

# NOTES ON THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF CHAD

## The Dynamics of National Integration: Moving Beyond Ethnic Conflict in a State-In-Waiting

Ladiba Gondeu



**Sahel Research Group Working Paper No. 006**  
**Scholars in Residence Papers**

**NOTES ON THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF CHAD**

**THE DYNAMICS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION:  
MOVING BEYOND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN A STATE-IN-WAITING**

LADIBA GONDEU

October 2013

The Sahel Research Group, of the University of Florida's Center for African Studies, is a collaborative effort to understand the political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics of the countries which comprise the West African Sahel. It focuses primarily on the six Francophone countries of the region—Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad—but also on in developments in neighboring countries, to the north and south, whose dynamics frequently intersect with those of the Sahel. The Sahel Research Group brings together faculty and graduate students from various disciplines at the University of Florida, in collaboration with colleagues from the region.

More information is available here: <http://sahelresearch.africa.ufl.edu/>

## Acknowledgements:

This work is the fruit of a four month academic stay at the University of Florida Center for African Studies as a Visiting Scholar thanks to the kind invitation of the Profesor Leonardo A. Villalón, Coordinator of the Sahel Research Group. I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to him and to his team. The ideas put forth in this document are mine and I take full responsibility for them.

## About the Author:

Ladiba Gondeu, Faculty Member in the Department of Anthropology at the University of N'Djamena, and Doctoral Candidate, Paris School of Graduate Studies in Social Science for Social Anthropology and Ethnology.

Ladiba Gondeu is a Chadian social anthropologist specializing in civil society, religious dynamics, and project planning and analysis. He is also very active in the Chadian Peace and Reconciliation Initiative. From 2008-2012 he taught in the Sociology department at the University of Ndjama. In the Spring 2013 semester he was a visiting scholar at the University of Florida, hosted by the Sahel Research Group as part of the Minerva Initiative project. He is the author of numerous works, including a book on the emergence of Islamic associations in Chad, published by L'Harmattan in 2011: *L'émergence des organisations islamiques au Tchad. Enjeux, acteurs et territoires* He is currently completing a doctoral thesis at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris, on The promotion of Republican values in the management of communal land in the Chadian portion of the Niger basin.



*« La société n'est pas une chose fixée dès le temps de sa création ; elle est constamment en train de se faire et ne peut se définir qu'en action »*

*"Society is not something fixed from the time of its creation; it is constantly in the making and can only be defined in action"*

*Balandier (1997)*

## **Introduction**

Recently, the international community has been focusing its attention on the catastrophic situation in the countries of the Sahel typified by the rise of Islamist terrorism. In these countries, international terrorism coupled with weak or weakening institutions join a thirst for power and personal wealth to complete a vicious cycle. We can hope the situation of widespread destabilization in countries such as Mali will motivate leaders to work toward change, and reach the kind societal transformation needed for them to successfully share their common space. The international community has often contented itself with merely supporting authoritarian regimes in these countries, relying on poor justifications that greater freedoms might bring harm to national unity. This tends to create autocratic leaders or warlords.

Chad has experienced civil wars, revolutionary cycles, pseudo- democracies, and strong-arm regimes that had everything to gain from stalemates in the political process. Identity markers were exploited early on (Ahmed Kotoko, 1989) to the benefit of the rebellions. Chadian rebels, who have managed to wrest their way into the State for more than 30 years now, have demonstrated cleverness with their ability to present a fight for power from a civilizational perspective, as a form of oppression perpetrated by the South against the North, by Christians against Muslims. Yet, their ascension to power has not significantly improved the situation. The North-South, Christian-Muslim dynamic that has long served as the matrix explaining the Chadian crisis has since become obsolete. The terms of the debate are certainly elsewhere, in the construction of a new model for citizenship. While the failure of a country is clearly apparent, one must question the terms of its failure. Demonstrating to or convincing Chadians that they are condemned to an eternal violent cycle signifies a strategy of moral leaching and skillfully orchestrated depersonalization. This is what this article hopes to help deconstruct. This is not to say that the country has broken the cycle of violence, but rather I want to show how this is possible if real work toward social transformation is initiated. In present-day Chadian society, the sense of divisions between communities still remains. Degrading language, socially constructed to designate the other still exist (*sara, kiridi, doum, habit*). The time has come to move beyond the terms used in the past, or at least to transcend it to give Chadians a better chance to ensure their development. This is what will entitle them to their developing mineral resources.

The word Chad owes much to the effort of the Europeans of the 19th century to underscore or demonstrate their itinerary throughout the continent: 'Chad is a Lake (...). The name of the Lake Tzad or Tchadou is Bornuane, or rather Kanouri, the language of the Bornuan people. It means "large body of water or Lake" (B. Lanne, 1998: 9). It is around this Lake, central core of the Chad basin, that human settlement will unfold. According the archaeological and paleontological research, particularly in the context of reviews in Tchadanthrope in the 1960s, Abel or Australopithecus Bahr El Ghazelis in the 1990s, and Toumaï or Sahelanthropus tchadensis in 2003, it can no longer be convincingly argued that populations first arrived elsewhere.

Lake Chad is the meeting place of various populations. It is at the center of an integration-disintegration dynamic on the political, economic than cultural and religious planes. The Chad Basin being the birthplace of humankind, it is the point from which the first settlements were to emanate. To understand this, it is important to understand man's relationship with water. People living in the vicinity of Lake Chad, whether Nigériens, Nigerians, Cameroonians or Chadians, drew most of their resources from its waters, including fishing, agriculture and livestock. They are the ones who, as research shows, initiated the foundation of the Kanem-Bornu Empire in the ninth century, extending to the Northeast of the present-day Federal Republic of Nigeria, establishing its capital in Ndjimi. At that time, they created the Sefawas dynasty, whose Kings bore the name of Maï. Saharan rock walls still preserve the cave paintings of these peoples who, by successive migratory waves, populated what is currently Chad. These peoples were open to the world, especially through the Nilotic dynasties, the Hittite Kingdom in Anatolia in Asia Minor, but also the Romans, with the Phoenician counters as early as the 1st century C.E. (Zeltner, 1992). These contacts gradually enabled the intensification of exchanges in the Chad basin where these populations played an important role in the control of trade and of the Saharan road.

For anyone embarking on studying Chad, the first difficulty encountered is related to written sources, the conditions in which they were produced, their heuristic quality and their lack of generalization. Most of the documents concern well-identified communities, facts of power or ritual practices, in distant or more recent eras, all in a never-ending division of the common space. The country is thus painstakingly dissected, as if the necessary quest is to establish differences to absolutely oppose the communities to each other. In most of the documents dating from the colonial period or generated by colonial administrators (except works such as those of Chapelle, Lanne, Magnant, ), the authors often rely on their memoirs, respond to administrative orders or dive into African reality within the framework of a thesis for example or simply "to kill time." In all cases they focus on characteristics of the studied communities, as distinguished from their neighbors, and rarely seek to underline the socio-cultural basis of any resemblance or similarity between them. Their gaze was influenced by the partial accounts available, and by their imagination, and contact with the populations studied constituted the remainder of their information. Sources that could be found at the time, apart from the writings of 19th century explorers, come mainly from the testimony left by Arab writers (Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Furtu or Ibn

Batuta and Leo Africanus)<sup>1</sup>. These Arab authors were in contact only with the kingdoms located in the Northern part of the current Chad. Most often they spoke of the Southern States in elusive terms, at the time of the hegemonic conflicts with the empire of the Bornu towards the end of the 16th century. This is precisely the case with the testimonies of Vincenzo Matteo or Giovanni di Vesti collected by Giovanni Lorenzo Anania (Zeltner, 1992: 129-150), which describe these kingdoms as “drowned among pagan populations.” Other more recent sources are of Fulani origin, especially during their confrontation with the populations located to the West and Southwest of the Chad basin (Martin) 1973.

It can therefore be said, at the outset, that Chad is a multicultural country where the richness of this melting pot has yet to be utilized in the service of the well-being of its people. Condensed into a true "ethno-linguistic puzzle", it is a country where 131 languages are spoken, each language corresponding to what can be referred to as an “ethnic group”: “the study of the settlement of the people of Chad is facing difficulties that must be accepted: chronological, names, or geographic difficulties, and those linked to the very definition of each group” (Chapel, 1991: 33).

The main purpose of this work is to enable a public that is not familiar with Chad to find a few key readings. Instead of a binary and simplistic presentation as is often the case in regards to Chad<sup>2</sup>, readers will soon realize that I tried all at once to be precise with the general data on the country from a historical, political and socio-cultural standpoint, and to draw links between this data on the one hand and analyses on the other, thereby shedding light on them or reestablishing them. Therefore, this document aims to be critical, dialogic and most importantly objective in both time and space. I am resisting the temptation to create possible spaces for mediation here and there;<sup>3</sup> my ambition is to see the challenges of constructing a nation-state in Chad, explaining stakeholder roles as well as their respective approaches, placing in perspective the dynamics of power and counter-power that interact in regulating or building the socio-cultural conceptual space. It will then be seen that Chad survives, despite forecasts that amount to condemning it to annihilation. It is this *conatus*, i.e. this fluctuating desire to persevere in its being, which makes it possible to find the country's new, less chaotic backgrounds. Integration of the nation-state in Chad is of course a real challenge, but precisely we must not forget this is what paradoxically allows it to survive. The risk of disintegration has ultimately contributed to

---

<sup>1</sup> Stories told by Arab explorers in the discovery of the Interior of the African continent were often used as more or less imperfect guides by European explorers. With regard to Chad, it includes the “travel writing” (Rihla) of Ibn Battuta in the fourteenth century, or Abu Zayd Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun who through his “*Introduction to a New Universal History*” the Muqaddimah “*Prolegomena*,” written in 1372, was an impassive analysis of societies in his time. Ibn Khaldun was also the author of other works the most notable of which is the *Kitab al-Ibar* or “*Book of considerations on the history of Arabs, Persians and Berbers*” also known as the “*Book of examples*.” This book is a genuine guide to the history of the Arabian world signaling the existence of Chadian empires, and focusing on the diplomatic relationship between the Empires of Kanem and Cairo.

<sup>2</sup> Presenting a North and a South, set in opposition to one another, for better and for worse.

<sup>3</sup> A thesis submitted in 2012 (Ali Zakaria Musa, 2012: 74-116) nonetheless shows the existence of practices of mutual assistance between the Chadian communities through various type of mediation and social regulation of conflicts, including the nafir or mutual aid, mutual assistance in the event of drought or poor season and Linguy (alliances and reliance, in terms of solidarity when conflict arises), etc.

gluing together these disparate sets shaped by history and the opportunities that often emerged in the margins, whether in establishing the Pharaonic empire or creating the Sudano-Nigérien space today.

More prosaically, through this overview, introductory remarks expose us to the foundations of Chad, to the colonial conquest in the creation of territorial space. I will describe major ethno-social and religious configurations, before mentioning how the terms of their administration were deployed during the colonial period. In a third point, I demonstrate how the accession of Chad to independence finally initiated the process of political instability, when trying to analyze the purview of the different schemes. I show also, in terms of analyzing resilience factors, the relationships between civil society organizations and the State, by defining the overall elements in understanding the political game in Chad. In my conclusion, I will indicate the winding paths leading out of the crisis of democratic governance in Chad.

## **0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS**

Chad certainly does not deserve to be kept at such a distance by the research community. Indeed, since the end of the 1970s, there is a scientific blackout concerning this country. Most of the publications about Chad are related to production sectors (agriculture, livestock, forestry, land, etc.) and ancient history (paleontological studies with the results that are already known to us). Rural life and prehistory therefore represent the principal field of research on Chad. There are very few publications on current realities, relating to political, religious and other dynamics. In addition, there is the issue of popularizing scientific outputs. Internal research in Chadian humanities and social sciences is nearly extinct. Teaching faculties do virtually no publishing and are coopted or invested into the political world. In these introductory remarks, I would like to present some points on current understanding of the country, based on economic, political, socio-cultural and other realities.

### **1. Economic factors**

Any understanding of the economic factors must begin with the natural potential of the country, taking into account traditional production activities (agriculture and livestock), commercial activities and mining activities.

On the country's natural potential, it is accepted that Chad is an environmental phenomenon. Located in the central basin of the African continent, its silting has essentially provided all the benefits a country could dream of. With its very diverse vegetation<sup>4</sup> and very rich ecosystem, the country abounds in natural and mining resources that have yet to be fully exploited (gold, uranium, petroleum, tungsten, iron, fish-bearing streams, ecotourism sites, etc.).

---

<sup>4</sup> It includes three plant zones.

The economy of the country is based on agriculture and livestock production, in which more than 75% of the population is engaged. Until recently, these two sectors were essentially the center of the national economy built around production of cotton and meat on hoof and processed meat for export. These two sectors are now endangered, in part because of the impoverished soil, the extension of farming areas, resulting in more limited grazing and livestock crossing routes. The rural exodus to the cities is still growing. The cash crop sector is sometimes neglected in favor of other activities such as gold mining, collection of gum Arabic, etc. All these developments have created a situation rich in potential conflict between farmers and herders, exacerbated by a deficit of administrative and political management.

The commercial sector in Chad is booming. Legislative incentives for improving the business climate have received excellent reviews. Every day the business sector in Chad continues to grow in numbers, with the proliferation of banking services, goods and services supplied to individuals and corporations (a pharmaceutical factory is soon to be built by an Italian company, as well as construction on an international commerce city in N'Djamena expected to begin in this first quarter). The development of the country's oil fields in the early 2000s increased investment opportunities, significantly lowered the unemployment that had been generated by years of structural adjustment imposed by the Breton Wood institutions, despite disruption of communities located near these fields and major ecological upheavals.

Today oil became the main income producer for the national economy. In addition to the Miandoum, Dosseo and Kome fields operated by the Exxon Mobil-Petronas-Chevron Consortium, other sites are in operation or being explored (the Bongor basin by the Chinese, Griffith from Canada in the Mid-Chari basin, etc.). Oil has become one more among the country's resources being exploited alongside Gum Arabic (controlled by Chadians), the Baoré cement plant, and construction of the Djarmaya refinery, which also produces butane gas.

The development of these fields generated financial capital that is reinvested in infrastructure, the proliferation of education institutions (schools, universities, public administrations, urban planning, etc.)<sup>5</sup>. So the economic fabric is expanding slowly but it faces increased corruption, scandals related to misappropriation of public funds, public resources managed for personal wealth by the government.

Mining has been an activity in Chad for many years and is still undertaken in an archaic fashion. These activities include panning for gold (in the region of Mayo-Kebbi essentially to Gambocke, Doué, Yapala, Zapili, Teubara, etc.). They are also activities that come at a significant human and ecological cost. Industrial mining is recent, with the construction of the Baore cement plant in Mayo-Kebbi and the exploring uranium in the Department of Lake Léré.

---

<sup>5</sup> We will return at the end of this work on these elements to explore the internal logic.



## **2. The political realities**

The political situation in the country is poor in its complexity, because this basin has long served as a refuge for people fleeing various communities. This has helped build strong identities and a strong sense of community territoriality. French colonization lasting barely forty years was unsuccessful in consolidating these spaces by forging common identities. Rather, it contributed to the exacerbation of divisions as I will present later.

Consequently, Chad's political reality is built around a philosophy that is more individualistic than community-based. The monopoly of policy initiatives lies exclusively within the hegemonic elite while the popular masses, generally kept in ignorance and illiteracy, are distanced from political issues and the political stage. From independence to the present day, political leaders have acted by following the playbook of manipulating identities, corruption, hardening an exclusionary and repressive executive branch and fragmenting other spheres that would help balance the power structure (including the legislative and judicial). In short, nepotism, clannishness more than tribalism, preferential treatment, misappropriation of public funds, etc. are real ways in which the powers in place evolve. The weakening of public institutions (administration, army, justice, etc.) reinforces power for the Republican monarch. With a long-term perspective, we can say that the various regimes have perfected preceding systems; which is understandable, given that it is still the same actors who control the scene, in some respect closely. Political recruitment is still poor, limiting itself to the heirs of previous systems.

Basically, a multi-party system has, to date, more or less failed to improve the management of power in Chad. Moreover, the poor supply and the absence of political debates make alternation only possible by coups and countercoups. A latent mindset would be that power belongs to groups of those who fought for it. They are entitled to everything and have power over everything. It is they who are the groups of untouchables, above the law and believe they alone embody public authority, the *hakouma*. Unable to have their own day at the head of the country, groups often create political parties, signifying an attempt by social actors to access the spoils of authority. Elections in Chad appear to be a discursive tool to obey orders from the outside and strengthen the subtle influence of exclusive power by manipulation of electoral codes.

## **3. The socio-cultural realities**

I would like to capture the dynamics of these socio-cultural realities through the following facts: the BET (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti) political equation, the roles and status of traditional authorities and the vagaries of Chadian civil society.

The BET is generally what was called Chad until at least 1935. It is among the most thoroughly studied regions in Chad, regions that have moreover aroused a certain colonial inclination. This region is also one that has not undergone much by way of structural modifications with the passage of the colonial era. Social habits were maintained, because colonization only bothered

with becoming legitimate by accommodating communities. Outside the territories surrounding Biltine where efforts at schooling are underway, there is rampant illiteracy.

Simply put, the BET gives the impression of being in a continuous war with itself and with other regions of the country. Rebellions, coups d'état are hatched by the people of BET or against them. Others even claim that the problem of Chad is not North-South but is subsumed in the BET equation which houses groups that are deemed anarchic, belligerent, accustomed to plundering and who have been monopolizing political power in Chad since the early 1980s. Several times, I heard this argument: "it is necessary that children of BET agree to make peace with themselves and with other Chadians." In short, the factor of imbalance in Chad is this part of the country, which is very poor in natural resources, and is highly politicized and militarized.

Contrary to the ideology that positions the North in opposition to the South and vice versa, the observations I have made and the encounters and discussions I have had in both the North and the South lead me to believe that there is a disconnection between socio-political elites and the masses. The Chadian masses, attentive spectators, are disillusioned by politics. They are looking for change and would like to see different relationships at play between Chadians. They are fed up with wars and counterattacks, rebellions and counter-rebellions. They want peace, stability, justice that will let them come and go, engage in economic activities and practice their religion. People know what manipulation is being perpetrated.

Chad seems to garner attention particularly with its wars and endless internal conflicts; wars and conflicts that are most often reduced to a cultural and identity dynamic synthesized by the image of a Muslim North against a Christian South. This binary vision of social relations, fed by many publications and research, turn into reality a tendency to look for the easy way out, not only to justify a certain domination of some other communities, but especially to prevent the emergence of a synergy of a broader and citizen-driven action. This binary, culturalist synthesis, recuperated by the political elites to fill their glaring lack of any ideology and political course of action, fortunately does not seem to be completely accepted by the communities at the grassroots level, which continue to develop more or less normal contacts by trade, migration, intermarriage, etc. It is this strength of social resilience that would explain in part the Chadian *conatus* of which I have spoken above and prevents the country from foundering into chaos.

To this persistence of communities who maintain the links amongst themselves, one must add the centrifugal force of the traditional authorities, who have always managed to preserve their interests and benefits gathering political and even revolutionary urges together. From my point of view, traditional authorities have helped keep the civil peace, more than the security, administrative or political apparatus. In areas where traditional powers are weakened, there is a significant resurgence of violence and banditry. Paradoxically, it will be seen that Jacobin-type republicanism, inherited and assumed by Chad, has still faced the force of inertia represented by traditional authorities. Manipulated, seduced, courted by some; mistreated, essentially threatened with extermination by others, the traditional authorities, relegated to the ranks of "administrative

aides,” and seem to me to play in this country a primordial political role, by the very fact that they hold a dominant position in communities and are still perceived to have a social aura. Faced with the chaos caused by politicians’ incompetence and impotence contributing to social dynamism, these traditional structures have *de facto* legitimacy, both on the local level and—as is often the case—in the national arena. No social and political reform could succeed without another redefinition of their roles and their status.

The last thing I'd like to add to the analysis concerns civil society organizations. In previous analyses, I put forward the impossibility for Chadians to come together around a cause without interference from variables other than the civic values that they share in common. Just as the political sphere, this sphere is also plagued by contradictions and other socio-cultural divisions. Until recently, engagement by this sector was a reserved privilege of Southern Chadians. This generation of elders, certainly because of trauma associated with the war, has built a discourse based on negativism. Even though they made speeches that distinguished them from the opposition, the radicalism they have borne caused some to see in them a form of revenge by the South. Now a few lines budge with the arrival of young people but they are hindered by their lack of capacity for political analysis.

#### **4. Other issues related to living together**

I would like to conclude this discussion by highlighting two major facts that I risk forgetting as I move forward in this work: research institutions in Chad, the practice of the *diya* and manipulation of history for the benefit of political agendas.

Higher education in Chad has significantly improved with the proliferation of public training institutions and the liberalization of the professional education sector. Accordingly, the problem does not arise because of the quantity of institutions or infrastructure but rather the quality of the supply. The demands of research as well as its necessary vulgarization are manifest. I do not wish to say more about this. The rest of the discussion that will follow will bear this out. What is unfortunate in all this is that the quality of the educational system, plagued by both student and teacher strikes, remains undermined by persistent gridlock!

