to maximize these resources.

Donor Commitment and Project Engagement

Summary

18. Both projects have had to manage setbacks and adapt to changing environment. One lesson learnt, however, is that projects can make great strides when there is a close engagement with trainers, mentors and other support staff. These do not necessarily have to come from the implement agencies. WAPIS has been able to secure the support of a police officer from an EU Member State stationed in Niger as part of EUCAP. Regular contact with beneficiaries is helping drive the implementation process and building capacity.

19. AIRCOP draws on law enforcement agencies from member states to provide training and mentoring for beneficiaries. The Belgian officer at Niamey airport demonstrated the multiple benefits of hands on support, by convincing several airlines to furnish the JAITFs with passenger manifests. In addition he was able to help improve the relationship with the Customs service, which will enable the unit to inspect airfreight. Direct contact and close participation in the work has the potential of enhancing the performance of beneficiaries considerably.

Action

20. Close contact also helps in keeping incoming staff informed about projects. There is a risk that project partners or focal points do not disseminate information in beneficiary agencies. This will cause an information gap and a lack of partners when they leave. In Niger, for instance, where the head of Customs had recently retired, the deputy controller of Customs had not heard of WAPIS. The projects should be encouraged to intensify their mentoring activity and extend the contact time with beneficiaries.

Donor cooperation

Summary

21. The inflow of cooperation funds in the wake of the insurgency in northern Mali has created new challenges for both, the absorption capacity of the beneficiaries and the coordination of inputs. CORMS mission findings from interviews with national stakeholders and the site visits to both Bamako and Niamey airports point to a development that threatens to undermine the effectiveness and impact of European interventions.

Key Issues

22. An integral part of the AIRCOP project has been equipping West African partners with the INTERPOL-developed I-24/7 communication system. Access to the INTERPOL databases and participation in the network of international alert notices has enhanced the capacity of governments in policing its borders and furthered their integration in the international law enforcement community. It appears that in both Bamako and Niamey these systems have been disabled following the introduction of the US provided PISCES system. Operated by the Directorate for Territorial Surveillance in Niger and the Border Police in Mali they collect information from incoming and outgoing passengers but have no database to check these against. This they were able to do before via the I-24/7 system. The introduction of PISCES has therefore reduced rather than enhanced the ability of these countries to identify and arrest international criminals at their airports.

Actions

23. These developments raise once again the need for donor cooperation. Given the massive investment in counter terrorism measures by both European and US agencies it is all the more important that these are coordinated and mutually supportive, rather than working against each other. It is particularly important for donors introducing large systems to consult their allies in advance through mechanisms such as the *Partner technique financière*, which reportedly provides a donor forum in Mali. It may also be useful for the CRP to feed into this exchange, with visiting experts or trainers providing outlines of their projects.

The limitations of working with law enforcement in pursuit of good governance

Summary

24. The underlying rationale for all IcSP supported actions like the CRP is to promote good governance and advance the rule of law by enhancing the capacity and competence of law enforcement agencies. It is assumed that in pursuit of these aims the capacity of the state in enforcing the law has to be strengthened. This is operationalised in raising the technical skills, improving the equipment and enhancing the competent of chosen partner agencies. It is assumed that these, be they the Judicial Police or the Customs service, work in analogous fashion to those in European Union countries on which they often are modelled. The evidence from Mali and Niger suggests that this is a false assumption and highly misleading.

Key Issues

25. Law enforcement agencies in both countries are so poorly resourced that officers rarely manage to maintain themselves and their families on the official salaries. The instrumentalisation of the office for personal gain is a working assumption across the system. One of the reasons that Customs officers across the region are so reluctant to join Aircop JAIFs is that there are no opportunities for earning an income. The Customs services everywhere work to raise revenue for the government. In Niger the officers take 20% of any duty or tariff charged on imported goods. They also have much latitude in securing private benefits informally or even illicitly. Bribery is entrenched and factored into the economic calculus of many officers with counterintuitive consequences. The former head of the Niamey JAIF requested to be transferred from his command at the airport to traffic duty. Directing the traffic, considered a low prestige duty in European forces, is highly prized because of the opportunity for extracting bribes from motorists.

26. In recognition of these drawbacks, the government in Mali did reportedly promise a salary lift or premium to JAIF officers that, to the consternation of the officers, is still to be paid. According to the head of OCTRIS in Niger, chronically low levels of remuneration carry risks: “everybody speak about fighting drugs but nobody thinks of paying the police officers for resisting temptation.” Temptation presents itself in multiple guises. Direct payment by perpetrators to officers for non-performance of duty, or the appropriation of drug seizures for resale, though no such cases were reported to the CORMS team.

27. Passengers can be victimised by, for instance, penalising them for carrying undeclared foreign currency when there is confusion about the actual legal limit. It was reported that cash seizures totalling millions of euros have been made at different points of entry. The observed uncertainty that Customs officers at Niamey airport had about the actual legal limit points to the possibility of some of these confiscations had been made illegally. The validity of these concerns was subsequently confirmed when it was reported that Customs officers were applying different legal instruments – a Nigerien law whereby any amount over CFA 2,000,000 needs to be registered and an ECOWAS agreement lifting the amount to CFA 6,000,000– according to context.

Points for further consideration

28. The pursuit of governance becomes paradoxical when the agencies supported by the project have no legal mandate for their routine operations. In Mali, the JAIF is comprised of officers from the judicial police and the gendarmerie. It was reported that neither agency has a legal right to open and search the luggage of passengers as this is the prerogative of the Customs service. In the two instances observed by the CORMS team no Customs officer was present during the search. There is a paradox, then, in encouraging special units to stray beyond their legal competence as part of a wider effort to promote the rule of law.

Actions

29. While the integrity of institutions remains a continuous challenge for both countries, steps can be taken to ameliorate the situation for the operational units and the public. The programme can contribute to the realisation of long term objectives by working with beneficiaries in a series of small steps towards broader goal.

Situation in Mali and Niger

Locating drug trafficking in wider security challenges

30. Conflict continues in northern Mali where insurgent groups control large sectors and where the government is heavily reliant on the presence of foreign troops. The insurgents also have the capacity to strike in the capital as the attack on the Radisson hotel late in 2015 demonstrated. According to senior police officers there are now organised rebel groups in the south of the country, the Macina Liberation Front. During the CORMS mission a group of armed militants including suicide bombers captured a police station in the northern city of Kadila.¹ Fighting has escalated since, with several peacekeepers and Malian soldiers killed.²

31. The inability of the government to control the country's territory has created a governance vacuum that is being exploited by insurgents and transnational organised crime groups with destabilising consequences for the wider region. These conflicts are complex, consisting of boundary crossing rivalries often fused with national, political, ethnic, sectarian and territorial conflicts.³ Drivers include poverty, unemployment, inadequate services, population growth, food insecurity, weak governance, corruption and a widening gap between decision-makers and citizens.⁴

32. Conflict has set in train a vicious circle of a shrinking economy and falling living standard pushing people towards informal and illicit alternatives. Evident in Mali has been the downturn in economic activity following the collapse of tourism and the departure of the much of the expatriate community. The dislocation of economic activity from the licit to the illicit has also facilitated the emergence of conflict actors. The significance of the illicit trade is illustrated by anecdotal evidence. Competing militant groups, cartels, clans and families come to temporary arrangements to facilitate the trade which is prioritised over conflict itself.⁵ This of course includes government agencies, which will stay their hand to avoid upsetting existing arrangements.

33. Revenues from illicit activity have had a significant impact on governance structures in both Mali and Niger, albeit with different outcomes. Political elites and their families have tolerated or played an active role in smuggling across the Sahel. At times, governments have used organised crime as a political resource allowing their allies to benefit from criminal activity. Despite a reported coup attempt in December 2015, Niger has remained relatively stable, whereas Mali experienced state collapse in 2012.

34. These factors create a difficult environment to build capacity to respond to drug trafficking and organised crime. They also create a dilemma for development actors. This was illustrated by the observation of EUD staff in Bamako who said that the importance of

¹ Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-attacks-idUSKCN0VE0XX>

² Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-attacks-idUSKCN0VL0RP>

³ Steven Zyck and Robert Muggah, 2013. 'Conflicts Colliding in Mali and the Sahel', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2(2): 1-6.

⁴ Raymond Gilpin, 2013. "Bridging the Gap: Peacebuilding and Economic Development in the Sahel". Washington, DC: International Network for Economics and Conflict, United States Institute of Peace, 22 April; Mohamed Fall Ould Bah, 2013 *The Political Economy of Conflicts in Northern Mali*. Dakar: ECOWAS Peace and Security Report, Institute for Security Studies.