At a forum held in November 2012 in N'Djamena on the practice of the *Diya* in Chad where I was one of the reporters, we learned that the *Diya* is a practice prescribed in Islam. It is based on the Qur'an, including the IV Al-Nissa Surat which establishes the amount of 100 camels to 200 cows or even 1000 dinars or 1200 drachmas as compensation for any injury to the body or any crime. Literally the *Diya* would define what is due. This is a compensatory allowance paid after agreement between parties. Chadian laws had implicitly recognized it as traditional and customary practices.

This practice reportedly originated in Chad between the 10th and 15th centuries with the advent of Islam in the basin of Lake Chad. French colonization and evangelization blocked the *Diya*

practice in the North. With the arrival in power of FROLINAT,<sup>6</sup> the practice spread among people practicing Christianity, it seems, to mitigate revenge issues. The communities subsequently entrusted *Diya* management to traditional authorities, with the signing of the agreements regulating this practice among the communities. In fact, this is considered an adaptation of divine will, allowing the guilty to bear the consequences of their actions. Vengeance thus is not a part of the *Diya*. The price of the *diya* is split between all the beneficiary communities in three parts: one for the traditional authority who has handled the case, one for the direct victim or their family and the last for the community which will support future *Diya*. The *Diya* is paid largely in local currency and varies from one community to another and from one region to another.

This forum helped participants study the *Diya*, beyond more or less ideological speeches against the phenomenon. The debates have highlighted State responsibility in intensified use of the *diya*, its persistence, as well as abuses in the system. In this case the State appears complicit, weak and aloof. The views of participants lead to the idea that the *Diya* became a means of domination and enrichment. It must be understood less as a conflict resolution technique, a way to repair damage, or blood money. The balance of power and positions of power between victims and perpetrators influence the degree or the amount of compensation due. From this point of view, the *Diya* seems unfair (it does not give much consideration to the person or the fault) and unconstitutional (the current trend tends to turn the penalty and responsibility for the harm suffered into a collective burden).

Issues associated with the *Diya* as it is are currently at play at political and economic levels. On a political level, the practice of the *Diya* concerns the way in which State power is exercised and comes as a strategy for domination applied by the social elites in power. At the economic level, the *Diya* contributes to impoverishing communities and families, while becoming a source of enrichment for other communities, families and leaders.

Because the *Diya* practices involve complex interests, the fundamental challenge is to achieve “Building a rule of law, a united nation based on civil liberties and fundamental human rights, the dignity of the person (...),” as stated in the preamble to our Constitution.

It appears to me that Chadians are not all comfortable with their history. Some would even suggest that these peoples have never had a shared history. In the absence of in-depth research, certain individuals or groups retrieve history for their benefit, by building an ethnocentric and domineering concept. At the end of this work, I will show how it is urgent to soften social relationships between communities by socializing customs, helping Chadians to better discover and exceed their specific traditions. The important thing is to promote respect for laws and the promotion of an accessible and impartial justice based on equality, fairness and responsibility.

---

<sup>6</sup> An armed group which established *de facto* rule over the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibetsi northern region after the French military and administrative presence left the country in 1964.

## **I. From conquest to the creation of the Chadian territory**

To understand issues of power in Chad, it is important to refer to its genesis as a State, that is, through a process of institutionalization the Chadian State was created as a result of contact between its different territories and colonial France. It must always be remembered that this country was a foothold for the French empire, the last country in Africa to be settled. I therefore submit the myth of Chad featured as a part of a political concept during France's colonial project, and then approach exploration and conquest as successive phases, before giving an overview on the creation of the Chadian territory.

### **1. The myth of the Foundation**

Chad, epitome of *terra incognita*, became a “cornerstone of the French Empire.” This is the “myth” sustained by the colonial community, contributing to a strong patriotic feeling on these territories. It was the same feeling experienced by the first conquerors to arrive in Chad. It must be said that the entire Chad basin, with its mountainous and swampy recesses, once provided places of refuge for various populations in the face of diverse calamities: tribal wars, slavery but certainly religious wars as well (Magnant, 1994: 29-56). This space, which indeed came to be a vital space for these scattered populations, was the setting for continuous migratory movement, created by a succession of gatherings around fledgling kingdoms, irremediably followed by dispersing flights from hostilities. This long back and forth movement therefore opened this space and made it one of the places of most intense trade in Africa South of Sahara.

A space that is simultaneously open and relatively closed, being a place of refuge, rather than a “frozen” zone in which populations purported to be “petrified” as often described by some authors (Cabot and Diziain, 1955), the Lake Chad basin has, each time, aroused curiosity among travelers, who were not only Arabs but also the first explorers of the 19th century. For them all, it was a space to be conquered because of its strategic position. And especially for the French, more specifically the colonial and military sectors passionate for this corner of the world, possession of Chad (signifying Lake Chad) even became an obsession. It is the mythical vision of Chad that was conveyed in the metropole as has been underlined by Nina Stojanov (2005). Her work shows how this image of the then little known Chad was still based on fantasies and the wildest passions. Sometimes blind passions when the French were ousted from Fashoda; other times consensus-building passions when France lost sons who were celebrated as eternal heroes; and finally fatal passions when it takes to dreaming that it is through the conquest of Chad that it could be reborn and thereby even regain its soul as a great nation. This is what is put forth by three propaganda publications between 1895 and 1935: the *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française*, (BCAF), the *Almanach du marsouin* and *Illustration*. We witness the emergence of three figures that are of great consequence to the colonial project in Chad: Harry

Alis<sup>7</sup>, Eugène Étienne<sup>8</sup> and Auguste Terrier<sup>9</sup>. It is through these three characters that the fate of Chad was played out and, in terms of programming, has a legacy that perhaps lives on to this day.

The colonial project in Chad can be broken down into two periods: the first is “a time of discovery and conquest dominated by mystery, danger, self-sacrifice on a hostile territory but also fascination and heroism, then a second period where effective possession is taken, where the thinking revolves around the themes of value and usefulness. ” It is on the basis of this second timeframe that a hierarchy emerges, opposing the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parts of Chad.” As we shall see, this hierarchy is the foundation of Chad's current national integration problems<sup>10</sup>.

The French passion for Chad had a strategic and practical objective: “More than anything, Chad is a dream: that of seeing French possessions in Africa grouped together in a single set, that of the French colonial Empire. It is the hope that one day France will reign supreme in Africa, before the English, its eternal rivals” (Stojanov, 2005: 2). In other words, the stubborn opinion of all was clearly that Chad, the “cornerstone of the Empire,” could only be conquered by military and violent means. 1891 marked a temporary hiatus that was sharply focused enough to help better understand this mystification and the crystallization of the French colonial passion for Chad. This date is not the year of the dissemination of information on Chad but rather that of the publication of the book by Harry Alis entitled *A la conquête du Tchad*. In this book Alis (1891: 279) noted:

“(…)what a grandiose and logical action plan was charted for us by the very success of our earlier efforts! Algeria-Tunisia tends to extend South into Chad; Senegal, now the French Sudan extends gradually eastward to Chad; the French Congo bordering Northern Oubangui, turns back up to Chad. So, it seems that all our aspirations converge on this great Central African Lake, whose existence, doubted for so long, is still half buried in the mists of mystery. If we could one day join our three possessions on the shores of this Lake, we would have founded one of the largest empires in the world, in a sort of extension of France, and, for centuries, a field where our nationals could work. What a beautiful dream!”

This goal was the only one having long invested French colonial propaganda sung by Harry Alis. It is towards this goal that Harry (1863: 70) had Crampel recruited with this mission: “Crampel’s aim was to cross and conquer on behalf of France and in the name of science this region which was still absolutely unknown, stretching between the Oubangi and Lake Chad, where only, a Nachtigal narrative shows us the pagan cannibals, entrenched in the gigantic trees they inhabit, defending the last mysterious territory of Central Africa against Muslim slave hunters”

---

<sup>7</sup> Nom de plume of J-H Percher, BCAF director from 1891 to 1895.

<sup>8</sup> A patron who more or less bankrolls the *Comité d'Afrique française*

<sup>9</sup> BCAF director from 1895 to 1932.

<sup>10</sup> Of course Jules Verne (1863) played a major role as precursor of this approach to the discovery of Chad. In a series of novels published in 1863, he had set the scene with his three characters (Dr. Fergusson, Kennedy and Joe) flying over the mysterious Lake Chad, populated with hostile savages. When his characters arrived at this mythical lake Jules Verne (1863: 238) exulted in these terms: “So there it was, Africa’s Caspian Sea, whose existence was so long thought to be mere fable, this inland sea where the Denham and Barth expeditions managed to arrive.”

The objective of this conquest of Chad is not only humanitarian but was also related to French politics and the European geopolitics of the time. Indeed, the 1899 battle of Fashoda between French troops and British troops in their common desire to conquer Lower Egypt (present Sudan) and especially access to the Nile Valley resulted in a brutal eviction of the former. This defeat created genuine trauma in French public opinion and it became absolutely necessary to rally the nation once again around a noble cause. The Anglo-French Treaty established the Sudan border, according to the demarcation line along the Congo and Nile waterways; attributed to England the Darfur lands and to France those of Ouaddaï, as well as the entirety of Tibesti, Borkou, Ounianga and Ennedi. This Treaty was seen by the French as a second humiliation since it forced them to evacuate the Sudanese Bahr-El-Ghazal region. And then in some quarters it was felt that the acquisition of the Chadian regions represented virtually nothing compared to what was lost: “the hard lesson was learned, and we must forget neither the bitterness nor the teachings (...). As to any rejoicing on our part for this Treaty, it would be even vainer and more unwarranted. It gives us no territory that was not already virtually recognized as ours and that we were not able to add without much delay to our African empire” (Robert de Caix, 1899: 100).

## **2. Exploring and conquering Chad**

Exploration is a process that helps either measure a territory or evaluate its pulse, to see the potential it could have and especially to get to know those who live in it, with their strengths and weaknesses, through study of their customs and traditions. Already the English Hugh Clapperton (1788-1827) was the first Explorer to embark on this adventure. He made his way near Lake Chad where he settled. He was followed by the German Hönemann, who successfully recognized and identified Lake Chad under its current name in 1801. After him, Denham, an Englishman, left Tripoli in 1821 to reach Lake Chad. He was the explorer who introduced this part of Nigritie to Europe through his publications. He was also the first to have correctly traced its contours. In 1851-1852, Vogel, another German, discovered the Tupuri Lakes in Mayo-Kebbi. Heinrich Barth (1821-1865) traveled almost all regions of sub-Saharan Africa. Barth accompanied the sultan of Bornu in 1854 on his expedition to Musgum country. Barth named the Musgum territory African Holland, because of its wetlands and streams. He continued his journey to Djogoidi near Yagoua, in North Cameroon and for the first time recognized the upper course of the Benue. Similarly, in 1874, Nachtigal accompanied Mbang Gaouran Abu Seikin from Baguirmi on a campaign to the Goulai territory in Kimre. Kimre was formerly a village inhabited by the Gabri (Madou, 2009). Another German, Gustav Nachtigal, signed the protectorate treaties with Douala chiefs around 1874 and arrived in the Lake Chad region, from the Nigerian coast to Ouaddaï.

French exploration was belated and military. After the defeat in Fashoda, for France the march towards Chad became not only an effective opportunity, but also an obligation. For the

conquering troops, military glory came at the price of supreme self-sacrifice. The martyrs of this mission were celebrated and elevated to the rank of national heroes<sup>11</sup>. Now nothing seems to be out of France's reach in the effort to restore life to the motherland. It is this imperative that guided the French troops to undertake the conquest of Chad, in the face of hostile and fierce opponents, such as Rabah.

While Germany was discovering the center of Africa, the French were still at the project stage. The Adolphe Duponchel an engineer of the Bridges and Roads Corps devised the project to build a railway line linking Algiers to the Niger Bend. It was intended for this railway go through Chad. In his project Duponchel refers to Chad as the "future French Indies." His idea is accepted in 1879 by the Public Works Minister, who established a Trans-Sahara commission.

The Mayo-Kebbi basin is an intermediate annex between the Chad basin and the Niger basin. Formerly included in the Paleo-Chadian Sea and located at 320 meters, it constitutes the threshold, whereby this sea overflows into the Benue River onto the Niger and the Atlantic. It was through the Anglo-German Treaty of 1893 that what is now Cameroon was conceded to Germany and Borno, located North of Nigeria, to England. Seeing that Germany and England had moved ahead of it in the conquest of Africa, France wished to conquer the Chad basin. This intention is supported by Savognan-de-Brazza who, in 1888, drew a large blue line from Brazzaville to Algiers going through Chad on a map of Africa to show his friends, laughingly stating: "This is the French Congo." Brazza was the first French explorer to have signed treaties with the Makoko chiefs of the Congo.

Paul Campel was Brazza's secretary. He was the one who recognized Northern Congo. He then planned to follow the course of the Benue River to reach Lake Chad. However he did not complete his journey: he was murdered in 1896 in the Ndele region with its companion Bhat. It was Navy lieutenant Mizon who reached the Mayo-Kebbi through the Benue River in 1892. On November 29<sup>th</sup> of the same year Casimir Maistre signed a protectorate treaty with Mbang Dallem, Chief of the Laï Gabri. In October 1897, Émile Gentil, Commissioner of the French Government in the Congo traveled the Chari on Léon-Blot (a steamboat) to Lake Chad, coming from the Congo. He signed a treaty with Abderamane Gaourang II, sultan of Baguirmi in Tchekna. This alliance was established against Rabah. Gentil continued his journey on Gribingui in CAR. On September 5, 1899 the "military territory of the Chadian countries and protectorates" was created by decree. In 1899, a first mission of the conquest known as the "Bretonnet Mission"

---

<sup>11</sup> "(...), the years of doubt and failure are giving way to beautiful certainty and the brilliance of success and words of greatness, of national pride suddenly take a special meaning (...), the magnificence of the French 'race' and its vocation to guide peoples" (Stojanov, 2005: 28). This martyrological exaltation can be read also in the preface written by M. Mézières (1902) for Emil Gentil's book entitled *The Fall of the Rabah Empire*: "You, Sir, and with you the great explorers (...), you restore our self-confidence, you show us what remains of valour in French souls. Your struggles against nature and men have something heroic, you write fragments of epics. On the distant land where you are to brave so many perils, you deploy the great qualities of the soldier, discipline, patience, dedication, courage, boldness. All that which honored the heroes of the glorious wars of old relive in you. This is why throughout the land, in our smallest villages, your names are said with respect, with love. It creates in all the confused feeling that France remains the great nation, under constant threat by decadence of the prophets of doom will be wrong, as long as she can produce men such as you."



was massacred by Rabah on July 17<sup>th</sup> on the Niellim Togbao boulders, in Mid-Chari. In October of the same year, Gentil returned to Gribingui with reinforcements. He installed guards on the Archambault (former Kokaga) position. He arrived October 29<sup>th</sup> in the Kouno area where Rabah blocked his way.

To reduce Rabah's influence, the French then developed strategies to surround him. Three missions were formed. The first mission, called "Saharan Mission," left from Algiers led by scientific explorer Fourreau. The escort which included African *tirailleurs* was placed under the orders of Commander Lamy. The second Mission, "The West African Mission," located in the Niger Bend was placed under the command of captains Voulet and Chanoine. This mission committed numerous abuses on its passage, particularly at Birni Nkonni, Sansana Hausa and Langou. Informed of these misdeeds, the Minister in charge of Colonies decided to send colonel Klobb from Timbuktu. The mission entrusted to Klobb was to deal with Chanoine and thus get back on the road to Chad. However Captain Chanoine had decided to carve out a colonial empire for himself. When the Klobb mission arrived at his position, he ordered his men to arrest them. He fled the ensuing gunfight during which Chanoine's men killed Klobb and wounded Lieutenant Meynier. Chanoine and Voulet were later killed by their own soldiers.

Finally, Joalland and Meynier reached Kanem with a complement of 150 men. On November 25, 1899, they fought a battle at Dibinentchi and signed a protectorate treaty with the Kanem Djerab Alifat. Then Meynier moved up to join Commander Gentil in Bessada (January 10, 1900). Joalland allied himself with the Lamy mission coming together on April 21, 1900 in Kousseri. The fateful attack took place on April 22, 1900. During this battle Lamy and Rabah were killed. Damazé, a former Sao site inhabited by the Kotoko, took the name of Fort-Lamy. Moreover, in the note summarizing the official reports received in the Department of the *L'Afrique-Équatoriale Française* (AEF) Colonies the French intention was stated as follows: "it was necessary, however after this glorious battle, to prevent the remnants from the Rabah army to reconstitute itself under the orders of Fadel-Allah and Niébé his sons. Captain Reibeld who had the command of the troops, marched [April] 24<sup>th</sup> upon the town of Logone which he found evacuated. Then according to the instructions of Mr. Gentil, he settled with a detachment drawn from the three missions, in pursuit of the enemy which was executed with rare vigor. With Niébé killed, Fadel fled then returned on May 22."

In fact, Chad, the French colonial foothold, was previously shared between several power structures. To sum up, we could remember that around the year 800, a people which would arise from the mixing of populations from the South and North, hunted by the desertification of the Sahara, established the Kingdom of Kanem on the Northeastern edge of Lake Chad. The kingdom developed to the detriment of the Sao civilization, thanks to the control of the Saharan trade towards the Mediterranean and the slave trade, transported to Fezzan and Tripoli. In the 11<sup>th</sup> century, its rulers converted to Islam. In the 13<sup>th</sup> century, they extended their domination to Bornu (in what is now Nigeria), Fezzan and Ouaddai, in the direction of the Nile. They thus formed the Kanem-Bornu Empire. Conquests undertaken during the next two centuries helped to

expand the empire westward to the Niger River and eastward to the Ouaddai Kingdom. In the 14<sup>th</sup> century wars against the Boulala people in the South forced the Maï to go west to Bornu. The following Maïs restored the empire, and under Ali Ghaji, Ngazargamu was chosen as the new capital. In the 16th century, the empire expanded and grew in power, especially during the reign of Idris III Alaoma (c. 1571-1603), who acquired firearms provided by the North African Ottoman Turks. In modern language, the first genocide in Chadian history was that of the Sao peoples. It was under the reign of Idriss III Alaoma that they were forced to convert to Islam. Their refusal was punished by a drastic extermination. Those who managed to escape took refuge in the mountains (Guéra, Borkou, Ennedi, Tibesti, Mandara) or on the islands of Lake Chad or the Toupouri Lakes. The empire declined once more in the 18<sup>th</sup> century because of a growing presence of Fulani from the West. It struggled to resist an assault by Osman Dan Fodio in 1808 and 1809 and was finally absorbed by the Ouaddaians in 1846.

Ouaddai was an independent Sultanate since the 16<sup>th</sup> century mostly because of the installation of the Senoussyya. Abeche or Abacha was chosen as its capital. The capital of the Chadian Islam, Abeche was also a center of the slave trade for nearly 300 years. Thus, the new factor that will transform human configurations will be Islam. On this part of the African continent, Islamization has been gradual; but rarely by acts of war.

The 15<sup>th</sup> century is marked by the slave trade, the “invention of the century” (C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1999: 189-201). However, it did not really reach the Chad basin. Trafficking here is more domestic and more oriented toward the Arab and Muslim world. This slave trade was perpetrated under the Islamist monarchs and used as a means of constraining the unconverted peoples. It was starting in the 19<sup>th</sup> century that the Treaty would become an obligation, because the markets developed on the African coast: “From the Nile Valley to the edge of Lake Chad, 19<sup>th</sup> century Central Africa suffered greatly from raids that followed the expansion of Islam in the region.” (Cordell, 2002: 18). This author reports the testimony of attacks suffered by Fulani and the Sara of Southern Chad and the Banda or Manza of what is now the Central African Republic. It also distinguishes the procedures of the transatlantic slave trade developed on African coasts from those of the trade carried out by Muslims in the basin. It wasn't until 1850 that Arab merchants began venturing more deeply into the Southern and Western Sudan. These Arab merchants were escorted by armies of mercenaries recruited on the spot. They are the ones who opened new trade routes within the Continent. They defended their strategic areas by creating fortified camps called Zariba in Arabic (Zeltner, 1998 and Cordell, 2002).

From Darfur to Central Africa, passing through the sultanates of Baguirmi and Ouaddai in Chad, Rabah was the one who was most engaged in this trade. He managed to bypass the British on the Nile and Egyptian thrust into the Sudan. Indeed, the British forbade the slave trade. Rabah had managed to install his center of operation in Dikoa where “he constantly led raids in Baguirmi, powerless to defend themselves and soon, when the countries of the South were appeased, he went up to the North, towards [Lake] Chad, towards the Bornu and Kouka markets” (Lieutenant-Colonel Monteil, 1895: 170).

For a time, belonging to Islam served as a means of protection from subjection to slavery. But this was not always the case: in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, “at the edge of the worlds” (C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1999: 104) there was Rabah. He was a warlord of Sudanese origin eager to get away from the Egyptian authorities in his country. He settled for a time in Darfur then continued on to the Eastern part of Central Africa. He met with resistance from some Islamized chiefs that he managed to subdue. Little by little, Rabah invested Chad with his *bazingers*, a motley troupe made of conquered tribes who, without being reduced to slavery, swelled the ranks of his warriors. Rabah was a very cunning commander who managed to dominate the Chadian kingdoms of Kanem, Baguirmi and Ouaddai by imposing his authority without however completely destabilizing their existing institutions. They were expected to provide him with slaves in exchange for their own freedom. Rabah’s conquests had purely economic aims and involved the capture of slaves and their resale along African coasts. Rabah, armed with weapons acquired from Westerners and the Ottoman Turks, sought to dominate the Chad basin, thus building a solid market. In this approach, religion did not play an important role, given that some Muslim leaders and their subjects were reduced to slavery by Rabah in the most atrocious manner, thus breaking the Muslim confraternity or “pact” (C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Ibid: 109). Inside his capital Dikwa, Rabah was a true ruler covered in riches who governed his subjects, overlords and a harem of nearly three hundred women. Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Rabah had thus created a Peri-Chadian and established a Pre-Chadian state (Zeltner 1988). We can think that it was the relentless terror exacted by Rabah against defeated sultanates that was the root cause of his ultimate downfall. Indeed, the latter, to regain their integrity, gladly accepted the protectorate treaties offered to them by European explorers who at the time were roaming the continent. Such was the case of Mbang Gourang of Baguirmi, who placed himself under French tutelage and took active part in search parties out to find Rabah and his men. The other cause is linked to the European treaties following the Berlin conference convened in 1884 under Bismarck to physically mark their occupied territories. And then, once slavery was abolished, Rabah had become a threat, as he continued to engage in this activity. To conquer Chad, France had to first incapacitate Rabah. This was the work of the famous Gentil mission which was actually three missions joined together to put an end to the Rabah launched on April 22, 1900 in Kousseri<sup>12</sup>.

Before presenting the process by which France established its territories in Chad, it is important to say that tales of European exploration contributed to making the myth of the Southern Chad as a reservoir of slaves for the Sahelian kingdoms<sup>13</sup>. This myth of the South being populated with a

---

<sup>12</sup> It is the Fernand Fourreau (1850-1914) mission that traveled from Ouargala (an oasis in the Algerian Sahara) crossed the Sahara and Sudan, reached Lake Chad where it went up the Chari to join the Chari mission. There was the Emile Gentil (1866-1914) mission which explored the region of Lake Chad and Chari from 1895 to 1898. In 1900 he joined the Fourreau and Lamy (1858-1900) mission engaged in hunting down Rabah.

<sup>13</sup> “Due to the configuration of the territory, Chadian diversity falls into two categories; It is usual, in fact, to distinguish two Chads more or less separated by the Chari, and to place them in opposition to each other, and this applies to the ethnic, historic, economic and religious characteristics”(Philippe CHOW, 1963: 4-7). The author goes further by talking about “sara” social structures in terms of anarchy, because of their diffuse hierarchy. He considers that the North would be a model of civilization and thus the natural ability of Northerners to better direct the State.

never ending supply of slaves from the Chadian basin is an enduring one and is often brought forward to justify a number of claims. These theses are systematically re-appropriated by researchers, without further explanation or made new by those who follow, including Chadians<sup>14</sup>. Dadi<sup>15</sup> is certainly representative of this type of allusive writing, without producing facts or evidence: “the Chadian population is ethnically diverse in several ways: from East to West and from North to South, neither the lifestyles, nor habits or activities are the same.” He contradicts himself later in the text: “It is a country of contrasts in various ways: human, geographic and economic; which does not necessarily imply a separation between the men and the regions. Diversity is a source of wealth, often of complementarity” (1988: 23). He also writes this: “slavery caused a hemorrhage in human capital for Chad. The ravages due to the slave trade are felt mainly in Southern populations which were insufficiently organized to resist the onslaught of slave hunters” (ibid.). There are many culturalist allusions posing ethnicity as a doxa explaining social interaction.

Chad is not the only case of diversity in Africa. Analyses now lead us to state that cultural, linguistic, nor geographic diversity, can explain the fact that Chad is immersed in an ongoing crisis. Chadian wars were not based on ethnicity or religion but rather were more linked to politics and the elite, with the external influences. These factors were instruments in the hands of these power-hungry elites.

It is linked to a global context which involves the marking of territory between groups converted to Islam and non-Islamic groups. Thus, all the people in the vicinity of Lake Chad were at one point under the domination of another and therefore reduced to slavery. For example, Chapelle (1991: 193-228) indicates that the Tandjilé and Lai peoples have never been vassals of the Baguirmi, as was believed and never let themselves be attacked. These peoples had horses and warrior traditions. Similarly, it is starting in 1850 “through the use of firearms,” that expeditions became more deadly and Ouaddai arrived at Lake Iro and the Chari, Baguirmi in Mandoul; while at the same time the people of Mayo-Kebbi valiantly resisted the Fulani led by Ousmane Dan Fodio. There is no doubt a mistaken assumption of a historical fact as partisan mobilization. This is why, to understand the contradictions and conflicts between the various socio-cultural entities of Chad, it is useful to refer to these disparities in the history but especially the use made of it in daily interaction by various parties.

More generally, the negative perception of black Africa is not specific to France. It is inherent in the first contacts between two worlds that were previously unknown to one another: “Africa has

---

<sup>14</sup> Dadi (1988) but also Abakar Kallin (2010: 43). It is common for generic and rationalistic terms like “Sara populations in the South”, “ethnic groups”, etc. are used as a matter of course.

<sup>15</sup> Chevallier (1988: 6-7) the author of his Preface wrote this: “(...) ethnic diversity, redoubled by the religious dualism and the slavery practiced by the Sahelian kingdoms, led a deep antagonism founded on misunderstanding/hostility between Northern and Southern populations. [...] : State-sponsored violence, administrative arbitrariness were even more poorly tolerated by the populations of the North such they followed the paternalism exercised against them by the colonizers and that officials were mostly of Sara origins ; appearing as a “counter-domination”, reversing the former forms of subordination (...)

been presented as a world of mysteries, hostilities and fear with shocking cultural traits like bloody customs and human sacrifice. To this should be added the shame of slavery. These factors were strongly challenged particularly by missionaries, who came to replace fetishism, bearer of superstitions, with *true religion* and to eliminate Islam by spreading the universe of European civilization influenced by Christianity [...]. The canons of the European institutions erected as a universal system apart from which it becomes impossible to evolve” (Some, 2002: 42-58). For example, in upper Côte d'Ivoire in 1930 certain colonial Republicans thought that blacks were so backward that they could not understand the abstract ideas disseminated by Christianity<sup>16</sup>. This kind of thinking was inspired by the writings of Lévy-Bruhl on the pre-logical primitive mentality that postulated that blacks could never understand Christianity which is a religion whose dogma and morals was thought to be too lofty for African societies. It was thus believed to be necessary to exercise caution so as not to destabilize and demoralize them. Maurice Delafosse (1922) advocates for the secular education of blacks, in order to get them to bypass the religious stage of evolution by which they remained riveted to superstition and xenophobia to hoist them to the stage of philosophy. The basic idea is to bring them out of the religious state to access critical rationality. This thinking is still current if we consider the discourse about African political governance, and especially the inability of Africans to take their fate into own their hands or to define for themselves a sustainable historical trajectory. The same was attempted for those who were able to distinguish between the agro-pastoral and non-governmental societies to establish a hierarchy of societies: primitive community, unstructured communities, and more advanced communities. The criterion for moving beyond unstructured communities being trade and livestock-ownership, the power structures were in the form of hierarchy pyramids.

### **3. The creation of Chadian territorial space**

The current territory of Chad comes in the form of a multifaceted trapezoid, carved in the heart of Africa (Nelli, 2009: 12). This constitution is the product of a long history that we will now develop: “a military territory of Chad’s countries and protectorates is established by the September 5 and 8, 1900 decrees” (Philippe CHOW, 1963: 37). As indicated by Nelli, the current borders of Chad are the products of two legacies, namely arrangements between rival powers (Germany, England, France and Italy) and the administrative arrangements (borders with Niger and the Central African Republic): “the [post-colonial Chadian] political and social structures, witnesses to a multi-secular past, will crumble one by one over time. Societies based on lineage, kingdoms and empires will be emptied of their substance and then undergo the law of the French occupiers” (2009: 32).

The agreement with Germany was formalized by the signing of the March 15, 1894 agreement establishing the border on the *Bec de Canard*. This agreement led to a first border between

---

<sup>16</sup> This was the position held by Edouard Louveau who was Chief Administrator of this country

Cameroon and Chad. This agreement was motivated by the German fear of the French returning to the Benue River. However, this agreement will be amended several times until 1919, a testament to the turbulent history of Franco-German relations.

The agreement with England was built progressively from 1809 to 1899. It must be said that there were quite lively colonial rivalries between these two countries. In 1890, an agreement tracing a line from Say in Niger to Bornu on Lake Chad was established. This agreement was meant to preserve English interests in Lower Niger, leaving the Sahel to France. This line, redrawn by a second agreement later that same year, now established the Northern Nigerian border and its limit on Lake Chad with Chad.

In the East, the French objective was to join the Chadian basin to that of the Nile. These eastern borders were gradually set and had been traced since before the occupation. Ouaddai was conquered in 1909, but Doudmourah continued his struggle, Borkou and Tibesti were occupied in 1913, because of the Sanoussiyya resistance which found refuge there. The French ambition for Chad was very clear: “radically cut the ties that bound central Sudan to the West coast of the Mediterranean and bring on the breach of the commercial relations that France would not fail to do, and barring this, use it for the benefit of its Algerian colony. The object is to isolate our possessions in Algeria-Tunisia, separating them completely from Central Africa, and remove any reason for a path towards the interior” (Rodes, 1895: 174). It will also be to place Ouaddai, Baguirmi and Kanem at the heart of the trans-Saharan project. The French obsession with the “Muslim peril,” is reflected in these lines. This sight aroused strong opposition from the English. March 21, 1900, is the signing of the Franco-English accords which forced France to abandon the River Nile and the Northern part of Lake Chad. These agreements of March 21<sup>th</sup> set the borders with Sudan and what will become Libya, then Tripolitania, under Turkish sovereignty. The Ottoman Turks refused to recognize these agreements. Finally, Turkey was defeated in Libya by Italy which hastened to recognize it in 1900. But once having conquered the South of Libya, Italy sought to extend its Libyan colony toward Chad. This ambition was halted by Italy’s defeat in 1945.

Once the various forms of resistance to occupation are exhausted, missions were sent out for the purpose of establishing boundaries. These missions were intended to correct certain ethnic and natural anomalies. That is how the Moll mission (1905-1906) set the border with Cameroon, and the Gossard mission (1921-1923), did the same with the Sudan. The constitution of the borders with Cameroon evolved from 1890 to 1919. The first border dealt only with the Bec de Canard. The territories ranging from Miltou on the Chari by the 10<sup>th</sup> parallel (Bongor, Miltou, Guelendeng, Mailao and Koundoul) are German. The second border reduced the Bec de Canard by an agreement signed on April 18, 1908. This Franco-German convention overrides geometric limits by natural boundaries (rivers, mountains) and gives France territories on the space at the end of Bec de Canard but made it lose a portion of land located at Lamé, the 10<sup>th</sup> parallel and Northwest of Baibokoum. The third border concerns Greater German Cameroon which goes from Laï to Goré. This border is governed by the Treaty of November 4, 1911.

This Treaty was contracted after the confrontation between France and England in regards to Morocco. Cameroon was thus expanded by 259,000 km<sup>2</sup> at the expense of Gabon, Middle Congo, Oubangui-Chari and Chad. This also allowed Cameroon to have access to the Oubangui and the Congo. North of that border, the territory of Chad followed the Logone through Goré and Laï. The current towns of Baibokoum, Bébédja, Moundou, Bénoye, Bemar, Kélo, Béré, Gounou-Gaya, Lére and Pala become German. On the other hand, France regained the Bec du Canard (Bongor, Guelendeng and Koundoul). Finally, the fourth border with Cameroon was set on June 28, 1919. It was derived from the Treaty of Versailles. Indeed, as early as 1916, British and French troops rushed to conquer German Cameroon. The Versailles Treaty helped freeze the conflict between the French and English about the race over Cameroon and resulted in the current borders.

The borders with Libya and the Sudan were created between 1899 and 1924. On October 18, 1912, the Treaty of Lausanne recognized the victory of Italy over Turkey in Tripolitania. On October 30<sup>th</sup> the Poincaré-Tittoni agreement recognized the 1899 borders. In July, 1898, a French mission arrived at Fashoda on the Nile, from Upper Oubangui. The British saw it as a direct violation of Egyptian and British rights. Negotiations were undertaken. The Marchand mission will be recalled to Paris. This recall is followed by the signature of the additional Declaration to the 14 June 1898 Convention. The November 21, 1899 Treaty set the boundary between Nigeria and Niger, from the 11<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> parallel, separating Darfur and Ouaddai. Another convention of September 8, 1919 specifies the borders of Northern Chad at the 24<sup>th</sup> Meridian, in point 19°30' latitude North.

The border with Niger was consolidated between 1912 and 1930. This border has been set in several stages. On February 11, 1912, an agreement between the two commanders of the military territories of Niger and Chad set a boundary at the 16<sup>th</sup> parallel, putting Kanem in Chad. In 1916, France entered Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti and the border with Niger is extended to Zouar and Bardaï. On November 11, 1929, the entire Tibesti is attached to Chad, established by the February 18, 1930 decree, by the Governor General of the AEF.

The border with the Central African Republic was stabilized between 1906 and 1936. In addition, this border was periodically amended. The territory of Chad included a large part of the CAR to the Ubangi River at the Kemo confluence. On February 11, 1906, the military territory of Chad and Oubangui-Chari was created. When Baibokoum was attached to Chad in 1920, the Oubangui boundary was close to that of 1910. In 1925, Mid-Chari and Middle-Logone, including both Logones and Tandjilé, are part of Oubangui administration. From December 31, 1925 to November 18, 1932, Mid-Chari and Middle-Logone are attached to Oubangui-Chari. From November 18, 1932 to November 15, 1934, Koumra, Fort-Archambault, Maro and Kyabé are returned to Chad. Moissala and Middle-Logone remain in Oubangui-Chari. This border moves along the Barh-Sara and passes through Mandoul, bypassing Bedaya. From November 15, 1934 to April 29, 1936, Mid-Chari, Middle-Logone and Mayo-Kebbi are part of Oubangui-Chari. From October 29, 1936 to December 28, 1936, Chad resumed its possession of Mid-Chari,

Middle-Logone and Mayo-Kebbi and also Birao (Northeast of the current CAR). As of December 28, 1936 the current border between Chad and the Central African Republic was established.

It must be said that the Italian frustration about Libya contributed greatly to consolidating the territory of current Chad. In 1915, Italy wanted to go to war alongside France, England and Russia against Germany and Austria-Hungary. To do this, it asked for territorial expansions in Africa, in case France and England would take over the German colonies. This was a promise placed in the Treaty of Lourdes signed on April 26, 1915, Article 13 of which recognizes “fair compensation.” After the victory of November 11, 1918, the Italian claims to the promised compensation were received less than warmly. In 1919, France agreed without fully committing on the Algeria and Tunisia borders. In 1925, England and Egypt did the same with the Egypt-Sudan border, but Italy found these concessions inadequate.

Beginning in 1927, the French press voiced reservations about these deals and demanded the retreat of the Southern border of Libya to a Chad-Biltine line. In 1935; France wanted friendship and an alliance with Italy against Hitler, who constituted a threat to Europe. On January 7<sup>th</sup> in Rome, Pierre Laval, the French Foreign Affairs Minister and Mussolini, head of the Italian Government, signed a treaty known as "Treaty between France and Italy relating to managing their interests in Africa." Title 2 of the Treaty concerns the Libyan border. Libya received a 114.000km<sup>2</sup> band in Northern Chad (with Aouzou, Ouri, Guizerti and Yebbi-Souma). The Southern part of Tibesti (Bardai and Zouar) remained in Chad. The French and Italian Parliaments approved the Treaty but nothing more. The treaty was never implemented, because it was not enacted. In December 1938, the Italian Government declared the Rome agreements null and void.

On February 10, 1947, Italy signed a peace treaty with the Allies in Paris confirming the obsolescence of the Rome agreements (Article 44). The United Nations General Assembly decided on the fate of Libya which became an independent State with Adrien Pelt, who was of Dutch origin, as Commissioner. Libya's effective independence was proclaimed on December 24, 1951. On December 15, 1950, the United Nations enacted a resolution requiring France and Libya to establish their territory. On August 10, 1955 the Friendship and Good-Neighborliness Treaty was drafted and later ratified on February 20, 1957 by the two countries. Article 3 and Annex I of this treaty recognizes the 1899 borders.

The Libyan occupation of the Tibesti in 1973 was the beginning of the Chadian war of liberation that culminated in 1986. Chad's claim to the BET region was confirmed by the decision of the Hague on February 3, 1994, thus recognizing the 1950 Friendship and Good-Neighborliness treaty.



## II. The various sociolinguistic groups in Chad

Chad has 131 linguistic or “ethnic<sup>17</sup>” groups. In fact, ethnicity is the identifier of populations based on their language. And, from the colonial period to the present, the territories have been established and managed on the basis of this distinction. The large number of linguistic groups is categorized by specialists into three large families: the Nilo-Saharan, the Afro-Asiatic and the Congo-Kordofanian languages. These language groups are in turn subdivided into subfamilies, to cover all the known socio-linguistic communities.

### 1. The Nilo-Saharan Languages

The Nilo-Saharan language group includes subfamilies of Central Saharan languages and contains the Ouadian, Mabang languages, Sara-Bongo-Baguirman and Boua languages forming a specific subgroup. This sub-group overall was assembled under the name of the Toubou and the people speaking these languages are considered as being mostly nomads living beyond the Chari. It is to them that Dalloni (1934), then Professor at the Algiers Science Institute, refers, stating: “when our subjugation policy will have borne fruit, the Toubou will be our best aides. It will be unnecessary to populate those positions with Negroes from Chad, who are in a perpetual state of war with the people of the country” and Le Cornec (2002: 177) concluded: “bandits certainly but which inspire some sympathy.”

*Central Sahara’s first linguistic subfamilies:* the first group of the Central Saharan languages consists of **Teda** and **Daza**. The Teda language is spoken by the Toubou in Tibesti. This language is also spoken by some residents of nearby oases of Northeastern Niger and southwest of Libya. On the other hand, the Daza language speakers are further south and live in Borkou and Kanem. Specifically, these are populations that live between the Tibesti Mountains and the North of Lake Chad. Despite their shared linguistic heritage, the Teda and the Daza claim they belong to different groups; each is in turn divided into subgroups. Among the Toubou group, the Teda of the Tibesti are the majority groups. The Daza themselves are distinguished into more than a dozen groups. The Kreda of Bahr el Gazel are the most important groups of the Daza group. Following them are the Daza of Kanem. The smallest subgroups, who are also the most scattered of the Daza subgroups include the Ouaddai Chafarda; the Kecherda and Djagada of Kanem; the Doza, Annakaza, Kamadja and Noarma of Borkou; the Ounia, Gaeda and Erdiha of the Ennedi. About one-third of the Teda are nomadic; however, the Daza are semi-sedentary travelling from pasture to pasture for eight to nine months each year but return to the village during the rainy season. As a general rule, the Teda live with their camels and move from oasis to oasis. This is not the case of Daza who, in addition to camels, also raise horses, sheep, and goats. These groups are generally called Toubous, and Chappelle (1957) refers to them as the “black nomads of the Sahara.” They are very individual societies where social control is loose; the absence of any social hierarchy makes any cohesion temporary and fragile: “it is not society that makes the man

---

<sup>17</sup> There is research showing the artificiality of the concept of ethnic group in the African context. Both marking identity marker and assigning identity, ethnic reality is more complex in ways that we shall refrain from discussing here.

but rather every man who builds his own version of a social setting for his own use, based primarily on his genealogy and his lineage, then on alliances that he contracted himself through marriage, by the links that occur later in life and his adventures, between favorable or hostile relations. To stay standing in the presence of others, every man must have enemies and he does find them. “The level of deadly offense ranks most often very low: sarcasm, allusion, material or moral damage, the injury to an animal is enough to bring out a dagger” (Chapelle, 1991: 167). This author notes that “the mores of the Toubous cause conflict like the clouds produce lightning.” This is an individual society, yet vendettas drag “in a carousel of honor and crime all allied by blood for generations.” Genealogical kinship therefore has an important place in these companies and supersedes the tribes, factions, cantons, etc. Each lineage that also includes the maternal clan (where it draws support and obligation) is identified by a specific name, a coat of arms, a nickname, forbidden and reciprocal duties. Until the fourth generation exogamy is the rule of marriage; this leads members to practice kidnapping in distant places.