⁵ Andrew Lebovich, 2013, Mali's Bad Trip: Field Notes from the West African Drug Trade, Foreign Policy <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/15/malis-bad-trip/>

the licit / illicit trade for livelihoods in the north of the country made interventions against smuggling counterproductive.

35. The situation was also calm in Niamey even though the mission coincided with the run-up to presidential elections. While there have been incidents in Niger the security forces appear far more in control. At the same time it is reported that the northern region is stable only because the government has accommodated local power brokers. Given the paucity of economic alternatives the region is economically highly dependent on trade and particularly on migration. Long distance bus routes connect the city of Agadez at the northern extremity of the Community of West African States with population centres in the south. A regular bus service arrives several times a week from Accra in Ghana.⁶ From Agadez migrants move to Algeria or Libya and from there to Europe or the Middle East.

The relevance of Mali and Niger for Cocaine Route Programme

36. Trading links have spanned the West African land mass for centuries, with a lively caravan and porter trade connecting the forest zone in the Gulf of Guinea and the southern Mediterranean. For much of the 20th century, these links were overshadowed by the expansion of maritime trade and the imposition of colonial rule, but in recent decades there has been a resurgence in the economic and political significance of the Sahelian and trans-Saharan trading networks. Two important factors need to be included in the analysis of the phenomenon and the design of development interventions.

- The weakness of the post-colonial state and the importance of other political forces, including ethnic groups and religious authorities.
- The convergence and fluidity of licit and illicit trade. In fact, to a large extent these are notions imposed by external actors with no meaning for the players involved.

37. For the Cocaine Route Programme the implications are profound. The significance of the region as a transit zone gained international notoriety with the 'Air Cocaine' incident in 2009, when a burnt out Boeing 727 was found north of Gao in Mali believed to have carried 10 tonnes of cocaine. It brought to attention that there is a lively trade in illicit commodities of which drugs are among the most valuable.

38. The findings of the CORMS mission point to three distinct flows that should be taken into consideration but require different responses.

- (i) Arrival of cocaine by air to a) unofficial airstrip in the uncontrolled areas of northern Mali. These are often flights from Brazil or Venezuela. b) flow of small quantities of cocaine by mules or airfreight to the international airports at Niamey and Bamako.
- (ii) Overland shipments of cocaine by car or lorry from ports along the Gulf of Guinea and entering southern Niger for onward transport to Agadez, Libya, Europe or the Middle East.
- (iii) The northern arch spanning Mauritania and the northern regions of Mali and Niger for the movement of Moroccan cannabis resin (hashish) to Libya.

⁶ CORMS Ghana-Benin Mission Report

39. These trafficking routes are also used for shipping other contraband, particularly arms, and for the movement of migrants. It is also widely reported that the trade is 'taxed' by armed groups including the different insurgents such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Ansar Al-Dine. It has therefore been argued that the drug trade, as well as other forms of licit and illicit commerce, strengthen insurgency groups. On the other hand, not all groups controlling territorial sectors are insurgents, and these also benefit.⁷ Commercial activity, be this licit or illicit, is not merely a bonus of insurgency, but also a stabilising factor in the vulnerable and fragile north. The strength and intensity of the connections between insurgency and organised crime groups is not clear. Meetings have been recorded between, for example, senior AQIM figures and Colombian traffickers in Guinea-Bissau in October 2010.⁸

40. Western preoccupation with security has led to an increased military presence, counter-terrorism operations and efforts to secure Europe's southern border.⁹ The threat posed by organised crime and the destabilising impact it has on the region has been underestimated.¹⁰ It has certainly led to a divestment of resources from inter-ministerial drug control agencies created only recently in response to western pressure.

⁷ The proposal that " Illicit money undermines long established principles of social organization" assumes erroneously that the rural poor distinguish between the sources of wealth of their patrons and leaders. Shaw, Mark, Reitano, Tuesday, Hunter, Marcena, 2014. *Comprehensive Assessment of Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime in West and Central Africa* was commissioned by the African Union. Institute for Security Studies

⁸ Laurence Aida Ammour, 2012. *2012 Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria's Pivotal Ambivalence*. Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

⁹ ICG, 2015. The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm, International Crisis Group, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/227-the-central-sahel-a-perfect-sandstorm.aspx>

¹⁰ Wolfram Lacher, 2012. *Organised Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC.

CORMS mission (02 -06/02 Mali, 02 – 11/02 Niger)

41. There are two CRP projects in which Mali and Niger participate, AIRCOP and WAPIS. The team had been requested by the contracting authority to conduct an end of term assessment of the IcSP-funded WAPIS pilot phase (September 2012 - February 2016). The project is due to be rolled out across all ECOWAS countries with funding from the 16th EDF. In the interim bridging funding is being sought from INTERPOL internal funds and the Trust Fund for Africa.

42. The actual timing of the mission, however, was occasioned by a mentoring event for the AIRCOP project at Niamey. After coordinating with the AIRCOP team and the Belgian trainer the mission was therefore arranged to allow the team to participate to the mentoring.

43. Interviews were held with stakeholders in Bamako and Niamey. Most importantly, the team visited the sites of both projects, including the DACORE centres at the Judicial Police in Mali and Niger. The team also visited Bamako and Niamey airports to shadow the teams as they worked on incoming flights. In Bamako it was a Royal Air Maroc flight coming from Casablanca and in Niamey a Turkish Airline flight from Istanbul and an Air Burkina flight from Ouagadougou. The team observed the entire process from the profiling of passengers, the identification of suspects, the interrogation, luggage search and urine testing.

44. The team was comprised of the CORMS team leader Axel Klein, Laurent Guillaume, a former French police officer as Non Key Expert, and Sasha Jespersen from RUSI.

45. In line with a request from the contracting authority a ROM template has been adapted for the reporting on WAPIS. A narrative report is provided for AIRCOP.

WAPIS

46. It is important to break down the project into its three key components. The concrete output of transcribing police paper records into a digital data base, is readily understood, as is the objective to spur international law enforcement cooperation and information exchange. A more implicit, but critical objective underlying the entire project, is the attempt to spur fundamental changes to West African policing. Information and data records are intended to facilitate and encourage an investigative approach to law enforcement, based on evidence. This is where the police become a pillar for good governance rather than a tool of incumbent government and ruling elites.

WAPIS Technical Progresses in Mali

47. In Mali, the WAPIS focal point is the Commissioner, Chief of the INTERPOL's National Central Bureau (NCB). The NCB is a decentralised unit of the Directorate General of the National Police (DGNP) and hosts the I-24/7 terminal. The DACORE platform, which is a part of and managed by the NCB, is located within the new area of the DGNP. These premises house operational material resources and IT equipment provided by INTERPOL. During our visit, we could observe operators from two different law enforcement agencies contributing to the WAPIS project (Gendarmerie and Police). It was noted that officers from Customs and Eaux and Fôret were not on site. Customs officers appear not to participate actively in feeding data into WAPIS server. The agents in charge of filing the digital data had a good

command of the IT instrument. They all had benefitted from trainings on procedure scanning organised by INTERPOL. Nevertheless, when we asked them about the number of procedures that had been archived on the database so far, the Police Commissioner responsible of the DACORE Platform told us that approximately 600 cases had been filed. We were not able to verify this number. Given the hesitations of our interlocutors and the contradictory information from other staff members, we concluded that the implementation of the procedures' collection had begun only very recently.

48. From the interviews with different project partners we realised that there is limited awareness and understanding of the objectives of the project. While the decision-making department fully realises its potential usefulness and underlines the difficulty of its implementation, other technical departments were not even aware of the existence of this project. It is recommended to continue and intensify an "awareness action" with operational services, so that each of them realises the benefits that the project can provide.

The problem of Malian Customs

49. During the interview with the Director-General of Customs, the heads of departments and with the French ITE (International Technical Expert), advisor of the Director General, it was observed that the Customs Directorate does not feel the need of being involved in the WAPIS project. The Customs believe that the project is an offshoot of the General Directorate of the National Police (DGNP) and that they do not have any interest to participate to its implementation. Customs officers recalled that a number of computers had been provided to them when a focal point was established. A while later, these same computers were then removed to be sent to the DACORE platform, located in the Police Directorate. The fact that the project managers had decided to centralise the scanning of paper documents in a single place and that the terminals therefore had to be transferred was not accepted as a legitimate reason by the officers.