*The second linguistic subfamilies from central Sahara:* the second group includes the **Kanembu** languages whose speakers inhabit Lake Chad and Southern Kanem. Although derived from **Kanuri**, the Kanembu language was the main language of the Bornu Empire. In Chad, the Kanuri language is limited to handfuls of speakers in urban centers. Yet the Kanuri remains a major language in Southeastern Niger, in Northeastern Nigeria and Northern Cameroon. The Kanembu are identified with the Alifa Sultan of Mao who was among other things accepted as Governor of this area during the colonial period. The Kingdom of Kanem, as I indicated above, has developed a richer relationship with the Islamic world. Starting in the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries, the rulers of Kanem made the pilgrimage to Mecca. In the 13<sup>th</sup> century one of them had a Madrasa built for Kanembu students and travelers in Cairo.

*The third subfamilies of the central Saharan languages:* then, among the groups of the Central Saharan languages, there are the **Beria** and **Baele** wrongly referred to as Bideyat (Chapelle, 1991: 45; Hagggar, 2004: 8-15). Baele is rather the language of Bideyat. The Zaghawa are not a monolithic group. Those who are known as Zaghawa call each other Beri. Their language is “Beri a.” These populations live in the Biltine region. The “Zaghawa” group is subdivided into three major groups: the Wegni or Towers who live in the Sudan, to the Northwest of Darfur, the Kobe living in Chad, Northeast of Ouaddai in a zone located between Iriba and Biltine. The Bideyat are located in Ennedi. They are considered bandits living of rapine, withdrawn from others, despising the property of others with no regard for human life and the preservation of its immediate or future interests. The most numerous members in the Bideyat group are the Borogat. The Biryera or Bilia inhabit the Am Djere water point, are fewer in number and speak a language called Baelé. The Zaghawa and the Bideyat have various lifestyles in common. A few Zaghawa live in a centralized sultanate with a sovereign family that would be of Dadjo origin. They are semi-sedentary and participate in local and regional trade. The Bideyat are also nomadic.

President Idriss Déby Itno is not Zaghawa but Bideyat, specifically Bilia. Since 1990, the Zaghawa and Bideyat are the groups who monopolize national political power in Chad<sup>18</sup>.

***The fourth linguistic subfamilies of the Central Sahara:*** Central Saharan languages also include languages known as the so-called **Ouaddaian languages**. This language's origins remain obscure. The speakers of this language have been able to move to avoid Arab immigration as it moved from East to West, or from the Sudan to Chad. Despite having separate authorities, the Tama, Dajjo and Mimi are part of the large group of Ouaddaian languages which is a real linguistic archipelago. This archipelago stretches from the Sudan westward to central Chad. These languages are found in Chad in the Wadifira, Ouaddai and Guéra. The Tama languages are spoken in Biltine and North of Ouaddai, and include the Tama Marari (Abou Charib), the Sungor, the Kibet, the Murro and the Degel. The Tama who are close to the border with the Sudan are sedentary peoples and are the most numerous of the group. Although they lived in the arid Sahel, crop rotation allowed them to settle in permanent villages. The Tama live in cantons or townships governed by canton chiefs who often originate from the Dajjo and is inducted during ceremonies on the ruins of Nir, their pre-colonial capital. The Marari and Abou Charib are also sedentary peoples and share the same language as the Tama. They live in the South and West of the Ouaddai region. Although they are Tama speakers, their traditions suggest they are originally Tunjur who are seasonal workers from the Sudan, who once ruled the Ouaddai. To the West of the Tama and North-West of Marari and Abou Charib, the Sungor are another sedentary population. The Sungor consider themselves to be of Yemeni descent. The Sungor customs are however close to Maba although they speak the Tama language. The Dajjo languages are spoken to the East and West of these groups. At least once, the Dajjo have certainly been the rulers of the Ouaddai Sultanate, until the 15th century when they split into two groups. This was the time when the Tunjur conquered Ouaddai, pushing the Dajjo to the West. It was after this defeat that the Dajjo founded a new sultanate whose capital is located at Goz Beida. The descendants of the Dajjo are farmers and live among the peoples known as the Hadjerai (*people of boulders*), North of Guéra. Aware of their common origin, these groups practice intermarriage between East and the West.

Another group of Ouaddaian languages is the Mabang group of languages spoken in Ouaddai but also Biltine and Salamat. The Maba language is the main language of the Mabang group. The Maba are agro-pastoral and semi-sedentary. Many have immigrated to the Sudan. The heart of the language group is the Ouaddai sultanate based in Abeche. The Maba played an important role during its conquest in the 17<sup>th</sup> century; this is why the Ouaddai sultans chose their first wives from among the Maba and the first dignitary of the Court of Ouaddai is usually a Maba. Another Mabang group is that of the so-called Massalit languages, which are a subgroup of the Mabang languages. Its speakers live along the border with the Sudan. The Massalit are usually agro-pastoral. This group includes another subgroup that is called Massalat. They are to the West of the Batha, in Ouaddai and in Guéra. Once part of the greater Massalit community, the Massalat

---

<sup>18</sup> Although, as I shall explain later, this is a hasty conclusion.

have diverged from the group. Masalit and Massalat are two totally different languages, because Massalat resembles Dadjo. The Runga language is also part of the Mabang. It is spoken in the Salamat and part of the Central African Republic. The Runga are farmers. It is they who founded the Dar Kuti and were the first to undergo the successive attacks by Rabah that decimated their Kingdom and left with those he found in captivity. The other Mabang languages spoken by small populations include the Marfa, the Karanga and Kashemere constituted by mountain communities in Abéché, the Koniere to the East of the town of Abeche and the Bakhat West of the same city.

*The fifth subfamilies of the Central Sahara languages:* the fourth group of Central Saharan languages consists of the so-called **Sara-Bongo-Baguirmiennesan** languages. This subgroup is classified under the Chari-Nile family, itself a subfamily of the Nilo-Saharan languages. Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi languages share the area between Lake Chad and the White Nile, southwest of the Sudan. These groups speak languages that are different from the languages of central Sahara. They are rather a kind of patchwork and not a solid group. We find first the Kouka, Bilala and Medego which are languages spoken around Lake Fitri, in Southwest Batha and constitute the most northerly members of these groups. These languages are mutually intelligible and the people using them present themselves as legitimate descendants of the pre-colonial sultanate of Yao. Yao was a sultanate founded by the Bilala. These Bilala ruled a vast area stretching to the West of Kanem, and this lasted until the 15th century. Kouka, Bilala, and Medego intermarry and have the same conflict mediation institutions. They are farmers but entrust their herds to their Arab neighbours. The Barma language is also part of this Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi group. This language is spoken in the Chari-Baguirmi by the Baguirmi group, a people who founded another pre-colonial state. The Baguirmi are concentrated around Massenya, located Southeast of N'Djamena. They identify themselves as “people of the river” or “people of the land.” On this land they cultivate millet, sorghum, sesame, peanuts and the barmi the fishing along the Chari and Barh Erguig stretching. In the Barma language there are words that are borrowed from Arabic. This is explained not only by the adoption of Islam by the Baguirmians, but by their long interaction with Arab pastoralists as well. Of course we must not forget the commercial caravans with the West through the Sahara facilitating incorporation of the Kanuri and Arabic into the Barma, for the purpose of creating a commercial vocabulary. Similarly, the Kënga language group found among the Guéra Hadjerai was in relation with the Barma language. It is also said that the Kënga played a crucial role in the founding of the Baguirmi Empire.

Naturally, the Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi languages are among South Chad's Sara languages. These languages are the central part of the group as it covers the territory. They stretch from western Logone in Mid-Chari through the eastern Logone and Mandoul regions. Sara Groups are considered the first settlers of the area. These languages are divided into five subgroups (Sara Madjingaye, Sara-Kaba, Gambaye, Mbaye and Dai). Sara populations would be the last arrivals in the area. They became sedentary there because of the fertility of the soil and the abundance of game. They live close to the river Chari and the Logone. They are spread from South to

Northeast Chad. However, the Sara languages are mutually unintelligible with the groups located in Northern Chad. Another particular group among these is the group of Boua languages. This group is spread along central Chari, in the region of Mid-Chari and a part of Central Guéra. Like any other Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi language, Boua language groups are also divided into five subgroups, namely Boua, Niellim, Tounia, Koké, Fanian, or Mana. Boua speakers are a minority, barely 4,000 individuals. The Boua say that their ancestors came before Sara settlers in the Chari Valley. These Boua groups have been raided by the Baguirmi Empire and themselves have practiced slavery on their Niellim neighbors in the Southeast. Similarly, the Niellim attacked the Tounia, pushing them to the Southeast, forcing them to seek refuge among the Kaba populations, where the city of Sarh is currently located.

As a footnote, in reference to the term *sara*, Arditì (2004: 841) writes: “a term that nowadays means a population set estimated at more than 2 million people, speaking related languages and living in the Sudanian zone. There is a Southern identity (high numbers for schooling, Christianity, cotton growing, etc.) as opposed to a Northern identity (low enrolment in schools, Islam, ranching, cereal and peanut growers, role of trade, etc.).” There are two comments to be made about this note. The first is that Arditì is mistaken in saying that the Sara group is homogeneous, and—what is worse—that there would be a single and univocal Southern identity. As has been shown earlier, the Sara language is a derived sub-group of the Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi language. This subgroup is not only present in the regions of Mid-Chari, Mandoul or the two Logone. It is spread over the entire Sahelian strip. The second comment concerns the definition of Northern or Southern identity by religion, because that is reductive. The inhabitants of North Chad are not necessarily Muslim and all Chadian Muslims cannot be found in the Northern part of the country. Similarly, South Chad is not only Christian and the Christians of Chad are not all located in the South. From an analytical standpoint, therefore, use of such concepts is merely to fall into clichés. More importantly, it is to see the relationship between Southern and Northern Chadians in antagonistic terms or in opposition to one another. And to do this brings harm to the common fate of Chadians for whom the urgent matter at hand is building their nation. It is the duty of the social sciences to help Chadians produce meaning for better integration into a nation-state; this is something they have not always done. Instead, they sought to divide rather than unite.

Later in the work, Arditì explains the low share of savings in Sara societies by “an ethos of immediate consumption closely linked to a requirement for redistribution to which the rich are subject.” Here he echoes an idea developed by Madjiro (1993) when he analyzed the new solidarity paradigms in Africa. Arditì notes that the mistakes of developers are insufficient interest in the functioning of local companies. He considers that the societies in the South cannot accumulate wealth. This is borne out by the fact that they are not a strong presence in Chad’s commercial circuits. An activity largely dominated by their compatriots who are from the North and are and therefore Muslims. It should be said here that Arditì errs in his analysis by relying on a culturalist approach. What if the refusal to accumulate was the result of a part of a philosophy

of resistance and adaptation to a hostile environment? We know that in the very recent past, these peoples had long been subject to raids by the Rabah's troops. These raids involved not only black gold (the captives) but also crops and livestock. Such violence is not only related to the pre-colonial period. During colonization, human specimens were culled on many occasions by the colonial administration (guards, Congo-Ocean railway workers, porters, etc.) as analyzed by Sautter (1967). The conditions in which this project was undertaken drastically reduced the male populations in the Southern regions of the country. And by this I am not referring to the political events of the 1980s where the granaries and fields of some communities were burned as a reprisal perpetrated by the CCFAN. This is what is referred to in local memory as "Black September." Moreover, this author himself recognizes that during the colonial period and since Chad's independence, public policy is characterized by cynicism and cruel violence: "In colonial ideology, the cotton cultivation could develop only under duress against farmers who refused to engage in it or to comply with the technical guidelines set by extension agencies (soil type, calendar and ways of farming, etc.). This violence that, in Sara country, had previously taken various forms (recruitment for the construction of the Congo – Océan railway, conscription, etc.), went from *correction* administered by guards against hostile peasants, where imprisonment (the legal framework for forced labor will not be abolished until 1945)" (Arditi, 2002: 847). He adds that the across-the-board price reductions of prices paid to the producers were intended to prevent the creation of "new needs" among the populations. This author believes that such a policy of "condemning" the thirst for novelty and subsequent improvement of people's living conditions would have been harmful in the Southern areas favorable to producing cotton: it would have future consequences on nation-building on the one hand and would have contributed mainly to cause difficulties for coexistence between cash crops and subsistence crops. This approach has contributed not only to contempt of wealth amongst the inhabitants of these areas but also to eliminate the notion of accumulating goods from their culture. So why build up wealth when one is not sure to benefit from it or when the products accumulated could be captured or destroyed overnight by the enemy? There are even local language expressions that to this day justify this practice. For example, why do women traders from the "Sara" say that they are making "mosso", meaning literally "I am fallen or lost?" We suggest that it is in this way that the attitude of these people should be read qualified by Arditi as Sara and Southern. Extravagance is not listed *ad vitam aeternam* in their cultural ethos but it is the result of an adaptation to a hostile social environment. The inclusion of violence in these people's space has led them in certain ways to live in the present moment, to enjoy every moment, in the immediate. There is consciously a form of resistance to deconstruct.

## 2. The Sub-Families of Afro-Asiatic Languages

*The subfamilies of Afro-Asiatic languages:* the second major Chadian language family includes **the Afro-Asiatic languages**. Two categories of Afro-Asiatic languages are represented in Chad. They are the **Chadic languages** (stretching from the Nigeria borders to the West to the Ouaddai

region to the East) and **Arab** populations (whose the language areas are located throughout the Chadian Sahel). Most of the speakers of Chadic languages, including more than 20 million speakers of Hausa languages (which is the major Chadic language), live in western Chad. This distribution to the West is special, because it lies on the Southern edge of the Sahara, west of Nigeria and in eastern Chad. This distribution leads linguists to say that the Chadic languages are older and are spoken by peoples who lived along the Paleo-Chadian Sea. Water is very important to these people and plays a key economic role. It is certain that subsequently there was the addition of elements descended from migrant populations, in search of refuge, due both to the lowering of the Paleo-Chad Sea and increased aridity in the region. These newcomers did not fail to operate a more aggressive penetration, forcing them to take refuge in mountainous or swampy areas. There are two categories of Chadic languages. The first extends to the Southern part of Lake Chad, along the Chari and the Logone, reaching to the Mayo-Kebbi region. The second category includes more individual languages, divided into five subgroups, from the North to the Southeast. Among the first category, there is the Buduma-Kouri language, which is spoken by two intermarrying population groups located in Lake Chad. The Buduma claim they are the first inhabitants of Lake Chad where they live in its Northern part, on the islands and shores. The Buduma were fishermen before they diversified their economic activities to include agriculture, livestock and trade between Chad and Nigeria. The Lake served as protection for the Buduma against Islamic invasion and allowed them to maintain a homogeneous identity, despite the proximity with the heavily Islamized states. The Kouri who speak the same language as the Buduma also live on the Islands and the Southern shores of Lake Chad. A Muslim population, they see themselves as descendants of the Yemeni Muslims. They are closer to the Kanembu and it is they who have helped the Maï from Kanem to propagate Islam. The Kotoko are another Chadic group. The Kotoko language is spoken along the Chari and Logone rivers by peoples who present themselves as direct descendants of the Sao. They are divided into small States where capitals are fortified cities. They also consider themselves “owners of the land.” Their Arab neighbors pay tributes to farm there or graze their herds. They also monopolized the fishing in the region. This activity is managed by “chiefs of the waters.” Many of the Kotokos live in North Cameroon.

Another group of Chadic languages, certainly the most important involves the Massa, including Massa, Mousseye, Marba, and Dari. These groups are concentrated in the Southern part of Chari-Baguirmi and in the Mayo-Kebbi region. Massa Groups are agro-pastoral and fishermen in the major beds of the central Chari. They have suffered attacks from their Muslim neighbors, including the Kanuri, the Borno, the Baguirmi Barma and the Fulbe of Northern Cameroon. If they survived these attacks, it is because their villages are dominated by chains of hills and Chari Plains provided natural protection. The Massa have an aversion to the authority and have borrowed from the Fulbe some features of their political structures but only for the use of the local land chiefs. Theirs is a diffuse hierarchy that is basically a mode of egalitarian governance whereby power is not centralized and truly exercised by the whole of the community. Massa language groups live in Bongor, Gounou-Gaya and around Sena-Oura. Nantchere, Lele,

Kabalaye and Guidar are languages spoken in the region of the Tandjilé, with Kelo as its major city. These languages are also Chadic languages. They exist alongside more distant languages which they resemble, such as Gabri (Tandjilé), Tamak, Somrai, Ndam, Miltou, and Saraoua (Mid-Chari). This group is actually a transition between the Massa and the Sara languages. Another group of Chadic languages includes the languages spoken by the Hadjerai condensed around the Guéra mountain chains. They are certainly descendants of refugees from the Plains, having found refuge in the mountains to escape the raids carried out by the Muslim States of the Chad basin. Despite the presence of the Kenga language group which is a non-Chadic language but rather Sara-Bongo-Baguirmi, the Hadjerai speak Chadic languages, namely Djongor, Dangleat, Bidiyo, Mousgoum, Sokoro, Barain and Saba. They share important common religious institutions around the Margai cult. However, they maintain separate identities and refuse to intermarry. These are groups who demonstrate independence and belligerent characteristics.

Arabs of course belong to the Group of the Afro-Asiatic languages. In Chad, there are thirty different Arab dialects. The Chadian Arabs are divided and are subdivided into three major tribes: the Juhayna, the Hassuna, and the Awlad Sulaymaan. The term tribe here refers groups that claim their origin from a common ancestor. The Juhayna arrived in the Sudan in the 14<sup>th</sup> century and constitute the largest group. The Hassuna immigrated to Chad via Libya and live in Kanem. The Awlad Sulaymaan were the latest to arrive. They also come from Libya. All of these groups have an agro-pastoral population. The Arabic language has had a major impact in Chad. In the Sahel the wives of cattle-raisers attend local markets to exchange animals, butter, milk, fabrics and clothing. This contact with indigenous populations, throughout the Chadian territory, eventually gave rise to specific Arab dialects, a *lingua franca*, or the *tukur*, a language used in trade. There was also fusion of other groups among the Arab peoples, and they eventually merged into one. This is the case of the Yalna and Bandala which were actually Hadjera or originally ouaddaian.

### 3. The Congo-Kardofanian Languages

The greater family of languages found in Chad is the group of so-called Congo-kordofanian languages. These groups are distributed between **the Moundang, the Tupuri, Mboum/Laka, the Fulbe and the Banda-Ngbaka**. The Moundang-Tupuri-Mboum/Laka form a single linguistic group. These peoples are classified in the subfamily of the Congo-Niger languages of the greater Congo-Kordofanian language family. These languages are spoken by a wide variety of Mayo-Kebbi and Western Logone peoples. They are subdivided into seven sub-groups comprising in addition to the top three, the Kera, the Mongbai, the Kim and the Mesme. Although they belong to the same group, the Moundang-Tupuri-Mboum/Laka have political structures, lifestyles and various founding myths. The Moundang are grouped around the Lere kingdom; the Tupuri of Fianga and the Mboum/Laka straddle three sovereign states: Cameroon,



the Central African Republic and Chad. Another group is the Congo-Kordofanian but they are from the West-Atlantic subfamily. This group includes the Fulbé or Fulani. The Fulbé are not very numerous in Chad. They reportedly arrived in Chad around the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They appeared in the Valley of the Senegal River in West Africa. The increase in the population and the vagaries of the climate pushed them to migrate across the Sahel. Some adopted Islam, so much so that they become proselytizers, with the creation of the Fulani States of Sokoto. Some Fulbé remained loyal to the pre-Islamic faith of their ancestors and have kept the nomadic lifestyle (Borroro). They are spread between Kanem, Batha, Chari-Baguirmi and Mayo-Kebbi. Les Banda-Ngbaka, also belong to the Congo-Niger subfamily of languages and include the Sango, the Bolgo the Goula and the Goula Iro. Sango is spoken in the Central African Republic. This language has played an important role in trade during the colonial period. Nowadays, Banda-Ngbaka groups inhabit only the Central African Republic but it seems that in the past this sub-group was most populous in Chad. There is proximity between the Bolgo and the Hadjerai, and Lake-Iro Goula languages and Lake Mamoun. In addition, their customs are close to those of the Sara.

#### **4. The Religious Aspects**

Throughout this work, religion appears in the background. I shall now try to briefly provide some analysis about its dynamism. From my point of view, the touchstone in the study of religions in Chad in general, and the study of the revealed religions Islam and Christianity in particular, is to be read in the history of contacts between peoples, as well as influences on their borders. I will therefore briefly discuss the local religions, Islam and Christianity respectively.