50. It resulted in considerable inconvenience for Customs officers who had to cross Bamako to upload documents. Moreover, the Malian Customs highlighted the fact that they possess only the Mali's optic fibre network that allows them to communicate with cross-border checkpoints countrywide. They are willing to make it available to WAPIS only if they are more involved in the management of the project.

51. In conclusion, the CORMS team believes that it is essential to implement awareness actions for operational services so that they understand how the project could benefit them in the future and thus begin participating in WAPIS.

WAPIS Technical Progresses in Niger

52. The CORMS team was impressed by the positive involvement of the Nigerien authorities in the implementation of the WAPIS project. The organisation of the procedure collection is rational and the data filing procedure is efficient. According to the local authorities, the National Police have filed more than 2700 procedures and the National Gendarmerie 1100. On the other hand, only a relative small number of cases have been filed by the National Guard. During the visit to the DACORE centre, the Nigerien authorities explained us the filing process. An official is in charge of data validation to avoid errors and unjustified registrations in the server, an aspect that the CORMS team has considered very important. All the police services utilise a complete and very-well designed model.

53. It is important to notice that the Directorate-General of Customs does not actively participate to the phase of data collection.

The problem of Nigerien Customs

54. When the CORMS team met the Deputy Director General and his French ITE advisor, it appeared that they had not been informed on WAPIS implementation. After verification with the focal point – the Director of the Judicial Police – it was confirmed that the Customs had transferred the section chief in charge of WAPIS to the province and that, from then, nobody has assured that there was a contact point for the project.

A well-established project

55. Despite these difficulties, the different services consider the police information system a very effective tool. They discern its potential utility and the added value for their investigations. It is possible to notice that the Nigerien authorities want to rapidly advance in the framework of WAPIS, but not without any conditions. They want the system to go live only once there is sufficient information on the database. The intention is to avoid users being disappointed in their searches and being put off the system.

56. The CORMS team has also met the EUCAP mission's direction staff and experts. The latter contribute to the realisation of the project providing training actions and ensuring a WAPIS follow-up and mentoring. Their permanent presence is probably one of the explanations for the advanced state of the project.

57. The Nigerien authorities have invested in WAPIS by providing the DACORE platform with a new building, staff and an efficient electric generator. This synergy gives hope for a completely operational use (at national level) in the short to medium term (an extension of two-three months has been mentioned). It is expected that in the next phase the project will be extended across the capital and environs, so that officers can access the terminals from their stations. To reach its potential, however, the project will have to be extended across regions. For now, data is being sent by fax, which strictly limits the utility of the system.

ROM report: WAPIS

58. The experience of the two countries is very different making it difficult to produce a single assessment of the situation. Whereas in Mali much more support is needed not just to raise capacity but to build up understanding of the basic benefits of the project, WAPIS is almost up and running in Niger.

Relevance

1.1 Does the project presently respond to the needs of the target groups?

59. There is recognition among law enforcement officers in both countries that there is a need for improving the police information systems. The increasing movement of people within each country alone has left the old system of paper-based police records held at regional police stations unable to match the demands of law enforcement agencies. The threat of insurgency and the accompanying lawlessness particularly in northern Mali underline the need for more effective law enforcement capacity.

60. The project was developed in response to a request of West African Chiefs of Police to the European Union. The actions can therefore be said to respond to the identified needs of the target groups. One difficulty, however, is the turnover of senior officers leading to a loss of institutional memory. Where strong leadership is provided however, beneficiaries can take ownership and push the project forward.

61. In **Niger** the need for an electronic database has been recognised by senior police officers at the Judicial Police who have benefitted of sustained support and unlocked funding from the Niger government. At operational level there is sustained commitment from officers of several agencies working at the DACORE centre.

62. At agency level the need for better information system is fully understood. The Customs services in **Mali** are reportedly using IMF funds for setting up a database.¹¹ Customs is the only agency that since 2009 has a global network connecting the border posts with headquarters.

1.2. Is the action adequate vis-à-vis the present capacity of the local partner?

63. In addition, the changing profile of organised crime and the increasing incidence of terrorism are making new demands on law enforcement and security services. There is a rising need for investigative, evidence led policing. The police forces in both countries have responded to that need by taking a more scientific approach to policing. In Niger the Directorate of Technical Police (DPT) is charged with establishing the Judicial Identity by taking and classifying fingerprints, while the Technical and Scientific Police (PTS) runs the forensic laboratory. They work closely with the DACORE centre which is located on the same premises.

¹¹ Presumably this is the Automated System for Customs Data World (AYSCUDA) "the purpose of this migration is for all Customs documents to be processed in paperless form and institute a fully electronic Customs declaration system" mentioned in IMF Country Report No15/151, June 2015, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15151.pdf>

64. In **Mali**, however, the laboratory is on a separate location and officers have difficulty with transport as they have no vehicles and an allowance of 120 litres for their motorbikes for a three months period. They do not lead investigations but provide technical support. This indicates not only a different attitude to policing but also practical difficulties in transferring disks to the DACORE centre.

65. The police services in both countries are also integrated into the global communication network provided by the INTERPOL I-24/7 system. This is the system that will be used for passing international requests for WAPIS. In **Mali**, the only functioning terminal is at the NCB at the Judicial Police (the I-24/7 terminal at the airport was reportedly disconnected by a US project),¹² but it has only limited capacity due to the intermittent electricity supply. A GIZ supplied generator from 2011 is no longer working and the NCB is looking for a replacement from donors. It was claimed that 50-80 alerts are sent out per year and about 100 received.

66. According to the NCB at the Judiciary Police in Niamey, **Niger** reportedly receives and responds to five international alerts per month, usually for stolen vehicles or terrorism. It is led by a well trained and motivated officer. It has the capacity to take on the international WAPIS inquiries once the system become operational.

67. The importance of data transmission is also captured by the EU funded Project Action Judicial Police (PAJET), which will link police stations in Niger with fibre optic cable. The Judicial Police stations in Niamey and Agadez are already connected by fibre optic cable.

1.3. Do all key stakeholders still demonstrate effective commitment (ownership)?

68. In Mali where the project was launched in September the data loading process has just begun. A number of Judicial Police officers and Gendarmes were observed scanning and uploading documents at the DACORE. The chief administrator reported that by then around 600 cases had been uploaded. None of the other services, Customs and Eaux et Forêt, had provided data so far. It was reported that at one point in time the project had provided the Customs service with computers, but that these were subsequently removed and taken to the DACORE. This did not help build relations with the agency.

69. In **Niger** the project has obtained the support from the PJ, Gendarmerie and the National Guard. Of the 4,000 plus cases uploaded onto the data base 2,700 were from the PJ and 1,100 from the Gendarmerie. The Customs service does not seem to be participating at all. The deputy director of Customs had not heard of the project.

1.4. Is there an effective government led system of sector coordination involving the relevant local stakeholders and donors?

70. Leadership has been central in guaranteeing the success of this project in **Niger**. There is strong support within the police with buy in from other services. There is also a national committee that has met. There is an opportunity to develop this further by complementing the strategic level work with a technical committee where rising issues can be discussed.

¹² Interview with Commissaire Principal Badji Coulibaly 02/02/2016

71. In **Mali** the national committee was said to be meeting twice a year, but it was not clear when these were held, what had been discussed or who had attended. There is a need for a review of the committee and its functions.

1.5. Are there any complementarity issues with other ongoing/planned projects or programmes managed by donors that need to be addressed?

72. In **Mali** the Customs service have developed an independent database that could be linked to WAPIS. The US is also in the process of providing finger printing capacity to all commissariats. Again, this could provide a valuable data source. At present however, the installation of US funded finger printing systems appears to degrade rather than enhance police capacity in both countries.¹³

73. In **Niger** the project has managed to secure the support of Romanian, a police officer seconded to EUCAP. This has proved invaluable for ongoing mentoring, training and technical back up. At the same time there has been a lack of communication with US-funded database projects, where there is a real opportunity for synergies. There is an urgent need to create coordinating mechanisms to avoid projects working against each other.

1.6. Have changed circumstances (including critical constraints in the context) been taken into account by updating the intervention logic?

74. The project was developed as a police project and integrated into a programme that is principally concerned with combatting organized crime and drug trafficking. Across the wider Sahel region the rise of radical Islam has changed the priorities of the authorities. In **Niger**, the drug control agency, OCTRIS, is underfunded and the morale is low. It should be considered emphasizing the valuable contribution the project can make to counter terrorism. In **Mali** too, the inter-ministerial OCS has lost in status and they have not been asked to upload case files onto the WAPIS database.

1.7 Indicators

75. Indicators are yet to be developed.

Conclusions

76. The project is highly relevant to the fast moving West African crime scene and the growing internationalisation of crime. Since it is technically ambitious there are practical challenges that have held back implementation and caused delays. Support will be required for the acceleration of the data migration and for making the database accessible from local police stations.

Efficient

2.1 Are the chosen implementation mechanisms (incl. choice of implementation modalities, entities and contractual arrangements) conducive for achieving the expected results?

¹³ See appendix f

77. The project makes good use of INTERPOL expertise, technology and reach. Every police force has a National Central Bureau which is a contact point. As it was West African chiefs of police who first identified the project and who are partners of INTERPOL, the contractual arrangements are fundamentally sound. On the ground, however, the implementing agencies in West Africa need regular support. The training and mentoring provided is too intermittent and ways should be found to maintain more frequent contact. The partnership with the EUCAP mission in **Niger** is exemplary for building synergies across projects. The anticipated location of the project management office to Abidjan under the EDF may create greater connectivity between implementing agency and beneficiaries.

2.2 Do local partners effectively lead in the planning of the action (including CD if relevant) beyond formal endorsement?

78. See above – the project was identified by West African chiefs of police. In Niger the strong leadership of the Police FP means that the project is being adapted to national requirements.

2.3 Inputs

a) Do the resources correspond to the needs of the action?

b) Do local partners provide the inputs (human or physical) that would be required to enable the action to be effective?

c) To what degree are resources (inputs) available on time from other stakeholders?

79. The resources provided by the project include the servers, computers and communication systems identified and installed by INTERPOL. It is not clear what is being done to maintain these systems. In **Niger** the police have trained up personnel who have taken ownership of the project and are working with it. They have also identified colleagues in the other agencies to discuss technical issues with.

80. In **Mali** the process has only just begun and no local champion has emerged as yet. The NCB could provide stronger support to the project. The DACORE centre is located on a floor of the head quarters of the Judicial Police not far from the NCB. The lead partner agency, the PJ understand that this is not considered an adequate facility by the implementer.

81. But less visible project inputs have also contributed to efficiency gains. For example the WAPIS developed standardised format data entry now used by all LEAs in all countries. This is an extremely important development, that (i) facilitates the migration of data from paper to digital records, (ii) creates efficiencies in the recording of information pertinent to cases and (iii) harmonises the way information on cases is presented and used among different agencies. Potentially this is also an effective tool in promoting inter agency cooperation.

2.4 Delays

a) If there are delays, how important are they?

b) Have the reasons been identified?

c) Are the revisions of planning being properly implemented?

82. The delay to the project in **Mali** may be due to it not having attracted a powerful local champion. The absence of electronic links between police stations and the DACORE centre

means that files have to be transported either on a disk or in paper form. This is both risky, as data can get lost, labour intensive, and slow.

83. In **Niger** the system has not been used operationally because it does not as yet contain sufficient number of entries. One of the reasons is that paper case files are reviewed and summarised. Additional documents, such as finger prints, photographs, interviews, notes from the police officers are then scanned.

84. Two different processes are involved. First, the summary of the case on the template form, and, secondly, the scanning of the documents belonging to each 'procedure' or case. The documents are scanned in the police archives at the headquarters of the PJ and then loaded onto a disk, which is then taken to the DACORE. It is here that the summary of the case is produced and matched with the scanned documents from the disk. Subsequently, another officer validates each entry. This is a long and exhausting process, but it ensures that no false information is entered.

2.5. Have the outputs been produced/ delivered in a cost-efficient manner?

85. Information on budgets is not made available to CORMS teams on country visits. But the co-funding by the Niger government in constructing the building housing the DACORE centre as well as a generator suggests that resources are managed well to secure outputs.

2.6. Is the action adequately monitored and/or assessed by the local partners?

86. In neither country was the role played by the WAPIS committee sufficiently understood by any of the interlocutors to provide a satisfactory answer. One possible scenario is that the committee was instrumental in securing the participation of different stakeholders at the outset of the project. Now that this has been largely achieved the tasks need to be re-defined.

Effective

3.1. Has the expected progress in term of outputs being properly achieved?

87. The WAPIS project should be seen as having three interrelated but distinct components: first the raising of beneficiary capacity by providing training and equipment; secondly, the exchange of police information in the ECOWAS region; thirdly, the change in policing from reactive enforcement to intelligence led investigation. The first is easier to assess, but also a facilitator for the other two. According to mission findings there are considerable differences between the two countries. In Niger, however, considerable progress has contributed to raising capacity and changing attitudes towards performance. So far now international cooperation has been recorded.

3.2 Is the quality of outputs satisfactory?

88. In **Mali** the data migration has only just begun and at the time of the visit 600 case files had reportedly been uploaded and were available to the administrator only.

89. In **Niger**, the project has succeeded in establishing a functioning DACORE centre. This means there is a central building, furnished and equipped with computers, where officers

from Judicial Police, Gendarmerie and National Guard are scanning the paper records of cases and uploading them into the database. Up to 8 February, over 4,000 'procedures' had been entered. These can be retrieved by the officers seconded to the unit.



Paper archives at the National Police HQ in Niamey

90. A major shortcoming of the project in both countries is the centralisation of the database in the DACORE centres. Local stations of the police, gendarmerie or Customs cannot access the database but have to travel to the centre. While the procedure is easy the practicalities are not. The extension to all stations in Bamako is foreseen in the near future with the help of the project.

3.3 Are the outputs still likely to lead to the expected outcomes?

91. The commitment of the national government in **Niger** is underlined by the fact that it paid for the building and the generator, while the project provided the equipment. The positive attitude was shared by the administrator of the DACORE centre and the professionalism of the officers involved in uploading the data. The WAPIS system is central to the modernisation of policing techniques.

92. Much of this can also be said for **Mali**. But there is far less commitment by the partner agencies to serve as a guarantee that outputs will lead to outcomes in the mid-term.

93. One of the key difficulties for any West African police information system is the fragility of the systems for establishing identity. The records for birth and consequently for citizenship are deliberately elastic to make allowances for low levels of literacy and disconnection from government services. This is an inclusive strategy adapted to the reality of life for rural and nomadic populations. But it also creates opportunities for criminals to adopt new identities. In **Niger** the authorities issue documents when applications are supported by the testimony from two witnesses. At the same time voter registration systems including biometric data to prevent multiple voting have been introduced in **Niger**. There may be opportunities for using these systems to develop more precise citizens' registration procedures without excluding populations in remote regions. While this is well

beyond the scope of WAPIS the underlying fragility will continue to compromise the effectiveness of any police data system.

3.4 Are there evidences that the action supports the implementation or the development (or its changes) of the partners' policy/actions?

94. As discussed above, there seems to be a dynamic at work in Nigerien law enforcement to update and modernize procedures.

Sustainability

4.1 Is an adequate level of human and institutional capacity (avoiding unnecessary parallel mechanisms) put in place in order to continue delivering the action's benefits?

95. In Mali it is unlikely that the project activities will continue without further support. In all likelihood the equipment provided will go the same way as the generator provided by a previous GIZ-funded project in 2014 which is now defunct in the years. This is because there are no viable champions among the stakeholders to promote the project.

96. With the construction of a generator provided building, the coalescence of different agencies to work on digitizing paper records, the agreement on a common reporting format, strong institutional support has been provided in **Niger**. The officers working in the DACORE centre have been selected according to their educational background and experience with IT. It is presumed that they will regard involvement with the project, at least initially, as an opportunity to expand their skill set. They do not receive financial rewards for their work, which may prove a disincentive in the long term.

4.2 Is the role of the EUD/HQ in the management and the monitoring of the operation sufficiently respectful of the leading role of the partners in order to enhance their capacities?

97. The EUD does not have much involvement in either Mali or Niger. The CORMS visit provided a first opportunity for the programme officer of the Economy and Governance Section to visit the DACORE centre in Bamako.

4.3 If there is a financial contribution needed for continued access to the benefits of the action, can target groups afford such a payment?

98. The target groups will continue to need technical support for the foreseeable future.

4.4 Are the relevant authorities taken the financial measure to ensure the continuation of services after the end of the action?

99. The government of Niger has made a financial commitment in constructing a building, purchasing generators, maintaining the running of the building and making the human resources available but this will depend on support for the foreseeable future.

Horizontal Issues

5.1 To what extent have recommendations raised in QSG/previous ROM/ or previous evaluations been taken into account?

100. This was the first monitoring. The QSG recommendations were not shared with the monitoring team.

5.2 Have the communication and visibility actions been implemented in an appropriate manner?

101. The senior officers interviewed in both countries were aware that this was an EU funded, albeit INTERPOL implemented action. There were stickers and signs spelling out that this was an EUD funded project on equipment and the building.