- Local religions: every Chadian community dedicates a cult to the Earth and its spirits (even if this reality is today no longer as prevalent). It seems to me that the backdrop for Chadian identity is condensed in the fact of religion itself, based on the practice of the local religions<sup>19</sup>. This local religion is the true feature held in common by the communities. This is what structures the clans, lineages, organizes space, enabling the power structures to be legitimate and grounded. This religious reality cuts through subsequent adaptations of places of worship. Islam and Christianity, both revealed religions present in Chad, provide them a space for respiration, if not transpiration, in the sense that they do not suppress them but turn them into a kind of osmosis. In an earlier work (Gondeu, 2009), I showed for example that, although they have become Islamic, traditional powers in Chad continue to draw their legitimacy from the local beliefs that play an organizing role. As such, the crowning of the monarch still takes place following the prescribed uses; it is also the case for funerals or burial rituals. Most royalty that are considered sacred (as is often the case) have been sociologically appropriated, adapted new religions to their temporal needs but the realities, the organizational structure and the trappings follow the cultural ethos. In fact, despite the zeal of the new converts, the

---

<sup>19</sup> I prefer this term to that of traditional religion or animism which I find to be reductive and fraught with derogatory overtones.

ancestral religion is alive in local sociological realities: whether it is the practice of the Gournas among the Massa and the Tupuri, funerals and initiation masks among the Moundang, the religion of the Margay practiced by the Hadjerai in the Guéra mountain chain, etc. It seems even that there is a transmutation of these ancestral beliefs in the conquest of power and prosperity, with sorcery, the use of marabou practices, the wearing of *grigris*, etc.

- Islam: As has been said earlier, the presence of Islam in Chad is reported as early as the 11<sup>th</sup> century in the Kingdom of Kanem-Bornu. This Kingdom covered the entire Chad basin, until its domination by the Bilala and its split. This form of Islam was intellectual and hardly involved practice by the masses for obvious reasons. Nor was this form of Islam uniform everywhere. In the Kingdom of Ouaddai, it was rather the Qadiriyya inherited from Arabs coming from the Sudan. In Bahr-El-Gazhal, part of the Kanem, the Borkou and Tibesti, there was a movement where the Sanussiyya began to take root, after the expulsion of its followers from Libya by the Italians. However, the Sanussiyya was decapitated by the French at the time when Chad was conquered. This ultimately provided an opening for the Tijaniyya to gradually become the base of the 'Chadian Ouma. Following the Malekite school of Islam, the Tijaniyya gradually became the dominant representatives of Islam in Chad. This Islam was also influenced from neighboring countries (Libya, Sudan), the Maghreb and Middle East (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates United, etc.). Although it is difficult to speak of Chadian Islam, in this sense where this Islam has not yet generated individuals carrying the Baraka, it is nevertheless possible to speak of a certain consensus—however minimal it is—around the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs (CSAI). In the ten years I have been observing Islam, I have noted that there has been great progress towards rapprochement with Christianity. The emergence of young people within CSAI is certainly part of the explanation. A conscience has been arising in this environment which aims to establish the training of Imams who had previously been trained by only memorizing the Quran. An openness is being felt in the increasing rapprochement between this institution and the leaders of the Christian churches, through joint initiatives (national day of prayer for peace, offer of good services to mediate electoral and labor conflicts, initiation of the permanent joint consultations, common study tours, etc.). This openness is made possible by the paradigm shift that occurred in the public demonstration of religious fervor, verging on austere proselytism and especially the decline of Islamic organizations in the management of religious matters in the country; even if the CSAI is regularly criticized in reformist circles this group is currently represented by a certain Dr. Hagggar, native of Bahr-El-Gazal (a Kreda), one of the promoters of the Mammadiyya in Chad. This movement even managed to hold an international convention in N'Djamena, within the confines of the Chadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and African integration. The movement has a large university campus in the capital as well as a radio station. All this

seems to be managed by the cultural center for African and Arab research and studies (C.C.R.E.A.A).

- Christianity arrived in Chad in Protestant form around the 1920s in the region of ayo-Kebbi (Lutheran and Evangelical denominations) and in its Catholic form in the mid-1940s, in Kou in the area of Mid-Chari. Christianity is essentially the work of American ministers coming from Cameroon or of missionaries and clergy, coming from Bangui then capital of Ubangi (Contemporary CAR). The late penetration of Christianity should be considered in the colonial context. Fernand Fourreau, civilian head of the “Fourreau-Lamy” Sahara mission led to the defeat of Rabah’s troops, launched the idea, which would be applied literally, “if we wish to do something profitable and sustainable in countries where the Saharan mission traveled, the focus must be (...) to carefully exclude Christian missionaries whatever their denominations. The action of the intransigent missionaries blinded by their education and by the destination, has always been harmful in our colonies (...) and it is a thousand times better to let the populations of our various colonies practice in peace their respective religions” (Chapelle, 1991: 152). It must be said that the anti-clericalism of the French colonial administrators was manifest. Yet, churches grew rapidly in the South where they promoted education and social and healthcare services as well as development. The general configuration of Christianity in Chad is changing. Old structures are being replaced by emerging ones. Thus in Protestant circles, several denominations have emerged such as the Churches of God, Seventh Day Adventist Churches, and Christian Assemblies. To these more or less official names, others are to be added, such as the Neo-Apostolic Churches, Deeper Life, Winner Chapel, Full Gospel, etc. There is an umbrella structure that coordinates the activities of these churches in Chad. It is the Agreement of Evangelical Churches and Missions in Chad (EEMET). There are also theological training organizations for pastors and Bible schools as well as a framework for youth groups, through the Union of Young Christians (UJC). It should be noted that Catholic churches are also on the rise. Today, there are eight dioceses (Sarh, Doba, Moundou, Pala, Lai, Gore, Mongo and N'Djamena). The clergy is still largely foreign.

### **III. Administration and evolution policy in colonial Chad**

I shall begin this third chapter with some preliminary remarks, laying the foundation of the difficulty of national integration in Chad (in my mind it is indeed difficult but not impossible). Then I will show the management style applied to the North and South of the country by the administration (a management style that is the basis of many controversies), passing through the political evolution of the territories of Chad.

## **1. Preliminary remarks**

We have seen that the French colonial administration was effective after the victory of the battle of Kousseri on April 22, 1900. However, it is correct to say that this was not effective everywhere and domination over the whole of the territory was yet to be established: “a military territory of Chad’s countries and protectorates was established by decrees of September 5 and 8, 1900” (Philippe Le Cornec, 1963: 37). To firmly establish the administration, labor was necessary, including auxiliary staff, interpreters, customs officers, writers and guards. In Chad, this was difficult, given that “the level of these agents, who had status since 1907, rose slowly based on the progress of education, whose beginnings were slow and laborious” (B. Lanne, 1998: 49). The same author reports that the first native studies certificates were awarded in 1932. There were 9 in 1939 and 57 in 1945. And in 1943, during the development of the status of local officials, there were only 19 Chadians who had a higher rank than clerks of the administration, out of 305 for the whole of the AEF” (ibid.). The support staff to executives, strongly dominated by nationals from the South, came from the AEF, or even of the AOF and Cameroon. The July 29, 1942 Eboué reforms establishing the status of prominent workers helped some advanced executives to take an effective part in the life of the country. From 1900 to 1915, Chad was led by a military administration and starting on May 14, 1915, a civil administration took over. This is the famous “French peace,” a new social order protecting the safety of persons and property, based on “peaceful, domestic, economic and more neo-political relationships” (ibid.). This is in reality a matter of solidifying domination of the empire by standardizing the relationship between the various entities. The new element in French colonial management being the subdivision of empire territories into smaller and more controllable entities, “in 1921 the French Congo took the name of French Equatorial Africa or AEF. Until it became internally autonomous on November 28, 1958, Chad belonged to the general government of the AEF” (B. Lanne, 1998: 9).

Another feature of colonization is the centrality of the administration structured as follows: “the field of action of the Governor was mostly indigenous policy, or action exerted on the people of Africa through the heads of departments and subdivisions who were colonial administrators, officers or officials of the civil servants. All were called commanders by citizens despite the fact that this name was in no way official” (B. Lanne, 1998: 13). Administrative life was punctuated by the organization of the communal councils in which citizens had no decision-making power.

It should be said at the outset that French intrusion marked the existence of Chad as a State and it had two major consequences: first, the Southern part, which up to that point was generally heterogeneous and rooted in traditional religion, would prove permeable to the West and its school; at the same time, the Northern area, given its Arab-Muslim culture, would resist Western culture, especially rejecting modern school:

“As that the teaching of Islam grew...the Islamized - who had not yet adopted the Arabic language sought not only to imitate the Arab model proposed by Islam, but identified with the Arabs. In each clan, the chief installed and supported by the power structure (the Ouaddai kingdom) sought an origin in the Arab-Muslim world. In most cases, these went back to the family of the Prophet or, more modestly, those of the four direct companions. Adopting the religion of the Arabs, the customs of the Arabs, the language of the Arabs, binding oneself to Arab or Muslim peoples: this was the irresistible tendency of the entire Maba society” (I. H. Kayode, 1976: 42-43).

We therefore understand why Islam, in Northern Chad managed to avoid French influence, although it remained a military territory until 1966, at the outbreak of the rebellion.

This situation of *failed* integration in the Chadian space established a reality, or a dichotomy that appears to manifest itself between ethno-cultural groups from the South and those of the North. This dichotomy continues to weigh on the country’s modern history; more so since nominal independence obtained on August 11, 1960, this regional disparity gave rise to armed clashes with multiple consequences<sup>20</sup>. In short, the intellectual quantitative imbalance between the North and the South of the country was favorable to the Southern nationals. Naturally, it is to them that was given the responsibility to lead the national destiny: “frustrated by the power to which they thought they were entitled [because of their tradition of centralized power], traders, chiefs and conservative professionals [of the Muslim North] saw the State dominated by officials of the [Christian] South in a negative light” (J. P. Magnant, 1989: 139).

It seems to me that Chadians have not sufficiently benefited from this immediate past. By laziness or mimicry some authors continue to convey often false theses that undermine the common cause. In a thesis defended in 2010, the following can still be read:

“However in the South of the territory where the majority of the population was animist, it seemed to ignore the notion of kingship and lived in clan groups without a hierarchical political structure...This part of the country has had no notable Kingdom except some sultanates or traditional chiefs whose authority barely went beyond their ethnic groups. In fact most of them were under the influence of the neighboring Islamic kingdoms and they were continually victims of raids.” (Abakar Kassambara, 2010: 8-10).

This author takes this comparison further, after “Bantu families,” and “acephalous tribes,” he comes to this:

“...the colonial texts spoke of two Chads: that of the North, which is an area of covered savannahs, steppes and desert, with pastoral vocation, occupied by populations who were not always black and in any case not Negroid, where Islam is deeply rooted; Southern Chad, a region of large wooded savannas, that is agricultural, populated by Negroid genera, with an animist majority. Therefore the Chari River approximately draws the geographic limit between the two Chads. This distinction also applies to economic, ethnic, historic and religious matters” (ibid.: 41-42)

---

<sup>20</sup> I would like to emphasize that I share the views of Beyem Roné (2000) when he tries to dismantle the arguments usually put forward to justify the Frolinat rebellion. However, my views diverge completely from his when he launches a culturalist diatribes on the North-South dichotomy to finally propose Federation as a way out of the Chadian crisis. I do consider not myself to be an individual programmed by his culture and condemned to prosper there alone. I claim for myself a plural identity that doesn't want to or cannot be confined or reduced to the scale of a village or community, be it ethnic.

While abuses perpetrated by some Southern administrators in the North have helped create some discontent, it is undeniable that behind the political claims based on religious and regionalistic grounds, there is an individual and community logic to possessing the resources of power and exercising it. Moreover by closely examining the hidden meaning of the *Front de Libération Nationale du Chad* (FROLINAT), it becomes apparent that, for the leaders of this movement as long as Chad was led by citizens of the South, it was somehow under foreign domination, hence their resolute ambitions to liberate Chad. This intention will serve as a rallying and recruitment cry of strongmen to enhance the bulk of the rebellion. The question that arises after reflection is this: how have we come to this, when the few historical items discussed above are remembered? A review of the way in which the colonial administration is deployed in the Southern and Northern regions brings valuable insights.

## **2. Deployment of the colonial administration in the Southern region**

“What is called 'South' in Chad represents the five "cotton-producing" prefectures of Western Logone (Moundou), the Eastern Logone (Doba), Mayo-Kebbi (Bongor), prefectures of Mid-Chari (Sarh or until 1972 Fort-Archambault) and Tandjilé (Laï). In the area thus defined, and unlike the North (which is ultimately one of the few common traits), the population is not Muslim (apart from a few limited in cities and the Fulbé township of Binder in Mayo-Kebbi, which has about 25,000 residents” (B. Lanne (1984: 75-76).

Colonization was delayed in this part of the country, even though contacts had been established with the German Protestant Christian missions around 1905. On the other hand, Catholicism was introduced late in 1947 at Kou by missionaries from Ubangi, now the Central African Republic. On November 29, 1892, Casimir Maistre, a French explorer, signed a protectorate treaty with Mbang Dallem, chief of the Laï Gabris, in the present-day Tandjilé prefecture. The towns of Pala and Moundou were built respectively in 1920 and 1924. This period is that of the introduction of the compulsory cotton production, opening the country to the international market. It also allowed the ideologization of the South as the “useful Chad” for colonization compared to “the desert and hostile North.”

The territory of Chad played an important role in the war of 1939-1945. It is undeniable that this war permitted the opening of Chad to the outside world and to technical progress: construction of the strategic Fort-Archambault to Fort-Lamy route, which was later extended to Moussoro, one of the colony's military cities. From this period also, “a new native elite, still small and composed of officials and employees, asserted itself little by little and began to supplant illiterate chiefs whose abuse appeared increasingly unbearable to the people and to the administration.” This new class was born in the schools. As soon as new laws offered it the opportunity to do so, it claimed its place in the administration of the country's business and more importantly on an equal footing before the laws with the whites, Chad then entered politics.” (B. Lanne, 1998: 20). It must be noted that in the Southern regions, the significant speed with which education was

developed, arrived around the 1930s while it had been implanted well before that in the North (1913).

Contrary to what will be conveyed later, Christianity was not accepted without opposition. Even today there are societies that have remained mostly closed to this religion, like the Moundang, who maintained their traditional practices. Nonetheless, Christianity was seen as a factor for change and as a choice of ideology of modernization on the part of populations, in the sense that becoming a Christian opened the door to education. The refusal of the massive Islamization by these populations can be explained by the constant wars and resistances that they opposed to this religion, a cause of their successive wanderings. As we have seen in addition, the arrival of the colonists coincided with “the uproar” which would cover the Chad basin. The refusal of Islamization is primarily the cause.

Schooling allowed Southern Chadians to move ahead of those in the North. They were made more useful for the administration, in the sense that they were participating in colonial domination, through the use of arms. Their number in the colonial army would reach 70% of the total forces. The monetization of services will make this a more attractive career choice. This is evidenced by the passion of educated young people to integrate the colonial army

### **3. Ambiguous relations between the colonial administration and the Muslim North**

In the North, as analyzed above, Islam is attested as early as the 12<sup>th</sup> century as the religion in the kingdom of the Kanem-Bornu Empire, then the Baguirmi (end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century) Baguirmi and Ouaddai (17<sup>th</sup> century). If the first two knew Islam in its *tijâne* form, Ouaddai came under a completely different influence. At the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the town of Abéché is deemed to be the home of Islamic culture especially because of Arab immigration from Darfur in the Sudan, resulting in an installation of *Ulémas qadiri* scholars who invested it with a strong element of their religious knowledge.

These Arabs did not however seek to convert the inhabitants of Ouaddai in massive numbers. They were more interested in trade. For a long time Ouaddai remained a *qadiri* fief despite attempts by the Sanussiyya to recruit followers. The colonial enterprise in the Northern part can be summarized in a few key facts. In October 1897, Émile Gentil signed a protectorate treaty with Aberramane Gaourang II, sultan of Baguirmi. On July 17, 1899, the Bretonnet mission is massacred by the squad of conqueror Rabah in Niellim-Togbao. The second mission of Émile Gentil pushes them back on 28 October 1899 at Kouno. In addition, on November 25, 1899 lieutenant Joalland signs with Alifa Djerab of Kanem, another protectorate treaty, then the Joalland-Meynier missions came to A.O.F., Fourreau-Lamy, from Algiers and Gentil, coming from Congo, meet at Kousseri where Rabah's army is defeated and Rabah himself killed with Commander Lamy, on April 22, 1900.

It has been said that the colonial mission was a civilizing mission and its priority was to fight slavery. Immediately following the victory in Kousseri, the slaves were freed.

Very early on, the Commander of Fort-Lamy, Largeau signed an agreement on April 20, 1903, prohibiting the sultan of Baguirmi from acquiring slaves on his Dekakires vassals (Guéra, Boas, Moitos, etc.). “In compensation, he received from the French Government 100 horses, 100 oxen and 1,000 thalers.”

However, a particularism was granted to the Muslim sultans. It concerned the legal pluralism and respect of custom or rights originating from the Quran. Contrary to their habits, French colonists did not wish to overly disrupt the habits and the power relations prevailing in the Northern zone. At least in the beginning, certain traditional benefits due to the sultans were fully respected, as reported by Le Cornec (1963: 58): “land rights are the right of soil” and they involve such payments as “*hag el ard*,” a traditional tax or sovereignty tax, that is a contribution collected by the chief on all harvests and named according to the location, “*bourma, Kassarai, Mout*”, etc. The grazing rights or faldage or “*hag el guerch*”, continues Le Cornec, is a contribution in cattle due by the nomadic herders to chiefs of the cantons they cross, proportional to the size of the herd. Rights that can be called administrative include turban rights or “*hag el kadmoul*,” a gift offered by the newly appointed village chief to the chief of a township, and that naturally varies according to the size of the village.

There is also a fee paid on foreigners or “*hag el kanyiri*,” corresponding to the concept of escheat whereby property of a foreigner who dies without an heir on the land of the chief’s township are due in full to the chief. Judicial duties are the fees of justice itself or “*el cheria hag*” which is the share to be paid to the chief as a customary judge when he rules on a customary law case, a de facto transformation of legal power of a simple conciliation: “*hag el warassa*,” inheritance distribution, “*hag el dia*” (birthright), civil remedies, etc. or, in principle, one tenth of the value of the object in dispute. These duties also include various monetary fines, for adultery, “*hokoum el zani*,” for rape, “*hikoum el irse*,” for illegitimate children, “*hokoum el boumi*,” for insults, “*hokoum el lissan*,” etc. Optional charges include, the “*diffa*,” or hospitality and maintenance granted to the traveling chief, and to his suite by his constituents, the “*hag el salam*,” a gift made by the “*meskine*” (subjects) to his chief when they come to pay him their respects, etc. With these benefits, we understand then why, traditional chiefs have provided essential support to the colonial administration. And the protection that has been given to them helped a priority application of Quranic or customary rules. This was not the case in the South where the application of the custom was the exception that confirmed colonial cultural domination.

In 1948, there were 378 sultans, township and tribal chiefs and 6,266 village and ferick chiefs: “in 1945, in the Northern part of Chad, there were actually seven (7) sultans from the sovereign dynasties or feudal vassals of these monarchs: Alifa of Mao (Kanem), Baguirmi, Fitri, Ouaddai,



Sila (Goz Beida), Tama and Zaghawa. In the South, with the exception of the Moundang system of chiefs exercised for at least the past two hundred years by the Gong of Léré, this lack of traditional authorities was the rule. [...]. Colonization drew sometimes from among this staff to make leaders. Often this was a former demobilized soldier or an intelligence officer, or even a servant speaking a little French” (B. Lanne, 2000: 14).

The influence of Islam in Ouaddai was attenuated by the massacre led by the French colonial administration, and what the local collective memory remembers as the “night of the machetes,” during which more than one hundred fifty Muslim dignitaries were beheaded. This crime took place on the night of November 15, 1917 and is commemorated today (Mahamat Adoum Doutoum, 2002).

However, this Islamization is more from the top down than from the bottom up. As noted by H. Coudray (1992: 182 - 8), unlike Mali after the fall of the Songhai Kingdom, Chad has not experienced a movement of Islamization at a high rate. Similarly, the country has escaped both the Fulani jihad and the mahdist movement trending in the neighboring Sudan. In other words, Islam in its infancy exists in the courts and is not a popular practice. Therefore, we refer to a State religion (J. Stamer, 1996: 17). This is evidenced by the fact that Northern Chad, though in the vicinity of the Islamic world, was not Islamized until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century (J. Chapelle, 1980: 21).

#### **4. The development policy of the French colony of Chad**

The Second World War played a catalyzing role in the political evolution of the colonies. The repatriated *tirailleurs* of Syria revolted against the colonial administration which stripped them of their war bounty as well as their weapons. “They became very bitter” (B. Lanne, 1998: 94) and called for attacks against the whites in Chad. This attitude has been interpreted by the administration as anti-French. They actively worked to undermine any democratic aspirations among Southern Chadians and fomented distrust among the Muslim population toward them by portraying them as dangerous.

A new type of relationship between administrators and their constituencies emerged with the Brazzaville Conference under the initiative of General De Gaulle. The conference resulted in a decision that marked the political emancipation of Africans through three important principles: the accession by Africans to citizenship, colonial purpose in terms of enrichment of the Metropole and the means by which Africans would participate in their own development (electorate, eligibility, representative assemblies and political parties.) As Le Cornec noted (1963: 78): “in its essential provisions, the 1946 constitution could be regarded as having suddenly abolished the traditional institutions of French black African countries; indeed it integrated the overseas territories of the French Republic, unitary and centralized, since the

legislative power belonged exclusively to the French Parliament which had therefore, in principle, the monopoly of institutionalized political power.