Entrance of the DACORE centre in Niamey

5.3 Are there good practices inherent to the project which could be useful to share beyond the project context?

102. First, the value of securing a good champion in the beneficiary country. Second, the importance of knitting together stakeholders from different agencies into a coalition of supporters. Third, the value of regular contact, mentoring and technical supervision.

Impact

103. The situation once again varies between Mali and Niger, but it has to be said that neither country has so far seen the system contribute to any investigation. In **Niger**, it was reported that the system will become operational “in three to six months time.” It was argued that the database had to reach critical mass before being made available to officers. It was important not to raise expectations that would lead to officers investing time in futile searches.

104. The process of transferring the paper-based data has, however, invigorated two processes. First, ongoing shift towards 'scientific' and intelligence led policing exemplified by the determination of the Directorate of Technical Police to raise its scientific capacity by recruiting chemists, pharmacists, and physicians into the police force. The DPT is closely involved as the DACORE is based near the lab, creating a hub of interacting, law enforcement officers with a modern attitude to policing.

105. At the moment the DPT are supporting the work of different agencies with forensic analysis, particularly finger prints. The capacity in the laboratory was said to have been upgraded with EU funding. They use the Automatic Fingerprint File (FAED), a French system for collecting and storing finger prints.

AIRCOP Assessment

106. The assessment is based on interviews with officers from the two inter-ministerial agencies that are the national beneficiaries of the AIRCOP projects and the lead agencies identified by UNODC in the implementation of the project. This was followed by visits to the JAITFs at Bamako and Niamey airport. In both countries CORMS monitors shadowed the teams as they worked on incoming night flights. In Bamako it was a Royal Air Maroc flight coming from Casablanca and in Niamey a Turkish Airline flight from Istanbul and an Air Burkina flight from Ouagadougou. The team observed the entire process from the profiling of passengers, the identification of suspects, the interrogation, luggage search and urine testing.

107. The team also observed several sessions of training provided by an officer from the Belgian police to the Niamey JAITF.

Institutional Context

108. In both countries the drug control is the responsibility for an inter-ministerial agency. In Mali this is called Central Bureau of Narcotics (OCS) and involves the Judicial Police, border police, Gendarmerie and Customs. In Niger it is the Central Bureau for the Repression of Illicit Drug Trafficking (OCTRIS) and comprises the Judicial Police, Gendarmerie, National Guard and Customs. In Niger no officers from the Customs service were working in the JAITF. The AIRCOP lead agency, UNODC, has identified these agencies as their respective partners and has signed Memoranda of Understanding that commit these to support the project, ensuring, inter alia, that the JAITF offices at the airport are supplied with electricity and water, and that staff who benefit from project training remain in post for a number of years.

109. Due to changes in the security environment the role of the drug control agencies has changed in recent years. In Niger the OCTRIS director complained about neglect, low budgets and a lack of government and donor interest. He thought that donors were now only concerned with “migration and terrorism”. The budget for conducting activities was low and the officers regarded their appointment as a ‘punishment post’.

110. According to one officer in Mali the falling status of the OCS was exemplified by their not being allowed to access the WAPIS database and not even having been asked to input their case files. There was an internal debate about changing the remit to cover all organised crime. It is clear that the rise of terrorism has made the fight against drug trafficking a lesser priority for national governments and international partners alike.

111. There is a sense in both countries that the JAITF are the most important activities run by the agencies.

Drug trafficking in Mali and Niger

112. Neither country is a producer or importer of drugs, but basically part of a wider transit zone. There are three main trafficking routes. Small planes land on air strips in the uncontrolled parts of northern Mali. Shipments of cocaine as well as cannabis are carried by truck or car up from the ports in the Gulf of Guinea. Cannabis from Morocco moves across

Mauritania into the northern parts of Mali and Niger. The shipments are destined for the Mediterranean coast or the Middle East.

113. The agencies had no information about size and trends of local drug markets. The incoming head of OCS said that the lack of information was the biggest problem for the organisation. The director of OCTRIS said that there was no local drug use to his knowledge. Yet, the reported seizure of drugs identified as crack in both Bamako and Niamey suggests there are pockets of consumption. There is no understanding of how these markets are organised, their supply chains and distribution patterns.

114. Both cocaine and cannabis are considered as commodities in transit. In both countries local groups are believed to be exacting taxes on drug flows through their territory. Such groups include insurgents, Jihadists but also local power brokers without political affiliations.

115. The importation of drugs through the main airports is small scale but in the absence of analysis it is difficult to draw conclusions about the scale. In 2015 a group of Nigerians was intercepted in Mali with a cargo of methamphetamine. As there was no investigation it is not clear how this is connected to Nigerian methamphetamine production.

Setting up JAITF at the Airports

116. Both airports are small, with only six international flights per day in Niamey, and low number of passengers flying through. The different services working there have therefore allocated only limited resources that means projects have to be adaptable. In both countries it was reported that there was resistance to the units being established. Agencies vie for resources, including office space, and mandates.

Mali

Composition and mandate

117. The current unit is composed of 18 officers from the Judicial Police and the Gendarmerie. They work three shifts and seek to ensure that a female officer is present at all times.

118. In Mali any case involving drugs has to be passed to the OCS / JAITF which rankles with the other agencies, not least when corrupt officers, as suggested by a JAITF informant, provide protection to drug traffickers. Moreover, it was reported by Customs that prior to the coming of AIRCOP in 2012 they already had an OCS unit at the airport that was working with Customs. Since the project began, Customs have stopped cooperation which, according to them, explained the decline in seizures. The Director General of Customs further suggested reorganising the JAITF under their command, as they are the only agency with the legal right to search the luggage of passengers. Alternatively the lead could rotate between the agencies. A MoU should establish competencies and procedures so that JAITFs could follow both Customs and penal procedures.

119. The JAITF is not a popular appointment and the turnover is high. Last year the former captain of the JAITF asked to be transferred to the traffic police. The captain is positive and allows his team to use their initiative. The team is well motivated and works professionally.

Facilities and equipment

120. According to the PJ, the I-24/7 system is not working anymore, following the arrival of an American project. The JAIF reported circumventing this constraint by sending inquiries for names and flights through the NCB. But as this was found to be barely functioning when visited earlier we assume that the system is not being used. The unit did report communicating with other JAIFs via CENcomm. However, it being located in the main office means it cannot be put to use in the course of an interview or luggage search.

121. Drug testing kits from different donors including UNODC were available. It was said that there should be more kits for cocaine as those testing for heroin were of little interest. There were also no containers for the passenger to give his sample into, so that the JAIF had to improvise using water bottles. A project wide review of these test kits is recommended.

Airline access to passenger manifests

122. Several airlines provide passenger manifests before the arrival of the flight to allow the systematic profiling of passengers. Kenya Airways provides it electronically while the other airlines provide them in paper form. Royal Air Maroc continues to refuse, even after they have imposed rigorous searches on passengers from RAM flights.

Operation

123. The head of the unit reported that after a training on surveillance in May 2015 the unit allowed a Filipino national suspected of trafficking to pass through. He was followed to a private house and a whole group of Filipino, Nigerian and Malian nationals arrested and methamphetamine seized. This suggests that there is a rudimentary understanding of the need to go beyond airport seizures, though it has not yet delivered a realisation of the need for investigations. It is however, a promising start.

124. The actual search of a passenger that was observed by the team raised several issues. The facilities themselves are difficult, but the confusion was only amplified by the lack of direction. During the interview three different officers were asking questions to the passenger, with no one either leading the interview or collecting all the different responses. They were searching different parts of the luggage, which meant the passenger could not observe what was being done with his property, giving rise to unease and potentially a hostile attitude. The urine sample was carried to the office inside the container improvised from a plastic water bottle. The test was done there and afterwards one of the officers did not dispose of the urine but remained standing in the packed room holding it until the search was finished. It was not clear who was leading the search, what theory they were following and if the questions were strategic or simply reactions to the situation. There is need for streamlining, clear direction and better data collection and analysis.

Niger

Composition and mandate

125. The unit was only established in June 2015 and has only recently had a new captain come into post as his predecessor left to join the traffic police - upon his request. The officer said repeatedly that this is a very young agency, meaning that he did not have much

authority at the airport and has to work with other agencies. With 20 officers from the PJ and Gendarmerie he is still waiting for Customs to second someone. In the meantime, however, the JAIF has established a good working relationship with the Customs team, and is allowed to use the scanner of the Customs service. The officers sit together studying the screen.