In other words, this implied the suppression of the chiefs' privileges and assimilation as ultimate goal of the French community. But it does raise problems on the ground, given the agreement signed between the colonial administration and the Chadian sultanates. We have seen that indigenous criminal justice was exercised in Chad by the customary courts, emanation of the chiefs. It was the new policy defined by the colonial governor Félix Eboué to rely on leaders by strengthening their power, making them ancillary administration. But the Decree of April 30, 1946 suppressed chiefdoms and sought assimilation of the colony.

In fact, from January 30 to February 8, 1944 a conference was held in Brazzaville, capital of the AEF, bringing together the 19 Governors-General and Governors of French black Africa as well as representatives of the North African countries and the consultative Assembly of Algiers. This conference established the French Union in place of the colonial empire. On October 21, 1945 there was a referendum for the designation of the consultative Assembly and on June 2, 1946 in this same House. The French Union was promulgated in the territories of Chad on October 27<sup>th</sup> subsequently on November 10<sup>th</sup> with the election of the National Assembly, Gabriel Lisette, an administrator originally from Guadeloupe and architect of Chad's political emancipation, entered Chadian political life.

After the election of the National Assembly, the Union became effective: "Finally, beyond the texts, principled abolition of chiefdoms could result from the opposition of two political philosophies. On one hand, a Republican, secular, individualistic philosophy and on another, a certain African philosophy, which was monarchical, theocratic and patriarchal, from which one could infer the incompatibility of structures, and within a system of unequal colonial relationships, the virtual elimination of chiefdoms" (P. Chris, 1963: 79). This is further confirmed by B. Lanne (1998: 71): "the principles established in 1946 encompassed the introduction of political rights in Chad and the development of local political life; the result is a conflict of structures, traditional and modern, which deeply affects the operation of chiefdoms and makes their anachronism evident."

As would be expected, this decision would be variously appreciated: South, it met the aspirations of the populations for political equality with the colonists, while the North, it was experienced as a betrayal and led, *de facto*, to the Northern chiefs' reticent attitude with respect to colonization (A. Lamana, 2005: 24-25). This mistrust will be even greater when the policy of expanding of the French school system throughout the entire territory will be understood as an imposition from the outside, otherwise an affront against Muslim leaders. They will now work to discredit the French presence, by moving closer to the Arab world and by qualifying the people of the South as accomplices.

In the wake of the implementation of the decisions resulting from the Brazzaville Conference, some political parties were created in 1946, with the all-out organization of elections. They will result in the emergence of the political groups the most important of which were the Union Républicaine et Progressiste du Tchad (URPT) described by Lanne as a proto-PPT (Idem: 102) which included the Bloc Africain Démocratique du Ouaddai (BADO) of Abba Sidick and the Union Démocratique du Tchad (UDT) representing the Franco-Chadian lists through the Progressistes Français du Tchad (PFT). In regards to the UDT, Lanne notes: “without being a party of activists, this did not mean the UDT was an artificial group created *ex nihilo* by Rogué. ” It represents a genuine political force based on two networks: that of township chiefs, influential in the bush and that of a small group of Western-trained Muslims, who were influential among the Islamized masses, particularly in the North” (1998: 115). It should be noted that generally the township chiefs are also Muslims.

From 1947 to 1949 Chadian political life will be punctuated by alliances and counter-alliances giving rise to interference by the colonial administration in the life of the party. The election of Lisette in the National Assembly and its action for Chad’s emancipation was taken as an affront by the administration. This was the case of Rogué who led anti-PPT propaganda, aimed in this to tarnish the image of Lisette among the populations. This reaction created in Fort-Lamy a “deleterious climate,” especially in the “advanced and administrative sphere” (B. Lanne, 1998: 114). In addition, he said that Rogué had endangered the secular nature of the administration as early as November 15, 1945 by installing the Imam Assan in Fort-Lamy. This installation of course, as we have seen, consecrated a local custom, aiming to control Chadian Islam but Rogué’s action sought to protect itself from the revolutionary the South’s ardor. Rogué presented the PPT as a Communist Party for the simple fact that reports would have it that Tombalbaye and Toura Gaba would have been members of the Communist studies group (GEC) whose territory was under the responsibility of Gabriel Lisette. And “Muslims were viscerally opposed to atheistic communism” (idem). In 1947, a rumor about an Islamic conspiracy instigated by Abba Sidick, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, spread in European circles of Chad, including in Abeche and Moussoro. This was the basis for the strained relationship between Muslims and *tirailleurs* and Sara officials. In the South, conflicts orchestrated by the trade unionist Tombalbaye but harshly repressed, opposed Southerners and colonial rule by Muslim minorities interposed in Bebalem and Doba around the years 1950 in the area. In other words Muslims were used by settlers to prevent contamination of the South by the progressive ideas promoted by Lisette.

The action of Governor Rogué and fear of subversions plotted by Lisette with Southern officials contributed to maintain the animosity between the North and the South in the colonial public space. This has even led to loss of lives in both communities. It is reported that racist and religious insults were directed by some Muslims against “Saras,” leading to revenge and counter-revenge on both sides of the divide with sometimes dramatic consequences. Lanne, for example, states that it is at a meeting of the municipal delegation that the term “kirdi” was used for the first

time by a Muslim against Southerners, provoking a strong response by a prominent Sara. “Sara living among Islamized populations who were much more advanced than themselves, felt despised. They were referred to with the condescending term kirdi” (B. Lanne, 1998: 96)

The UDT composed entirely of Muslims was manipulated by the Rogué Governor to counter the PPT. From this period on, parties based on the defense of local interests were created. This was the case of Parti Indépendant du Tchad, created on September 21, 1950, by Ahmed Koulamallah, defector from the UDT. The presentation of the Arab list in Kanem at the last session of the representative Council of September 20, 1951 will be 36 [incomplete sentence in the original]. In general understanding, the term kirdi is pejorative. It would designate the Muslim perspective of heathen peoples but in the regular conception the word kirdi would return to the idea of enslavement. The kirdi are the descendants of peoples formerly reduced to slavery for the fact that they had not professed the Islamic religion.

This was followed by the proliferation of other political groupings. The first grouping is the Front de Défense des Droits Civiques du Tchad (FDDC) gathered around Koulamallah, which was created in the local elections of 1952 after an alliance was established with the PPT. Koulamallah appears to play the role of political agitator at this time since it is involved in all initiatives. In this regard, Pierre Hugot (1965: 81) says of him that he is "the only Chadian politician to have searched in the history of his country for the justification for his action [promoting] Muslim anti-chief reformism which immediately won him favors from a population that, for religious reasons, remained deaf to the calls of the Kirdi progressives. Mr. S. Yacoub (1983: 73) also speaks of the desire of Koulamallah to arabize the administration through the Mouvement Socialiste Africain (MSA). He stated, furthermore, that the UDT was a Muslim party, in the sense that it only brought together Muslim populations and arose as a defender of their interests and served them as a framework from which to move forward: “political action of the UDT [thus considered the vanguard of protecting these interests] was summarized in two ideas: first, attachment to the metropole, on the other hand, the legitimization of traditional leaders, including by religious credentials.”

The other minor groups are: the Union des Républicains d’Action Sociale (URDS) created in North Ouaddai, Action Sociale Tchadienne (AST) created December 10, 1954 by the defectors of the UDT and the Union Démocratique des Indépendants du Tchad (UDIT) created November 30, 1954. Similarly the June 2, 1956 election on the implementation of the framework law will mark the break between Chadian Socialists, causing the entry into politics of Ngarta Tombalbaye, an active PPT militant from Mid-Chari. Other twists would still emerge such as Koulamallah taking the direction of the Chadian federation (MSA) in vogue in French West Africa (AOF). The establishment, always centered around Koulamallah of the Amicale de la Jeunesse Tchadienne (AJT), “consisting entirely of Muslims some of which will go on to create the UNT that itself will be the foundation to the Front de Libération du Tchad (Frolinat)” (B. Lanne, 1998: 296).

Indeed, in the elections of 1958 under the command of the French community, while the major parties called for a Yes vote, “youth from the TPP and the MSA (all Muslims) came together to advocate for a No vote. On September 16, 1958, Mahamat Abba and Issa Dana, dissidents of MSA from which they had been excluded, founded the Union Nationale Tchadienne (UNT) violently opposed to the Yes vote” (B. Lanne, 1998: 211). The emergence of this new party was sparked by the Muslim Brotherhood. Some authors consider that UNT’s No vote was intended to break with French imperialism (B. Rone, 2000: 39-40). Contrary to many opinions, including Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh and Abba Dana (2005: 22) who say that the UNT is “a group of trade unionists, intellectuals and students,” without exhausting the exclusively regionalist and sectarian character. Ultimately, we see that the Chadian crisis has its historical roots and that the animosity between Christianity and Islam is as far distant as the encounter between monotheism’s different communities. This animosity was exploited by the colonists. We will see that this reality is present and continues to structure Chadian political life.

#### **IV. The Rise to independence or "the labyrinths of Chadian political instability"<sup>21</sup>.**

We have seen what the mood was when the referendum of 1958 on the French community of Africa was organized. On September 28, 1958, the Republic of Chad was proclaimed. Very early, the country’s progress would be hindered by a continuing political instability. In the space of two years, three Prime Ministers were elected, namely Lisette, Sahoulba, president of the Groupement des Indépendants et Ruraux du Tchad (GIRT) bringing together traditional chiefs and Koulamallah. In 1959, a rebellion by Chadians from the Sudan broke out following the interference of the Muslim Brotherhood in the life of Muslim communities of Ouaddai, but especially over the measures taken to contain UNT propaganda. Subsequently, these same communities lost in the 1958 election. It seems even that from these moments, Koulamallah and his allies called for secession of the North from the South, and in the same tone, Ngarta Tombalbaye called on the South and the North pursuing separate futures (B. Rone, 2000: 53).

##### **1. The policies of Ngarta Tombalbaye**

After the elections were won by the PPT- RDA, Tombalbye had to form a government. Tombalbaye was appointed head of government, and with the granting of independence on August 11, 1960, he became first president of the Republic of Chad. This was far from pleasing to everyone, starting with the former colonists who were still leading the military administration in the Northern region in the North, and the nearby religious fanatics close to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and sensitive to the revolutions that have taken place in the rest of the Muslim world (Iran). Early on, the Tombalbaye regime faced violent opposition, especially from Muslim leaders. This led him to adopt unpopular measures to consolidate his power. First, he

---

<sup>21</sup> This is in part the title of the work drawn from Nébardoum’s thesis (1998)

declared some leading politicians *persona non grata* on the grounds that they are of foreign origin. This was therefore the case of Lisette and Ahmed Kotoko.

This is why some analysts see in the 1962 Ordinance dismissing political parties the cause of the revolt by the UNT leaders, leading to the creation of the Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT), the largest and longest rebellion. Created in 1966 in Nyala in the Sudan, it is symbolic of the passage from Islam as a refuge where Muslims live a sort of internal exile to Islam as a counter-power. Frolinat was led in the beginning by young Chadian Muslim students out of Arab universities in Cairo and Khartoum. Indeed, during this period, a series of laws were passed (see appendices) limiting political and civil freedoms, followed by the arrest of the UNT leaders and several political leaders in March 1963. Ignoring these measures, Muslim leaders met on September 11, 1963 at the home of Djibrine Kherallah and when a law enforcement officer appeared to notify them that the meeting was illegal, the latter was beaten to death by the participants. This resulted in a bloody crackdown and the arrest of the officials. Some witnesses such as J. Chappelle (1982: 37) speak of the event of March 1963 as an “an aborted coup” which would be the start of the UNT rebellion. This thesis could be valid if one considers what the first Frolinat combatants say: “As soon as it was created, the UNT took care to establish clandestine structures, overcame many difficulties and could continue its clandestine work” (I.O.M. Saleh and A. Dana, 2005: 25).

This being the case, the decision to stop the political leaders was taken following the ban on meetings. The ban on political parties would have deprived the North of any political expression: “the abuses by agents of the State will do the rest. They are what caused the first uprisings in the country’s central-Eastern region in 1964 (Amtiman) and in 1965 (Mangalme)” (R. Buijtenhuis, 1984: 10). The revolt by the Toubou of Tibesti can be explained in the same way: following the reform in the holding of the communal courts, eliminating the exercise of traditional justice, which removes from the canton chiefs an important source of wealth, the supreme chief of the Toubous, the Derdei asked to meet with the prefect of Tibesti. In his grievances, he expressed the wish that his son Goukouni Weddeye continue on as assessor. He won when the prefect, a Southern soldier ordered him to remove his chèche turban before entering his office. He felt humiliated and left to go into exile, accompanied by his court in 1968 toward Libya. This group immediately joined the rebels led by Ibrahim Abacha. Abdrehrhmane Dadi (1984: 41), an ideologue of the regime of Habré then that of Déby, essentially attributes the cause of the Northern Muslim revolt to President Tombalbaye, “schoolteacher and Sara” and to France that had caused the emergence of “a Sara elite more than any other” because of cotton production rules,” as well as the recruiting of the many Sara into the French army and Christianity. Others are questioning the tax policy initiated by the Tombalbaye’s Muslim-dominated government in addition, but especially the domestic borrowing would come to increase various taxes to which the populations would be subjected, resulting in the revolt of Mangalme. B. Roné (2000: 154-170) contests this argument about the abuse of taxes and the national debt to justify the creation of Frolinat as defending the interests of the Muslim population of Chad.

There are analysts who highlight the local nature of the Mangalme revolt and not a revolt against the "kirdi" administration. Indeed, M.Yorongar, prefect of the region at the time of the events, explains that this revolt was due to the succession of canton chief Adoum Gadaye. Gadaye was supported by members of parliament and politicians of Batha, including Faki Abdoulaye who at the time was in Fort-Lamy, the Ahmed Hadaba faction from Batchotchi and the Minister of the Interior Ruwan Selengar. He was challenged by two other Moubi factions, namely the Bitchotchi Kibissimi and the Zilebini of Labado.

It is the mishandling of this case repressed in violence following the death of the above-named Minister that must be taken into account. Similarly, the alleged humiliation of the Derdei that led to the massive emigration of the Toubous to Libya in 1969 to join the rebels which would not have been such an issue if an effort had been made to educate and raise awareness among the local population as to the Republic's new values, namely equality between citizens and submission to the authority of the State.

In addition, there is an ideological link between the UNT officials and the Algerian Front National de Libération (FLN) as well as the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). UNT's strategy was modeled on the FLN in its fight against France for the independence of Algeria and "(...) the period from 1958 to 1966 has indeed been the period when in the UNT, the idea of organizing a rebellion against the PPT - RDA, responsible for maintaining the link with France was incubated and maintained" (R. Buitenhuis). With regard to general remarks about the movement, researchers agree in recognizing its revolutionary side but also its anti-Southern side: "the Frolinat, from its inception in June 1966 to its rise to power in June 1979, has always had two forces: that of a genuine revolutionary movement as expressed in the Ibrahim Abatcha's program (...); that a coalition of regionalist and sometimes religious (i.e. Muslim) forces that represent North Chad and a single one" (Buijtensuis, 1984: 28).

It is in this sense that the Frolinat fighters are defined first as Northerners and Muslims against the regime imposed by the South. On the national level, the fight against the rebels and the need for Ngarta to keep a hold on the State apparatus caused it to fall into a notorious political stalemate. He continues to harden the measures restricting civil and political freedom, by publicly humiliating some senior officials. He borrows from Mobutu's policy of authenticity in Zaire by the creation, , the Mouvement National pour la Révolution Culturelle et Sociale (MNRCS) to replace the PPT-RDA.

This movement was massively rejected by the Chadians due primarily to its ethnocentric character. In addition to his anti-French impertinence, through the renaming of public buildings, cities and even personal names with a Western connotation, the MNRCS sought to bring Chadians together in an overarching movement devoted to the cult of the president's personality by the forced institutionalization of the Ndo, a Sara country rite of passage. The suspension of diplomatic relations with Israel would be followed by the opening of Chad to the Arab world. So Chad joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Through this integration, the

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on an official visit of King Faisal, signed with Tombalbaye the construction of the great mosque of N'Djamena (ATP [Chadian press agency] No. 4174 of January 27, 1978). In 1972, the Toubou, encouraged by Libya which had expansionary ambitions in regard to Chad, created the 2<sup>nd</sup> army, which subsequently became the Force Armée Populaire (FAP).

It is in this framework that the French paleontologist Françoise Claustre was kidnapped. She was held in rebel caves for 32 months. This contributed to internationalizing the movement and impose it as the main player in Chadian the opposition.

On April 13, 1975, a military coup ended the Tombalbaye regime tragically, causing the arrival of members of the military to power. They put in place the Conseil Supérieur Militaire (CSM) of which General Félix Malloum Ngakoutou Behidi was made the leader. This coup, while putting an end to the totalitarian drift of Tombalbaye, brought about a reorganization of the rebellion in East-Central and Northern regions.

It was the time during which the conflict degenerated into an ideological war, paving the way for all those who aspired to better living conditions. The revolution therefore became a good career path. What has not been often said about the permanence of political and military violence in Chad, is the attraction weapons have on individuals, on those living in the Northern area, cradle of the armed conflict in Chad: “(...) The career of the *Suwaari* or that of a revolutionary against the established order of non-Muslims, both black and white, and the ‘traitorous’ elements in their community was the main motivation of junior officials in Frolinat. This was because entering the revolution advocated by Frolinat was in itself an elevation to important social status, “from a material perspective, in terms of future prospects and of personal dignity.” (P. Doornbos(, 1982: 7).

Propaganda was conducted by the various factions to create such enthusiasm among young people. An important witness reports:

“psychologically, the campaign exercised since 1966 by Frolinat against the power structure considered to be Southern, headed by Tombalbaye, who succeeded Malloum, can only prepare the ground for action of this kind, even when it is driven by quite specific motivations, clientelist and constituting miniscule groups. Also, it is the time to exonerate all by specifying that, although a few rare leaders maintained the amalgam because it had to serve their objectives, for the ordinary people, the fight is carried out against a power that does not give sufficient importance to Muslims and not against the non-Muslim Chadians” (M.D. Khitir, 2000: 3).

Indeed, for a population that has been *de facto* excluded from the normal course of professionalization within the administration which includes French schooling, pursuing a military career in its rebellious form, allows people to skip over the steps toward acquiring economic and social capital, or even more. There is even a popular phrase that perfectly explains this. For a Frolinat combatant-soldier, “the definition of a man is one who has the rank of colonel, who has a Land Cruiser and has a gun.” Anyone who does not have these things is part



of the *sakit* population, in other words a weak and unimportant individual. To have this kind of status makes the recipient “*hakouma*”, or government, otherwise the State. And personified in the combatant-soldier is a blank check that covers all the most heinous murders and abuses. We understand also why illiteracy characterized the Chadian National Army (ANT) since the advent of the Frolinat regimes. If with weapons we have the right to decide on the life or death on a trained official in the largest University in the world, why bother with studying?

Habré’s FAN (Armed Forces of the North), after the break with Goukouni, withdrew from the Tibesti to Sudan in 1977 where they benefited from significant support to that country’s authorities, but also the recruitment of combatants among the Masalit, Zaghawa, etc. populations. The main cause of rivalry between these two men was the binding rapprochement with Libya: “In 1973 the Libyan army had already occupied the Aouzou strip, to which units were added to help Frolinat in its conquest of Faya in February 1978 and who became trapped in tribal clashes between Frolinat. Around Lake Chad, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, little equipped and numerically weak, benefiting from some Nigerian sympathies, seized several islands and threatened the city of Bol to the Massakory axis. Southwest of Ouaddai, the Volcano harassed the FAN and the FAT (Chadian Armed Forces) that were monitoring each other in Abeche” (M. D. Khitir, 2000: 2). Similarly, in June the conflict between Abba Sidick and Mohammed El Baghabani resulted in the creation by the latter from the Volcano army taken over by Ma Açyl in June 1977. It is under his action and with the support of Libya that Volcano was transferred to a management and relief command in 1979.

The first major offensive by Frolinat against the Government forces took place in June 1977, with remarkable logistic and financial support from the United States. These attacks occurred in the positions of Bardai, Zouar and Kirdimi in the Tibesti mountain chain under the command of the Goukouni FAP. This victory resulted in the rallying with the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) led by Mahamat Abba and Malloum Boucar. The loss of the Faya-Largeau positions on June 18, 1978, then Fada and Ounianga in Ennedi, with the help of Libya, will seal the beginnings of negotiations for the so-called Khartoum Agreement in 1978 with the support of the Sudanese authorities. It is through this agreement that Hissein Habré was appointed Prime Minister (PM) in August 1978 with the signing of the fundamental Charter. Here, the naivety of Malloum should be noted, as he believed in moderation and reconciliation (hence his opposition to the desire to open his eyes including Kamougué).

This is not the case for Habré whose versatile personality, but especially his thirst for power cannot be unnoticed: “In a few words, the Frolinat program that he recovered serves as revenge of the North against the South. As if to make things clearer for everyone, he moreover names the movement he led FAN (Armed Forces of the North). This explicit reference could no longer be denied. Even if, for the needs of the State cover, after the auxiliaries from the South and the Center were incorporated, the fanatic militia of the will take on the name of FANT (Chadian National Armed Forces). Its permanent mission was to break the Southerners in the North against the Libyan people by putting them on the frontlines or hunting them like wild animals in

the countryside of the South” (Lop Fota, 2000: 8). Indeed, Habré, upon his return from France where he had gone to study political science, was appointed Prefect in the Chadian administration. At the time of the Frolinat revolt, as a Northern official, was sent by Tombalbaye to negotiate with Abba Sidick. Abba Sidick was exiled in Algiers. The meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood gave him the opportunity to betray the Government and go in hiding. Then, seeing the pan-Arab side of the Abba Sidick’s Frolinat, he betrayed it to join Goukouni Weddeye who had just created the FAP. He betrayed in turn Goukouni, by apparently taking his war booty. With the creation of the FAN, he acquired a certain audience. This allowed him to sign an agreement with CSM, an agreement that he later betrayed in the most bloody way.

The CSM definitely wanted to put an end to the State crisis. An attempt at reconciliation, desired and encouraged by general Malloum, was considered with Goukouni, but the latter failed to end his grudge against Habré whom he considered to be a traitor to the Frolinat cause. Very quickly, a deep dissension arose between the PM and his president. Beginning in 1978, or a few months after the arrival of Habré, there was no longer a Cabinet Council. The Chadians participated as spectators in the insolvency of a divided government typified by the refusal of Habré supporters to convey their wishes for the 1979 new year to the president.

He reacts by seizing the passport of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who was planning to travel on a mission under the PM’s orders. The president also ordered the arrest of the Commissioner who executed the order of the PR by the PM, etc. In all this France remained an observer and was already thinking “of dropping of the South” (B. Lanne, 1984: 79). Habré stuck in N’Djamena where he encountered nothing but hostility (from the Government, the gendarmerie, the population which was aloof, stalemate in negotiations, etc.) “made the following decisions: recruit massively from among promising Muslim officials by offering attractive administration positions held by Southerners since the country became independent, constitute support committees in the neighborhoods to transmit a specific mantra: the injustice of which Muslims are the victims and the need for them to exercise their rights regardless of the price to pay. To do this, [he had to] move from mosque to mosque every Friday: the PM was to make a spectacular appearance to show interest in the cause of the Muslim community. Finally, [he also had to] bring out the formidable bulwark that is the weapon of Islam. There, the imams broke their silence, asking the faithful to support the PM in his righteous claims against general Malloum” (M.D. Khitir, 2000: 3).

This thesis is supported by other testimony including that of Gali Ngothe Gata (1985: 177), formerly of the Frolinat then of FAN: “when Hissein was appointed PM, he declared at the Grand Mosque of N’Djamena that with him no Northerner, no Muslim would submit to a Southerner, that he represented them and that the fight would go on to the end. The crowd applauded, and the next day the muezzin called for holy war.” The ethnic and religious turn taken by the Chadian crisis broke during the events of February 12, 1979. This was considered by some as a breach of the national consensus. Dissension between Goukouni and Habré would be ironed out for the duration of an objective alliance between the belligerents to securely take

foot in the capital by hunting down members of the national army located there. In the space of two months, citizens of the South underwent a textbook exercise of genocide by the reconciled Frolinat.

Having retreated in their regions, under the iron rule of Kamougué in the Standing Committee, the Southerners organized their resistance. This allowed them to influence the negotiations in several reconciliation conferences held under the auspices of the neighboring countries to bring the Chadian brothers to get along and put an end to the murderous madness which was enflaming strife in their country. These conferences were held nearly one month after the N'Djamena massacres. These were the Kano I conferences of March 1979, and Kano II in April of the same year in which the Presidency was entrusted for three months to Lol Mahamat Choua, then Mayor of the city of N'Djamena. The third Conference was that of Lagos in August. These conferences would result in the Gouvernement d'Union Nationale du Tchad (GUNT), entrusted to Goukouni Weddeye.

## **2. Policy stalled by violence through the regimes of the FROLINAT**

The nascent Republic under Tombalbaye, certainly occurring in a period of political virginity, if not a new experience of self-government, was confronted with challenges, of which the most significant is the result of accumulated frustrations. Frolinat was able to channel these disputes into an instrument of political rallying. The central argument they found being the marginalization of Muslim modernist Northerners, and having experience with the centralization of power contrary to the different realms of Christian Southerners, who were anarchic and acephalous, barren of any political hierarchy.

This thesis has been developed by some Tchadianist (not to mention Africanist) colonists, who were fascinated more by the political history of Northern Chad than by that of the South. To note, one can emphasize the reductionist and derogatory connotation of this thesis, in the sense that it establishes a value judgment between two totally opposed political systems, one hierarchical and sheltered by an environment characterized by hostility and insecurity, hence the effort towards greater centralization of power, and the other set in a context of abundance where the ecotone provides some protection and where therefore it is difficult to have control over a large area and on men, who are much freer from the pressure of the group. With other externalities, the successive challenges, also the result of setbacks undergone by the power in place, led to the April 13, 1975 coup d'état. And it also did not prevent the scorching of the Republic. This explains the difficult cohabitation and the impossibility of a national convergence strategy that would have helped counter Frolinat misdeeds. The period when the country was under the military government and that derived from the consensus, namely the GUNT, that in fact inherited the instability of the early period and this only reinforced Chad's balance of force. The few officials who might still be questioned saw, better than anyone, a national destiny for themselves in this.

In March 1980, what is known as the second battle of N'Djamena was fought by Habré (helped by the French) in Weddeye. The imbalance of the Weddeye FAP forced him to call on Libya to help him drive Habré out of the capital. This assistance was decisive, and allowed him to temporarily maintain power. Libya withdrew from Chad in November 1981. On April 20-23,, 1981 a seminar for officials was held in N'Djamena to try to reconstitute the country and move on. But participation in this seminar is not homogeneous: “Northern delegates were [illiterate] combatants than officials. Some of them demanded the implementation of Frolinat’s June 22, 1966 program, the use of Frolinat’s flag and the creation of an Islamic democracy with [Libyan] popular committees” (B. Lanne,1984: 33). Lanne then notes that Goukouni was unable to rebuild the State and “incompetence, waste and inertia reigned supreme along with shabbiness" (ibid., p. 37).

The advent of UNIR, despite its dark side, suffered the same dynamic with, in addition, all-out international interference. It is the return of the greater North but also that of mediocrity. Habré arrived in N'Djamena on June 7, 1982 after getting strategic support from France, the United States, but especially the backing of the Revolutionary Democratic Council of Mahamat Acyl.

From September 1982 to September 1983, a humiliation and penitence campaign was undertaken in the South with unusual violence. The towns and villages of the South were submitted to blind repression by the Itno brothers, in this case Brahim Mahamat and Idriss Déby. In 1984, Hissein Habre, for the sake of a refocusing power, decided to create an ideological apparatus on 22 June This unit was called the National Union for independence and revolution (UNIR). Article 5 of the UNIR statutes stigmatizes tribalism, sectarianism, regionalism and fanaticism. This amounted to a means of eliminating rebellion in the South. The Itno pair engaged in what the collective memory in the South called "Black September", a month during which a scorched earth campaign was systematically applied. The Habré regime which used the repressive weapon of the State in a juvenile way is still being judged for this. It is accused of massacring nearly forty thousand Chadians and this is an understatement. Even though he was ousted by one of his lieutenants, General Idriss Déby, in December 1990, as we do the analysis, the shadow of Habré, has been hovering ever since the Frolinat days.

### **3. Stories and misfortunes of democracy: between the mounting violence and political clientelism of a “crisocratic” State**

The arrival of the MPS in 1990 happens in a totally different environment. It comes not only to the democratic opening of la Baule, but it also resulted as public opinion matter as public awareness was increasingly awakened toward human rights. This is more closely related to the development of means of communication, this famous globalization, which despite the criticisms that can legitimately be levied against it, allowed intellectual progress to become denser and a human knowledge to be more widely disseminated. In this context, paradoxically, the Chadian people gave the MPS the benefit of the doubt, as the population aspired to freedom and control

over their own destiny. This is why it would be difficult to associate the fervor of the Chadians for democracy with the bombastic speech of December 4, 1990.

Many theories have been put forth to explain the reasons for which Chadians felt the need to resort to arms to settle their disputes. There are those who feel that it is the workings of power itself that would be in question and incited the dissident groups to take this route. Some believe that it is rather the thirst for power that was at stake. The group that comes to power aims to ensure “its absolute monopoly on State resources and its ceaseless prevarication, its inability to put in question the strong-arm system which serves as a sociological substrate to the permanent presence of armed groups through a genuine policy for demobilization and the creation of a national army, the wholesale impunity of its members, etc.” (Anonymous, 2006: 8).

As we have seen, several causes can be identified: the thirst for power, power as a source of enrichment, the role of colonization in the transmission of power to the authorities of the young Republic.

At the time of the MPS, the dynamics of power were broken down into three identifiable facts: the street protests that took place from 1992 to the beginning of 2000 and which were brutally repressed. These are more the work of schoolchildren and students or of civil society for reasons of survival, more than an effective challenge of the system. The democratic opposition had demanded greater transparency in the exercise of democracy. Finally, armed violence was flaring up everywhere, bringing distress in the countryside and cities of Chad. Armed violence in Chad is more the work of BET nationals (Borkou Ennedi Tibesti), and more recently those in the East of Chad (Tama). Everything happens as if they are the only ones entitled to the charge of leading the country. Each community cherished the secret dream to gain supreme power. All these movements that can be qualified as systemic readjustment which certainly aimed to put the fledgling democracy on track, in any case, have not allowed a major overhaul; on the contrary, as any system, they let it assert itself even more strongly, by grabbing of power on the outskirts. In other words, the mediocracy reaches the inner circle of the power in place, officials are no longer recruiting on the basis of their competence but according to the partisan logic or laudatory overzealousness for the prince or some group acquaintances.

*Strategic famine* (denial of promotions within the State apparatus) imposed on certain political leaders led to ignominious alliances, with results that are known to us: a strengthening of the regime and the reign of arrogance in the MPS. integration into the State system by individuals anxious to preserve their interests more than the well-being of their people; disintegration of public administration, that has become a cash cow exploited by regime officials, etc. The final result was the following: Chadian populations, in their vast majority no longer have faith in elections that do not bring the expected changes. public administration is neglected by qualified officials for the benefit of the private sector; various social categories become enemies; worse, dissatisfaction touches the ruling family, the Holy of Holies of Chad power.

The testimony that is to be remembered about the Chadian regimes would come up with a quite flimsy rating for Frolinat. Aside from the fact that it has facilitated the enrichment of a few close families of these regimes, could acknowledge a loss of national sentiment but especially of citizenship as common characteristics among them. It was under these regimes that more and more Chadians are distinguished on the basis of their religious and ethno-political affiliation. Since then, contrary to the strong and true optimism of some who thought they could detect at the approach of 1984 a resurrected Chadian State, it is easy to oppose an anthropological argument which is that of territory as the principal marker of individual identity that which best captures who a person is. In other words, by ignoring the conceptual debates, citizenship is what plants roots in an individual and denotes his attachment to a country. This is the result of a continuous and perpetually renewed consensus. But Chadians have long been living as foreigners in their own country, a domain conquered by the dominant.

Somehow, the raids of the past are modernized to take the form of a clannish regimentation whose ultimate goal is to capture national financial revenues. Thus, thugs are placed in structures or institutions with the mission of accessing financial resources and simply redirecting them far from the public treasury. It is also the case with customs, transportation, smuggling and foreign trade which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of a specific group. In contrast with raids where slaves represent the revenue, here it is the investment and perversion of the administration at the exclusive service of the special interests. Such public services as health, security, school, etc. that should be a sure thing, are mere illusions of State power as a reality: “The multi-party system exists; democratic institutions have been largely emptied of their meaning. The 1994 and 1997 elections were characterized by fraud and those of 2001 and 2002 degenerated into a farce. [...]. A thorough reconsideration of the social contract would lead to Déby reducing the power of dominant groups and to initiating an unavoidable political process,” as recently assessed by the International Crisis Group (ICG) [2006: 3]. However, it is important to underline that all these “frolinatistes” dynamics must be placed in the proper temporal context: the Habré regime was a diffuse dictatorship and Déby’s was a “démocrature” that was under French tutelage, where the State, in a way, is emptied of its substance to become a tool of repression and political power grabs.

For me, therefore, it is not the impressive number of recognized political parties (more than 150 a large proportion of which is massively rallied or integrated into the party in power, thus forming a presidential majority), nor is it the holding regular elections (1996, 2001, 2006, 2011) represent the stakes of power in Chad. These elections are a mere political window-dressing. What is important is how to achieve a peaceful alternation in power. But the current logic of power (continuous modification of the constitution, shameless enrichment of those close to power, privatization of the government, etc.) makes this hypothesis a difficult one. Opportunities are merely kicked like a can down the road and people are getting tired.

## **V. Relations between the State and civil society in Chad**

It should be noted right away that in Chad, there are few forums for meetings, exchanges or discussions between civil society and political parties where they could jointly analyze societal issues. The spaces that exist are often facilitated by the development partners. There appears to exist, at the political level, a wall of prejudice between political and civil spheres, resulting in a mutual exclusion and a recurrent accusation of bias and self-interested positioning. This unproductive attitude weakens the relationship between the two entities. This difficult reading of the formal relationship civil society organizations and the government affects the way in which the relations between the country's various socio-cultural entities are organized.

Depending on their leaders' regional origins, they are often considered as organizations that are part of the political opposition. It is easy to make this observation, namely that the CSOs in Chad are a domain largely monopolized by Southerners. On the other hand, Islamic organizations, that is, those dominated by "Northerners", are virtually invisible in the umbrella structures of the CSOs. Nor are they noticed in matters that are of general interest as is the case for the defense of human rights organizations, for example. They do not denounce government policy and are confined to identity-based activism. Perhaps unconsciously, relations between Chadians seem to be structured around the North/South, Muslim/Christian dialectic, this either in public administration, schools, markets, or in everyday life. These historical, cultural and political facts, by combination, eventually reflected on the creation of the CSOs and seriously handicap them.

From colonial days to the present Northern and Southern Chadians do not have the same historical or cultural relationship with the government. This explains the skepticism as to the current configuration of the CSOs. Since 1994, there has been a fracture between the CSOs and the government: any proposal emanating from the CSOs is always considered to be hatched by the political opposition. Thus, it is quickly stamped out by the ruling party.

Ultimately, the Chadian civil society organizations bear restructuring. For B. I. Haggat (2002: 22), they are very dangerous for the people because "the so-called defenders of human values have reached their objective, namely, to give Chadians amnesia or sensitize them only to the negative aspects of their own history. A paralyzing and shameful sense of guilt of sorts was instilled in them." They must reconquer the Chadian population in its entirety and distance themselves more and more from the demands of the political parties. Otherwise, they will be mere shadows of themselves: regarded by Muslims as a political instrument invested by Southerners for the conquest of a lost power, rather than be a fourth power in Chad as a whole.

### **1. A problem of definition**

If it is common to hear about civil society from everyone, it is a rare thing to agree on the direction it takes. To quickly define civil society as an association organized for individuals pursuing the general interest is an easy solution, because when it is taken in that sense, civil

society is the expression of an opposition between public sphere (or the politically organized society that is the State) and, its opposite, the private sphere (or society organized outside the State). Some authors have even seen in civil society the outcrop of the State as anchor (Lisette Jalbert, 1992). Such semantic nomadism regarding the concept reflects the fact that the term civil society is indeed a political concept, characterized by the lack of unity of meaning and the fact that it cannot operate alone.

The distinction between the concepts of political community and civil society is based on the distinction between the public and private spheres of social life, a distinction that lies at the very foundation of our modernity, characterized by the appearance of bourgeois society. Thus, the existence of a political community, manifested in the political public sphere, helps prevent the arbitrary use of State power, while ensuring the existence of a private sphere where civil society can develop. Civil society is the society of citizens organizing in the private sphere to defend general interests. In this sense, civil society is a society of equal individuals who, because they are owners of themselves, voluntarily give up part of their autonomy to stabilize their sociability and ensure respect for the general interest.

Civil society is this group of organizations belonging to the private sphere, volunteers, citizens, non-for-profit, with specific development objectives, serving the interests of a particular community, involving constant participation from the latter, autonomous from the State and neither subservient to political parties or ideologies or religious denominations. In other words, what is called a civil society organization is defined, in its intention, civic nonpolitical action, whose aim is not to take the political power of the State or in the State but rather improvement of a well identified social situation.

Civil society defends either values (aesthetics, feelings, dreams, the past, the community, the nation, etc.), or categories of facts (age, territoriality, ethnicity, sexual characteristics, cultural reproductions, etc.). It also takes into account the socio-professional categories (economic operators, trade unions, professional occupations such as lawyers, doctors): "civil society is chimeric, and that is both its strength and its weakness. It is this multifaceted character that in fact makes it the strongest bulwark against totalitarianism and allows its continual rebirth when (...) the power uses all its attributes to seduce it, or make it uniform. It is this same polymorphism which prevents the chimera from asserting a united front, possibly capable of proposing a counter-model of society likely to fight with equal force against the hegemonic block. It is as elusive to the power in place as it is to the groups who are fighting against that power. This is why it is the field of choice of democracy"(Joseph Yvon Thériault, 1985: 8-20).

Civil society thus has two features:

-The first is to escape from the State (which does not imply that it is non-political). It would therefore be the field where life of the city unfolds where the ruler does not exercise its authority does not prohibit, does not endorse... A domain where individuals follow their own standards,



and not those of the Law, congregating around their beliefs or their affinities, in pursuit of diverse purposes (which may go from saving their soul or the planet to looking for entertainment or defending financial interests). In short, civil society is defined negatively: it is the space where the general will (in principle formed democratically, made known by vote, expressed by legislative obligation, implemented by the executive and sanctioned by the judge) leaves every individual the leisure to pursue his goals in a group, with his parents, his friends, or those who share the same tastes, desires or ideals.

-Second characteristic: civil society is an abstraction that we can know only through mediations. It has no seat or constitution, no beginning or end in its activity: it encompasses all of our relationships with others.

However, there are only two ways to bring civil society down from the sky of pure ideas. Either, like polls, individuals, selected on the basis of their age, their gender, their profession... are considered representative and that this part can express the whole. They can express on the one hand what “people” are in their diversity and on the other hand their willingness (their requests, their demands, their hopes...). This desire would be distorted by the process of elections, by the political class, the elites... The same logic is that of participatory democracy or opinion. The other answer assumes the idea that civil society is embodied in volunteer-based organizations each representing one of the, cultural, religious, social components of collective life. Facing the political legitimacy that results from elections and the consultation of the people according to specific procedures, there would be a form of legitimacy that is simply bound to altruistic action, to the nobility of goals or taking into account of demands made by a fraction of society and its participation through associations, collectives, and unions.

## **2. Archaeology of civil society in Chad**

The dynamics of Chadian civil society is only the reflection of the political history of the country. The advances and setbacks of the country produce a ripple effect on citizen action. Order that was given to us sets the temporal break in our words in 1960, or in reality to a period where there are very few things to point out. Very quickly with the accession of the country to independence, three years were enough to seal the fate of the multiparty system and permanently install society in the single-party system. Yet it is undeniable that before independence, there was a bustle of movement in civil society, based on the model of the metropole. In absence of a real economic and intellectual fabric in Chad, the bulk of the administration officials consisted of citizens from the Federation.

Furthermore, it is these unions and other citizens groups that inspired the first political parties and opened the way to demands for independence. Ironically, the types of independence acquired have rather suppressed this citizen momentum towards the preservation of rights and democratic

achievements. Despite the military coups and the arrival to power of the fighters from Frolinat, a systematic distrust of politics towards these groups has been observed. Thus, the register at the Ministry of the Interior shows that from December 2, 1962 to October 2, 1990, only 92 associations have gotten their permission to operate.

Indeed, under single-party regimes, any group or association was considered a threat and thus prohibited. However, all this did not concern the development or humanitarian-based NGOs. Similarly, international NGOs for Chadian rights could exercise their activities as long as they were not explicitly in the political sphere or did not seek to control the masses or human rights as such.

Beginning in 1986, Ordinance No. 027/Pr/85 of 28 October 1985 and its application Decree No. 677/Pr/Mprn/85 authorize citizen groups under the banner of the single party. That is how various corporatist movements came about, all affiliated with UNIR such as the Rassemblement des Jeunes de l'UNIR (RAJEUNIR), the Union Nationale des Commerçants du Chad (UNACOT), the Organisation des Femmes de l'UNIR (OFUNIR), etc. In short, the dark years have further atomized citizen action and condensed certain contempt for the divergence of opinions. Truly the intention to homogenize the thinking turned concern for ethics away from the discussion.

It is from 1990, with the advent of the pluralistic democracy that there will be a blossoming of civil society. The number of civil society organizations has been multiplied by 10: “this second characteristic period is marked by the emergence of associations for the defense and promotion of human rights, of cooperatives, independent unions, political parties, grassroots organizations, of urban development associations, federations-unions-networks of associations of an economic nature” (R.Toriaira, 2002).