126. JAIF members do not have access to airfreight, however, in the context of the mentoring activities the AIRCOP trainer from the Belgian federal police has held discussions with the Customs officer responsible for passenger checks on arrival. He has agreed to reopen the office in the arrival hall to spare passengers having to walk across the airport (see Appendix). In addition, an undertaking was given to support the JAIF in searching of airfreight.

Facilities and Equipment

127. In Niamey the JAIF is working out of a well furnished office near the arrival hall. There are several computers with a sporadic Wi-Fi connection that allows the team to conduct internet searches on drugs. But I-24/7 is not functioning. There is an expectation that UNODC will pay connection with the existing I-24/7 system that is run by the border police the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST). The CENcomm system has not yet been delivered. The JAIF chief has obtained costing from the suppliers, forwarded it to UNODC Senegal and is waiting for a response.

128. They have drug testing kits and a book in which a narrative description of each search is entered.

Airline access to passenger manifests

129. Passenger manifests are being provided by most African airlines including Ethiopian Airlines and Burkina Faso. But Turkish Airlines and Air France refused to cooperate. Fortunately the trainer from Belgium was able to negotiate access with Turkish Airlines during the training period and it is hoped that this will become a permanent feature.

Operation

130. The process starts with profiling from the passenger information and observations of passenger behaviour. The teams are deployed around the arrival hall where they work with the other security services. Before the luggage is collected, suspects are questioned, passports and tickets inspected. Officers join their colleagues from Customs at the scanning machine to inspect luggage.

131. On two occasions passengers were singled out for closer questioning. In the first case the search was triggered by visual data generated by the scanner machine, in the second by the route taken by the passenger.

132. They were asked to the JAIF office in the arrival area where each time the controlling officer explained what he was doing. One officer conducted a systematic search of the luggage with two other officers in attendance. In one case the search of personal effects was followed by a urine test. The urine sample was given at the airport toilet and the test was also conducted there. The officers remained calm and professional in the face of noisy

protests made by the passenger. This was not helped by difficulty in communication as the passenger was a US citizen who spoke no French.

133. In the first case the passenger was released after the completion of the search. In the second he was taken to the Customs services on account of the amount of cash in his possession. Each time, information about the search was entered into a notebook. There is a need for this information to be more standardised and detailed. It should also be used subsequently for review and analysis.

Annex 1: Law enforcement at Niamey airport loses access to I-24/7 after the introduction of PISCES

Niger's law enforcement agencies are connected to the INTERPOL global police communications system. Computer terminals provide access to sensitive and urgent police information and INTERPOL's database at two locations. One is the National Central Bureau at the headquarters of the Judicial Police in Niamey; the other is at the airport.

Equipping the Joint Airport Interdiction Taskforces (JAITF) with I-24/7 is one of the objectives of the EU funded Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP) project that is being implemented by a consortium consisting of UNODC, INTERPOL and the World Customs Organisation. INTERPOL is the designated lead agency to "provide the required encryption equipment, training and access to I-24/7 to all airports" (DoA AIRCOP II, Output 2.4.2). In Niamey, the JAITF had not yet received this equipment, but according to OCRTIS, the agency that is AIRCOP's national partner, there was a terminal with I-24/7 with the DST, the branch of the police with responsibility for border control and immigration. All it required was to connect the JAITF office with the I-24/7 terminal. According to OCRTIS, this had been promised by UNODC during one of the visits by officials from the regional office in Dakar, Senegal.

Visiting the JAITF at Niamey airport it emerged that the unit has internet access only via a sporadic and unreliable Wi-Fi connection. Making better use of the existing communication capacities was considered a sensible management of resources in a small airport with only six international arrivals a day, and good relations between the JAITF and the other agencies.

Closer questioning of the responsible DST officer, however, revealed that their I-24/7 system was no longer functioning. When asked why this was, it was explained that the connecting cable had been cut when the PISCES system was installed.

PISCES is the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System that has been provided by the US State Department to the law enforcement agencies responsible for immigration services in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. This upgraded biometric system for processing travellers for the first time has been provided by the US "to improve exponentially their ability to detect terrorists travelling under assumed identities with sophisticated false documentation."¹⁴

Yet, in Niger the DST does not have a database of terrorists or criminals or false documents against which this information from arriving travellers can be compared. Nor can the agency any use the INTERPOL database as it no longer has a physical connection to the I-24/7 system.

¹⁴ <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2014/227413.htm> State Department's Bureau of Counterterrorism: Budget, Programs, and Policies *Testimony*: Tina S. Kaidanow, Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Washington, DC, June 10, 2014

These databases are still available to the Central National Office at the Judicial Police Headquarters in Niamey, where another I-24/7 system is installed. However, since the cable has been cut such alerts can no longer be passed to the DST at the airport on a secure line.

The NCB acting on behalf of a foreign agency or in pursuit of an investigation by a national law enforcement agency may, in theory, ask the DST for information from PISCES on incoming or outgoing travellers. The difficulties here lie in the actual process involved. According to the Director of Police for such information to be made available a formal request has to be submitted to the head of the DST for administrative research (which is not part of an ongoing investigation under the control of a judge but acting on a suspicion). For legal research (in connection with an ongoing investigation) the request must be made by the Director of the Judicial Police in person. This makes it practically unwieldy for effective policing of incoming passengers at the point of entry, even if agencies have access to passenger records.

The Director of Police also established that the data was shared with the US. It is not clear if the US agencies have to request the information from Nigerien partners or if they can access the information in real time.

For national purposes the PISCES system is therefore of little benefit. Since the cable linking the DST to the I-24/7 system has been cut the service does not have access to either the INTERPOL databases or international alerts. Whatever the intentions, the effective consequence of introducing the biometric system has therefore *reduced* Niger's national capacity to police the flow of passengers through its airport.

This case study illustrates how the lack of coordination between different partner countries can undermine the capacities of national agencies and nullify the efforts of other partners. It is particularly interesting to read in a State Department report that "Information sharing within the Nigerien government is adequate but sometimes slow between services due to stove piping or a lack of communications equipment."¹⁵ The findings of the CORMS mission suggest that it is interventions by US agencies that unwittingly exacerbate both problems.

It also illustrates further the need for closer coordination between international partners. There should be a regular exchange of information between agencies working in country, and at strategic level, possibly in the context of the West Africa Strategic Assistance Framework.

¹⁵ [Country Reports on Terrorism](#) » [Country Reports on Terrorism 2014](#) » [Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview](#)

Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview Bureau of Counterterrorism [Country Reports on Terrorism 2014](#) Report <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239404.htm>

Annex 2: Passenger Search - Case study 1 at Niamey and 2 at Bamako airports

The team studies the manifest of an incoming Air Burkina flight and identifies a traveller whose itinerary fits with the movements of couriers. He is coming in from Ouagadougou, going to Benin with a short stay in Niamey. Two JAIF officers in plain clothes, stop the passenger, US citizen, just behind the scanning machine, first to check his passport and tickets, then to open the suitcase. The passenger complies but complains in a raised voice. He continues protesting when he is asked to accompany the officer to the JAIF office a short walk away from the scanning area, saying that he has been searched before when arriving in Gambia, and that it ended with the officers asking him “what did you bring me from America”.

The matter is complicated further by his inability to speak French. The Belgian trainer who is watching the entire operation tries to calm the passenger by explaining in English that this is an official search and that he is there to observe the process, but he too is met with hostility. There are five to six people in the office – the officer conducting the search backed up by a colleague, who remains silent throughout, the chief of the JAIF team sitting on the other side of the room, the Belgian trainer and two CORMS monitors. The passenger is asked to unpack his case, to open envelopes containing his foreign currency, mainly US dollars in different denomination (an envelope each for US\$ 1, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100 bills), transparent files with travel documents, hotel bookings and spare passport photos, his medication and toiletries, and items of clothing. Unclear about the process and mistrustful of the intentions of the officers the passenger erupts sporadically, raising his voice, becoming uncooperative in his responses, refusing to open an envelope – “you open it” - or a pack of chewing gums. At times he does resort to abusive language (fuck, shit etc), never directly one of the officers but at the process or situation. As the officer removes item after item from the case the space on the desk becomes crowded and the passenger takes them from one desk and puts them back onto the other saying “your are not splitting my shit”.

It turns out that his journey to Niamey that day was unplanned. The airline cancelled a flight and re-routed him via Niamey. He is anxious to visit the airline’s office and organise the next leg of his journey to Cotonou. He explains that he is travelling through a large number of countries in West Africa, beginning in Gambia and finishing in Gabon. He has travelled widely across South America and other parts of the world and carries two expired passports to prove it.

After the search of the suitcase and hand luggage is completed and no drugs are found, the passenger is told that they need to test his urine. He initially protests that he will not do that here and it is explained that they will take him to the toilet. He then says he is not leaving without his luggage and his passport. The chief of the JAIF says he can take his suitcase but keeps the passport. Two officers and the trainer accompany the passenger to the male toilets at the airport where the sample is provided. The passenger has another outburst this time directed at the Belgian police officer. The test is conducted in the toilet and comes out negative, after which the passenger is escorted back to the office.

Although the search for drugs is completed, the JAIF officers decide that the amount of currency that they have found (US\$ 5,500) will require a currency declaration – something

the passenger has failed to do. He is therefore asked to accompany two JAIF officers to the offices of the Customs service a few doors along, with the CORMS monitors following. In the Customs service office two officers are sitting on the floor eating their lunch. They have no currency declaration forms there, no competence to work on this currency importation, and refer the JAIF officers to the main Customs office located in a different building.

To reach it the JAIF officers have to leave the arrival hall and step onto the tarmac. The passenger is now exposed to the full heat of the afternoon sun, carrying his luggage across the expanse of the airport. With limited knowledge of the English language the officers have not managed to explain him what is happening, but he follows, much more docile now.

The group comprising the passenger, two officers from the JAIF, three monitors and trainers, and two Customs officers walk across the tarmac to the office building, a distance of about 500-750 meters. The offices lie to the back of the building. To reach them from the airfield the group has to walk through a large hall with a wide gate that is manned by a group of Gendarmes uniformed and armed. After listening to the explanation from the JAIF officer the Gendarmes ask to see badges that permit access to the restricted section of the airport. Only the JAIF officers carry them. There are no spare badges for even the Belgian trainer, let alone the monitors or the passenger. (It was explained that badges were no longer provided after airport staff were caught giving them to relatives who wanted to receive family members on the tarmac).

Rebuffed, the chief of the JAIF team, who has also joined, leads the group back. At a halfway point we stop to regroup and watch a number of cell phone conversations. After some time an officer of the Gendarmerie arrives to authorise access to the hall and the group sets off again. By now there are three JAIF officers, three monitors and trainers, two Customs officers, two gendarmes, and two members from the private airport security service.

They pass through the hall, climb up the stairs on the other side to get to a first floor office where the chief of Customs hangs up on a telephone conversation when they arrive. He listens to the explanation of the JAIF officer and says that the amount of money is far too small to require any further action. Everybody leaves the office and prepares to go. One of the monitors asks for the amount of foreign currency that is allowed to bring into the country without declaration. The answer is "I think it's about five thousand".

In single file the group turns around, continues along the corridor, down the stairs, back to the hall, when they are called back. Alerted by the tumult, the chief of the Gendarmerie also wants to investigate the passenger. Everybody turns around, walks to a different office, watch the chief of the Gendarmerie look at the passenger's passport before dismissing him.

A group of nearly 20 people is now walking back to the arrival hall, now entirely clear of passengers. There are only a handful of flights arriving in Niamey and at this point the only people milling about are staff. The passenger is taken into the arrival area and left to get on with his journey.

Epilogue

The question about importing foreign currency is taken up with the Deputy Director of Customs, who was not entirely clear about the rules. In a subsequent conversation the

following explanation was provided by a French officer embedded in the Nigerien Customs service: according to Nigerien law the limit is CFA 200,000, but there is an ECOWAS agreement that raises the threshold to CFA 100,000 for travel within the community. Customs officers interpret the law according to the situation. There are regular seizures of money from travellers.

Conclusion

1. Coordination among security agencies at the airport needs improving including a protocol on controls
2. Law enforcement agencies have to understand the law and uphold it, not to make interpretations according to circumstances
3. Clear communication with passengers about process and purpose of an interventions is critical; the problem of language barriers needs to be considered carefully

Post Script

The JAITF, at the prompting of the Belgian officer, helped the passenger get a bust to his hotel in Niamey, contacted the airline office for him, and pushed them to assist in making onward travel arrangements. Two days later the passenger departed Niamey for Benin. When he met the Belgian trainer he was friendly and communicative. In effect, the encounter with the JAITF, however irritating and disturbing at the time, had served him well in fixing his onward journey.

Passenger Search 2, Bamako

CORMS observed one search of a passenger following a profiling by observation. The criterion triggering a search was the Argentinean nationality of the passenger. He was asked to accompany the officers to the office near the arrival area. The office was crowded with the three officers and the passenger. The luggage was searched and possessions placed on the desk. The second item of luggage was opened and items taken out before those from the first had been removed. Each of the three officers asked questions of the passenger, but nobody kept track of all the responses and no notes were taken. The passenger was walked to the toilet, and the urine collected in the bottom of a plastic bottle that was then taken to the interrogation room for analysis which proved negative. Subsequently, there was no analysis and nothing was written down that could be used for analysis later.

There was little explanation of the process throughout. The passenger was found to have a copy of the Koran in his possession and was on his way to Timbuktu which gave rise to suspicions of Jihadism, though there were no other indicators.

According to the DG of Customs, in Malian law only Customs officers have the authority to open passenger luggage. There are no Customs officers on the team. It appears a gross perversion in a project designed to promote good governance, to set into train processes whereby officers of the law are routinely in breach of the law themselves.

Annex 3: Training/mentoring Event

Observations on the Training process

The second training for the Niamey JAIF was given by a Belgian police officer over the space of two weeks. Since it was the second course, the emphasis was on practical work, with real time searches, followed by debriefings. The trainer also used his experience to support the JAIF in getting better access to passenger manifests from Turkish Airlines. During the processes observed the trainer used good pedagogic techniques, including positive feedback, constructive criticism, letting trainees explain each stage in their actions, and ensuring that the female team members were included. It was also evident from the way that the JAIF officers responded that the training was appreciated. The interest of the trainer in the organisation of the JAIF and in other matters pertaining to the organisation of the airport created a positive atmosphere and was good for the morale of the team. Organising training / mentoring events such as this one is a core activity for AIRCOP and is critical for making the project successful.

According to AIRCOP this was not a training but a mentoring event, and therefore there was only a single trainer as opposed to a larger team which arrives for the first training. We think that mentoring does not adequately describe what was actually happening. First of all, mentoring takes place within an established, long term relationship and is based on trust.¹⁶ In this case the Belgian officer arrived in Niamey for the first time and had to establish his relationships from scratch. Secondly, the skills of the JAIF were so rudimentary that the process was one of skill transfer. The fact that it was 'on the job', that is built into the routine operation and practical should not detract that what was happening was the transfer of skills and expertise from trainer to trainees. Moreover, both trainer and trainees perceived the event as a training exercise not as part of a mentoring relationship.

The use of existing capacity in the LEAs of EU MS is intelligent and purposive. It provides beneficiaries with up to date technical assistance, potentially creates links between EU and African law enforcement, and meets the strategic interest of EU MS. It is important, however, to ensure make optimal use of such resources through good organisation and coordination. In this particular case three points should be highlighted:

- Pre-training briefing and information for the outgoing trainer The instructions provided to the Belgian police officer prior to departure for Niamey could have been more exhaustive. Apparently there was no information on the size of the team, nor was he informed about logistical arrangements including transport from the hotel to the airport. He was also disappointed that his UNODC contact did not take the time to meet with him when in Brussels a fortnight before the training event. It would also be useful if trainers were provided with a list of previous trainings that had been furnished to the JAIF and more information on context and situation of the team.
- Composition of the training team Courses given by a single trainer should be reviewed as teams with a minimum of two trainers enhance the quality of instruction and the wellbeing of the trainer. Ideally training teams should be composed of a European and an African trainer. Where training is provided by the same agency efforts should be made to secure the services of the first trainer to help strengthen relationships

¹⁶ See Bremmers, Tim *Mentoring in Law Enforcement: a tool in technical assistance*. CORMS, 2015

- Timing of training events 08/02 – 19/02: The training was arranged over two weeks during which Niger was going through the first round of presidential elections. This is far from ideal in a country like Niger where elections can lead to security risks, and at the least may prove a distraction for trainees. It is even more surprising that this particular set of dates was chosen because there training had already been cancelled and postponed on two occasions. In the event, the trainer ended up stranded in Niamey because all flights were cancelled and the airport closed for a three day period. At the time of writing he is still locked down in the Niamey hotel awaiting the outcome of the election and the return to normality. It is remarkable that an organisation with long experience of African realities was not able to foresee this and find another training date.

Added value of having a committed and engaged trainer on location

It was evident from the enthusiasm of the JAITF that they welcomed the presence of the trainer and were eager to demonstrate their professionalism. They were also keen to listen to the feedback which was delivered sensitively. For the members of the JAITF it was not only professionally enhancing and skill building, but also a confidence and morale boosting experience.

The presence of the trainer, as well as of the CORMS team, was also useful for building the reputation of the JAITF and its captain at the airport. The other agencies, including the chief of the airport police, Customs and Gendarmerie were pleased to be consulted and in turn, learn more about the CRP of which they were forming a part. Training and monitoring helped in particular to improve the working relationship with Customs, leading to a commitment to participate in searches of air freight and to use the Customs office and obviate the need for passengers having to cross the airport (see appendix).

Most importantly perhaps, the trainer was able to intervene with Turkish Airlines and secure a commitment for the pre-arrival delivery of passenger manifests. This is an important precondition for the profiling work.

These positive results over and above the actual training mission itself simply underline the value of direct contact. AIRCOP has found an ingenious way of creating relationships between European agencies and beneficiaries in West Africa and the Caribbean. It would be desirable to increase the frequency of these mentoring visits and the composition of the teams.

Annex 4: Seizures of psychotropic drugs in Mali

Product/Year	2013	2014	2015
Cannabis	1614 Kg	3980 Kg	1090,5 kg of hashish
Cocaine	2,8 kg	2 doses of Crack 3,6 kg	5,12 kg
Heroin	N/A	2 kg	20 g
Methamphetamine/Amphetamine	1,4 kg	12 kg (amphetamines)	N/A
Smuggled medicines	A number of Drastin tablets	60,8 kg (Tramadol, Diazepam, Rivotril, Ephedrine...)	12,3 kg Ephedrine

Annex 5: Questionnaire

	DACORE administrator	Sources of Verification
Level of WAPIS Installation	DACORE centre has been set up at the police headquarters, one floor up from the DG Police Judiciare;	Site visit
Status of electronic digitalisation	three computers were in use for uploading of paper records. Officers from Gendarmerie and Police were uploading data. Gendarmerie reported to have uploaded 4,004 files. The WAPIS administrator reported having electronic files on 600 cases	Commisaire Umar Keita, administrator of WAPIS Gendarmerie officer uploading data
Is System operational	Only in sense of data being uploaded – the scanner is operating	
Have officers been encoding data	Officers are scanning files – the paper files are being brought over in boxes and scanned into system	Site visit Interviews with forensics officers and with DG PJ
Number of training sessions and officers trained	3 training sessions have been delivered and 27 officers trained	WAPIS administrator Keita
Nr of officials seconded to and have access to/are using the WAPIS system	There is an administrator and two officers have been seconded from each directorate (4) to provide data Each service has set up a FP who can access the DACORE – but to access the database officers have to visit the centre itself. There is no electronic communication	Commisaire Umar Keita, administrator of WAPIS
Results	The system is not being used for investigations	
Activities of last two months	Uploading of data	
National Committee formed and active	The committee has been formed and has met twice at the centre. The administrator was unable to tell us details of the members	Commisaire Umar Keita, administrator of WAPIS
Existing Challenges	No ownership of WAPIS by local partners – only DG PJ recognises the benefit of WAPIS – no internet facilities in large parts of the country – no connection and terminal in beneficiary agencies – maintenance of the system - Communication between the different partners in Mali	Director Judicial Police, Ami Kane

	Niger	Sources of Verification
Level of WAPIS Installation	A purpose build centre (Niger funded) has been established. It is well equipped, air conditioned, with security camera and an access code controlled entry	Site visit
Status of electronic digitalisation	A reported 4,000 documents have been uploaded	DACORE administrator
Is System operational	Documents are being scanned and uploaded	Site visit and interview with DACORE administrator
Have officers been encoding data	12 officers in the DACORE	Site visit
Number of training sessions and officers trained	20 officers have been trained (Police Judicaire, Gendarmerie, Garde Nationale), there have been two training events	DACORE administrator
Nr of officials seconded to and have access to/are using the WAPIS system		
Results	No investigations yet	DACORE administrator
Activities of last two months	Documents have been scanned and uploaded for over a year	DACORE administrator
National Committee formed and active	Yes – but there should be a technical level committee	DACORE administrator
Existing Challenges	Installation of terminals at police stations in Niamey followed by further roll out across country	

Annex 6: Mission Schedule

Working Agenda for the forthcoming CORMS Mission to Mali and Niger

Mission Team	Axel Klein, Team Leader, CORMS Laurent Guillaume NKE, CORMS Sasha Jesperson, Research Analyst, RUSI		CONTACTS Bamako: Malado Sidibe, Délégation de l'Union européenne au Mali Imm UATT BP: 115 Bko, +223 44 98 34 37 +223 66 62 22 32 Niamey: Bernard Friedling, Délégation de l'Union Européenne en Niger, +227 20 73 23 60; Mob: +227 92 19 29 99	
Tuesday 2 February	01:15		16:00	
Location	Arrival at Bamako Airport, Royal Air Maroc - AT523		Meeting with EUD in Bamako - Andrzej BIELECKI, Chef de Affaires Politiques and Ruth Maria Jorge, Chargeé de programmes Délégation de l'Union européenne au Mali Imm UATT BP: 115 Bko, +223 44 98 34 37 +223 66 62 22 32	
Wednesday 3 February	8:30-9:45	10:00 -12:00	14:00-17:00	23:00-03:00
Meeting	INTERPOL NCB	Direction Générale de la police Nationale DACORE	Office Central des stupéfiants (OCS)	Airport JAITF/CAAT
Participants	Abdou Sidibé, Commissaire chef BCN INTERPOL Abouside1962@yahoo.fr Divisionnaire (Point Focal)	Omar Keita, chief administrator Controleur Général Sacko Aminata Kane sacrisamikane@yahoo.fr	Lt. Colonel Adama Toukara Chef du Service d'Investigation judiciaire adtoukara72@yahoo.fr	
Thursday 4 February	08:30 – 10:00	10:00 -12:00	14:00 US Embassy	16:00
Meeting	Laboratoire de Police technique et scientifique		Brendon Hudspeth US Embassy – Law enforcement affairs HudspethBA@state.gov Ralph Hope Senior Law Enforcement Advisor hoper@state.gov	French Embassy Security Service Bernard Scapin Commissaire Divisionnaire Attaché Sécurité Interieure berard.scapin@diplomatie.gouv.fr and Chrstian Sarkis Commandant de Police , Expert Technique International,

			CHRISTIAN.SARKIS@diplomatie.gouv.fr
Participants			
Friday 5 February	08:30 – 10:00	10:00 – 12:00	14:00-16:00
Meeting	Judicial Police	Police Nationale	Civil Society Meeting
Participants	Director	Directeur général et Directeur adjoint	
Saturday 06 February	09:00 – 15:00		16:00
Bamako 09:05 – Ouagadougou 10:25 - Air Burkina - 2J513 Ouagadougou 13:00 – Niamey 14:55 - Air Burkina - 2J530			
Sunday 07 February	09:30 – 10:30	10:30 – 11:30	13:30 – 17:30
Meeting	CORMS Team Meeting	Tahirou Yacouba député de police judiciare. 96962398	CORMS Team Meeting
Monday 08 February	08:30 -12:00		
Meeting	Tahirou Yacouba député de police judiciare	Project WAPIS - CBN	DACORE Centre French Embassy
Participants			Antoine Tetaud, Police adviser

Tuesday 09 February		9: 08:30	10:00	14:00	19:00-21:00	21:30:00-22:00
Meeting	OCTRIS	Airport Niamey	US Embassy Rebecca Doffing, Political Officer,	EUCAP	Airport	
Participants		Dan Yaya Elh. Issoufou, Officer de Police, chief of airport police				
Wednesday 10 February		08:30-11:00		14:00 17:00		
Meeting	EUCAP		JAITF – Training at Airport			
Participants	Charles Staff, Deputy head of Mission charles.stagg@eucap-sahel.eu Marco Montanari Conseiller Politique marco.montanari@eucap-sahel.eu Pascal Carlucci, Cooperation Expert Pascal.carlucci@eucap-sahel.eu					
Thursday 11February		09:00	10:00	14:00	16:00	
Meeting	Directorate of Customs	EUD	DGNP			
Participants	Mahamdu Mayaki , Deputy Director of Customs Hamedame Hassani, Technical Adviser, Freny Customs Hamedame.hassani@douane.fiances.gouv.fr	Bernard Friedling				