This period coincides with the creation of structures such as the Ligue Tchadienne des Droits de l'Homme (LTDH), the Association Tchadienne pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (ATPDH), Tchad Non-Violence (TNV), Association Tchadienne pour la Non-Violence (ATNV), Jeunesse Anti-Clivage (AJAC), Commission Nationale Justice et Paix (CNJP), Cellule de Liaison des Associations Féminines (CELIAF), Association pour l'Appui aux Initiatives Locales pour le Développement (ASSAILD) Association pour la Promotion des Libertés Fondamentales au Tchad (APLFT), etc. Depending on the moment's opportunities and on the whims of its leaders, these organizations were assembled, shattered or reformed into a coalition of diverse interests around the themes of peace, national reconciliation, citizenship, electoral transparency, transparency in the extractive industries, the defense of community interests, etc. This is the case of the Initiative Paix et Réconciliation (IPR), the Chadian Coalition for Publish What You Earn, Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Commissions Permanentes Pétroles (CPPN, CPPL, RESAP, EPOZOP, etc.)...

It should however be noted that 92% of these organizations were operating in major urban centers and therefore the domain of urban elites. It has also been observed that these organizations were monopolized by nationals from one part of the country. This was one of the reasons why it was discredited as some viewed it as form of revenge. In any case, it must be said that the emergence of these structures with the discourse they served at the time, it was difficult to not read into it an ideological factor of social mobilization.

The return of civil society is historically linked to the dissident movements of Eastern Europe at the end of the 1970s. Václav Havel in his book "The Power of the Powerless" exalts the awakening of civil society: in post-totalitarian societies born out of the collapse of communism, it is necessary, he said, for new structures to arise, civic and citizen associations that will promote democratic transition. In a context of mistrust towards the State and large overarching ideologies, many Westerners place great hopes in these volunteer associations, dedicated to solving concrete problems, intended to strengthen social ties and, through deliberation in the public space, make a commitment to values accepted or desired by all.

The idea is becoming more and more popular. It is applied to the development of the South: generate independent associations that are independent of weak, ineffective and sometimes corrupt States, but also of traditional structures, all of which seems a promising path to finally make development assistance effective. Some even speak of a global civil society, international NGO or citizen collective and other components of the alter-globalist movement and oppose what they view as powerless elected governments attempting to manage all-compassing transnational problems and market forces.

In short, all virtues are attributed to civil society. It is a counter-power that controls the government intemperance. It is diverse and representative, contrary often to rulers and elected officials who tend to recruit in the same circles and share the same vision. It allows the emergence of new elites (and this is especially true in developing countries). It monitors and denounces power when it strays into authoritarianism, scandals, or incurs ecological or other risks. It soothes the debates and encourages citizens to participate in public life, restoring confidence in democracy. It does not seek to exercise direct commanding authority (unlike the parties looking to conquer the State, for example), or economic power. In addition, it acts more and more on those who are in power. It has a real grip on them, particularly through the media. With its ability to judge their actions or inspire their purposes, it applies an indirect strategy that combines moral pressure, seduction, negotiation, but also proposal and inspiration.

Civil society is the foundation of the greater rules applied by the institutional authorities (such as the precautionary principle, the right to intervene or sustainable development). Sometimes it is at the origin of the institutions themselves, such as the International Criminal Court.

Another factor that is not to be overlooked is its ability for direct intervention in political affairs, especially when major humanitarian rescues are undertaken. Not only does it very concretely

manifest its intention to implement the values which it asserts (it builds hospitals, saves lives, distributes food) but it competes against institutions that it often criticizes.

### **3. The Chadian media: quadrupeds of an orphan democracy?**

The media in Chad, as everywhere else, is divided in two: public and private. The public media sector has long been monopolized by Radio Diffusion Nationale Tchadienne (RNT). In addition to the home station based in N'Djamena, there are regional stations whose operation is hypothetical, especially because of nepotism and the lack of professionalism among the leaders. The component of spoken broadcasting is always accompanied by its print counterpart, the Agence Tchadienne de Presse (ATP). This publication has taken its title following the vagaries of succeeding regimes: from Info-Chad to the Canard Déchaîné (under Tombalbaye), by way of Al Watan with Habré to finally return to its first love, with a much greater ambition: visibility on the Internet and regular publication of the Government Bulletin (Chad-Info), which is distributed throughout the country. Added to these two media, is television. It emerged only recently (mid-1980s). Tele-Tchad is now managed in a consistent manner. It has converted to an all-digital format and has planned a large building for its headquarters currently under construction. Indeed, the Tele-Tchad has been a pioneer in technological modernization in the sub-region, according to general opinion. More than public structures, RNT, the ONRTV and ATP have proved to be more organs of propaganda for the different regimes to have succeeded each other in the country. Objective criticism is often absent and in electoral seasons the space for opposition views is reduced to virtually nothing.

The private media sector is very recent and appropriately linked to the democratization of public life. Publication of the first bulletin began under the Habré dictatorship and the sector has sometimes outpaced democratic institutions. From the first years of the democratic era, a number of newspapers join the veterans that are “Tchad et Culture” and “N'Djamena-Hebdo.” Also included are: “Sahibi’,” “Le Temps,” “L’Observateur,” “Le Progrès” that ushered in the first glow of the dawn of democracy in Chad and still more publications emerged subsequently (“La Voie,” “Le Miroir,” “Abba-Garde”). In addition to these French publications, Arabic language papers would appear much later: “N'djamena Aldjadida,” “Al Ayyam,” “Al Adwa,” “Al Moustaqbal,” “Al Nahda,” “Al Biteha,” “Al Afaq Aldjadida” and “Al Istiqlal” to name the best-known in N'Djamena. Youth-oriented publications are also abundant in the country: “Rafigui,” “Da'kuma,” “100% jeune,” etc. Some newspapers quickly appear and disappear.

In general, the French language print press is concentrated in N'Djamena, although some province newspapers are thriving and are dominated by Southern Chadians. This leads observers to assert that it is an opposition hotbed. Indeed, some newspapers were originally led by individuals who had evolved to become opposition political leaders. Conversely, some media are referred to as extensions of the government and voices of misinformation. In addition to private print media, there are so-called private community radio stations. They proliferate everywhere across the country and provide news and basic education. The image of Chad is quite present

also on the Internet with the creation of websites and blogs here and there. Virtually everything is represented in these: from opposition to misinformation, including positioning strategies in preparation for a better day or subtle solicitations from powers in place, etc.

#### **4. An unmistakable dichotomy**

In Chad, there are few forums for meetings, exchanges or discussions between civil society, political parties and government entities where they could jointly analyze societal issues. The spaces that exist are often facilitated by development partners. There appears to exist, at the political level, a wall of prejudice between political and civil spheres, resulting in a mutual exclusion and a recurrent accusation of bias and self-interested positioning. This unproductive attitude weakens the relationship between the two entities. This difficult reading of the formal relationship between civil society organizations and the government affects the way in which the relations between the country's various socio-cultural entities are organized.

Depending on their leaders' regional origins, they are often considered as organizations that are part of the political opposition. It is easy to make this observation, namely that civil society organizations in Chad are a domain largely monopolized by Southerners. On the other hand, Islamic organizations, that is, those dominated by "Northerners", are virtually invisible in the umbrella structures of the civil society organizations. Nor are they noticed in matters that are of general interest as is the case for the defense of human rights organizations, for example. They do not denounce government policy and are confined to identity-based activism. Perhaps unconsciously, relations between Chadians seem to be structured around the North/South, Muslim/Christian dialectic, this either in public administration, schools, markets, or in everyday life. These historical, cultural and political facts, by combination, eventually reflected on the creation of the civil society organizations and seriously handicap them.

There are differences in the actions undertaken by Chadian civil society organizations. There are civil society organizations that are integrated into the government and defend its interests. It is in fact an extension of public policy by activism in this heterogeneous environment. This civil society in fact represents nothing and it has no social basis if not that of the party sponsoring it.

Within society proper, that which looks to be politically neutral and extends its protection to society as a whole, two trends can be detected. The first, conscious of its role of safeguarding citizens' general interests, deploys into a friendly and easygoing truism. It includes everything from youth groups, women's associations, non-governmental organizations or human rights groups, as well as religious organizations.

The second, an individualistic one, is more difficult to isolate because it conceals its hand. Like an octopus, it is totally opportunistic and relies on food activism, without a real audience in other civil society platforms or even among the members of their original organization.

## **5. Interactions political actors and civil society: Ruptures and Confluences**

There are several moments in the evolution of civil society attitudes in relation to society as a whole and especially political power. Also, the political situation in Chad at one point or another in its history helped crystallize the interactions between political actors and civil society.

The moment of the first schism is political: in absence of a political opposition rendered inaudible, civil society has been led sometimes to play a role for which it is ill-suited. Faced with a government that was absent on the social field, civil society organizations assumed the right to protect the weak. Vocal and systematic denunciations whenever the government strayed characterized this early learning period. Any gesture on the part of the government was subject to criticism. A cluster of anxieties and accumulated frustrations explain the creation of this front of naysayers within national civil society.

The absence of dialogue between the government and the democratic opposition has also confirmed the breakdown in social dialogue. The abuses and other crapulous crimes, collapsed around the consensus resulting from the CNS, which was supposed to set new rules of the political process in Chad, the democratic opposition's alliances and misalliances with the ruling party analyzed as collusion against the people, the lifting of presidential term limits, etc. gave rise to speeches of rare violence. This was perhaps because in the government and among political actors, there also arose an arrogant front. When the opposition was discredited, civil society remained the only counterweight to the grinding machine of the political system. Some expressions like "the dog barks, the caravan passes!" invaded public space, coinciding with the period of frenzied debate on the exploitation of the Doba basin. Prosaically, it can be said that the rebel attack of February 2008 shed a new light on the weaknesses in the MPS system. There was a refocusing of authority over Republican foundations and a true turn towards widening the administrative apparatus.

The second moment is the option of maturity. Maturation has been difficult among the leaders and in the means of communication. Leaving the field of systematic denunciations and achieving the objective statement demands, to the well-researched presentation of problems was another step forward for civil society organizations. This was a work of synthesis and capitalization of the achievements realized within civil society that allowed it to understand its role of counter-power and a force for policy proposals. Certainly a renewal of leadership had something to do with this.

There also, some feel that by leaving the path of denunciations to be inscribed on the field of advocacy and lobbying, Chadian civil society has resigned. Leaders have abandoned the path of struggle for the good of all to worry about their own situation.

The culture of sincere dialogue is a central element that can make for a healthier relationship between political actors and society. Good communication and the ability to be attentive to the

expression of diverse opinions is a guarantee of societal progress. All social bodies should be involved in debates relating to the life of the nation. There must be no monopolization or domineering of discussions by any one group. This is the requirement of deliberative democracy. The opening of the political sphere to the private or civil sphere and vice versa allows a better reading of citizens' control over government action and conflicts in the leadership. To consolidate social peace, one of the democratic requirements is that political actors and state institutions accept citizen control.

At present, Chadian centers of expertise are available to civil society organizations and can usefully be mobilized for the improvement of social welfare. Civil society organizations can collaborate with republican institutions by reinforcing the professional capacities of *commissaires*, members of the constitutional council, political parties and candidates. Their participation in political processes helps strengthen the credibility of governance.

To do this, they must build a reputation for impartiality and neutrality in political matters. This also presupposes a good understanding by the political actors of the role of neutrality and impartiality of civil society organizations' actions and commitments as a whole.

## **VI. Some overall features for socio-political analysis in Chad**

I will now try to analyze a few overall elements to help understand social and political dynamics of Chad that previous remarks aimed to inform, clarify and amplify: a social and political elite brought into disrepute, recurrent manipulation of identities and various groups, clientelist power management, the gangrene of corruption and illicit enrichment giving the impression of a boring political theatrocracy.

### **1. A political sphere marked by violence**

The political history of Chad, as I have described above, is made of violence the causes of which have more to do with manipulating identities by the hegemonic elite than with the impossibility for the Chadians to live together. The different regimes have more or less maintained the country under the pressure of violence and structural unrest in order to weaken citizen resistance.

The PPT/RDA, despite its spiraling into totalitarianism after independence, was a national party with a national vision. The army which was composed of some colonial auxiliaries was trained in respect for republican values and for the State. Until its collapse in 1979, it indeed remained a national army. The element that distorted the balance of power between Chadians in the North and those in the South came basically from three levels, namely manipulation by the colonial administration that opposed Muslim leaders to those of the Christian South, the willingness of some Muslim leaders who found in Southern power an alibi for the ideological mobilization of

their community but especially amateurism which characterized the day-to-day management of Tombalbaye. The closing of political space created a situation conducive to the outbreak of armed rebellion embodied by Frolinat.

Among the legitimate questions that could arise, one wonders whether, if there had not been the introduction of the single party, the civil war would still have broken out. Why did the Muslim elites refuse the single party, when several Muslim parties supported the PPT/RDA in the 1958 vote, and there were Muslims in the governing entities of the single party, in the National Assembly, the Government and the Chadian army? Answers to these questions are certainly in the ideological substrate who participated in structuring the relations between the Northern and Southern communities, as I mentioned above.

Since 1982 under Habré and under Déby power continued to reinforce the logic of domination of a Muslim North over a Christian and animist south.

From September 1982 to September 1983, a campaign of humiliation and penitence was undertaken in the South with unusual violence. The towns and villages of the South were subjected to blind repression. The Southerners were portrayed by Habré as enemies to be exterminated, starting with the officials. Collective memory remembers this time as *Black September*. Indeed, the system put in place by Habré is a system of hatred and contempt, especially of the South but of all those who did not share his vision. For the first time Chad experienced an inhuman, racist and bloodthirsty system. By creating UNIR, Habré certainly wanted to turn a rebel movement (CCFAN) into a political apparatus, but he was careful to maintain the one-party system that he had fought in the past. In 1984 Habré created a single party, UNIR, the National Union for Independence and Revolution, whose statutes stigmatize tribalism, sectarianism, regionalism and fanaticism. In fact, it seems that this statutory item was asserted to justify the elimination of pockets of rebellion in the South by his military forces (CCFAN) in 1984, qualified by collective memory in the South as “The Black September of 1984,” a month during which a scorched earth campaign was systematically applied.

With Déby, there exists a dichotomy between the discourse and practice of power on a daily basis. In appearance, both the MPS and UNIR present themselves as national parties, with a regional division in the administration, the Government, the army and some decision-making spheres. Déby gives the impression of widely opening the political field by advocating freedom of opinion and of the press, and by organizing elections.

But in reality these are tribal devices in which key and strategic positions are in the hands of tribal allies. It is under these regimes that more and more Chadians have started to distinguish themselves on the basis of their ethnic, regional and religious identity.

With Déby power has been progressively concentrated into the hands of the Zaghawa minority ethnic group which ideologically makes a call for, once again, Muslim solidarity in order to keep power and prevent any alternation in power. Beginning in 2005, there was a narrowing base of



support for the system of inscribing power into the heritage that was established in Chad. Before this date, everything seemed to read as a sort of mechanical solidarity of Muslims against Christians. Then people realized that issues were only related to the BET members' inability to adapt to the Republican agenda. Now it is clear that the Chadian problem is not only related to shared values but more to the willingness by some groups to exclusively monopolize the country's wealth against all other communities. And this is not to be attributed to the Zaghawa alone, who today are now in power, but to all those who are able to or hope to take better advantage of the system that was thus created.

The political system put in place by Habré was a system of hatred and contempt, especially of the South but also of all those who did not share his totalitarian vision. Under him Chad experienced an inhumane, racist and bloodthirsty system. By creating UNIR, Habré certainly wanted to turn a rebel movement into a revolutionary political apparatus in which he was careful to maintain the classical single party system for which he had in the past blamed Tombalbaye. The MPS system, established by current president Deby, only further diminished the hierarchy between dominant ethnic groups. The change in dominant clan further exposes the identity group in whose hands most of the power is concentrated. Lifting presidential term limits in 2005 was in part responsible for the subsequent quarrel within the MPS as many of those officials imagined themselves in the presidential palace; the wars of 2006 to 2009 are the direct consequences of this.

## **2. Dichotomy between speech rallying and political practices on a daily basis**

The system put in place by Habré was a system of hatred and contempt, especially of the South but of all those who did not share his vision. For the first time Chad experienced an inhumane, racist and bloodthirsty system. By creating UNIR Habré certainly wanted to turn a rebel movement (CCFAN) into a political apparatus, but he was careful to maintain the single-party system that he was also fighting. This is where he joined Déby with the ever-present dichotomy between the discourse and practice of power. In appearance, UNIR and MPS appear as national parties, the regional division in the administration, the Government, the army and some decision-making spheres. However, in reality these are tribal devices in which key and strategic positions are in the hands of tribal allies. Are UNIR and MPS interchangeable systems? It is under these regimes that more and more Chadians distinguish themselves on the basis of their religious and ethnic affiliations. The MPS system has only further reduced the hierarchy between dominant ethnic groups. It is this change of the dominant clan in power that led to the amendment of the constitution and the expansion of the State's electoral mandate.

Finally with the glasses borrowed here in a reading of Chadian politics, we can say that the maintenance of a dominant order has easily brought about the republican democracy which was necessary in the eyes of the international community.

In reality, since 1978 there has been continuity in this deconstruction of the State power which until then was held by Southern Chadians. The episodic coups, rebellions, etc. are only the manifestation of a simple rebalancing or readjustment in the redistribution of power resources to the groups of Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti natives. The ethnicization of the status and functions of power are intended only to maintain a stranglehold on the financial resources. The army, public finances, and administration give the impression that they work because they help dilute the existence of this corrupting system.

In appearance, the function of visibility provided by the Southerners or other groups is representative of the payments granted by the prince. Democracy serves as an effective alibi to better control the rules of the game for the benefit of the power structure and to limit or anticipate any risk of destabilization. Everything functions on a temporary basis, including the government itself. Moreover citizens, bound by fear and hunger, think twice before venturing to challenge the system in place.

It is no exaggeration to say that Chadian populations when making their major divisions ignore one another even more, between North and South. Since the beginning, the only real relationships that existed were certainly related to slavery and the various conflicts experienced by the country. These relationships were not peaceful and have never pacified. This ignorance, reinforced during the colonial period, eventually developed into antagonistic attitudes. These attitudes continue to exist in the context of cohabitation on a day to day basis, in the absence of interpenetration, mutual knowledge and reciprocal trivialization of cultures, customs, and horizons. The communities consider each other as foreign. They despise and repel each other. They are certainly not strangers to the legacy of wars and mass violence. For example, the Southern communities see the migrating herders from the North as invaders. In reality, in Chad there are no homogeneous communities. They are all plagued by internal crises of legitimacy. The political situation as described is general and affects all communities, certainly in lesser ways for the group that is in power. So it would be fair to posit that the terms of the debate in a different way: it is no longer befitting to speak exclusively of domination of the North against the South, nor of Muslims against Christians. It is more accurate to read the current social dynamics as the ability of players to integrate the government and exploit it on a continuous basis.

### **3. Courses of action for the future**

This work has helped to understand that prospects of democratic alternation in power are possible in Chad. It is important for this to work to reinforce the State institutions that could benefit from being stronger than the parties or regime or the elites that manage them. Elections must here be perceived as the means that enable the people to experience more open democratic governance that is truly built by the free exercise of a legitimate State power. Without manipulating feelings of fear or insecurity, it is undeniable that in Chad we are now seeing the fragmentation of counter-power socio-political spaces. Today, the democratic opposition has

fallen apart and cannot truly embody the change coveted by Chadians as a whole. Those who claim the title of political and even civil leaders have adopted an attitude of systematic collaboration (or more precisely collusion in exchange for money) with the powers in place. Lacking in a unifying ideology, they consequently opt for the satisfaction of selfish personal interests at the expense of the real aspirations of the Chadian people to live together in peace and to benefit from the development of resources at the subsurface.

The future demands the creation and structuring of new leadership around a social project that can be *different* and serve to build common public goods: education, healthcare, open democracy, good local governance, a system of modernization of all public institutions intended to govern a State, in compliance with international standards and multi/bilateral commitments. It is a project that is in line with the huge expectations of Chadians, a project that is meant to be unitary, democratic, modern, secular, open and multicultural.

In this context of attempts to return to a single-minded system, big challenges for the future arise and they are pressing. The first challenge is the challenge of consolidating citizen civil society in accordance with the values it promotes. It is clear that in Chad, an element of foresight is part of the anti-establishment outskirts of the government's ways of functioning. It makes of civil society appear as the arena of national identity, in place of the State, in the sense that some of these organizations are resolutely committed to go against the tide of prevailing attitudes, building what is possible for all and with all. Despite administrative and political sanctions, multiple prejudices, the expansion of the discursive oxymoron of North–South ambivalence, there are organizations that refuse to live at the margin in the country's history. On the contrary, they are engaged in concrete spaces opening, expression, reflection and proposals. These organizations do not escape the steamroller of the existing system, to the point that its strong personalities are mired in internal contradictions and sterile leadership wars. It is possible to rely on civil society to push for change, provided that the catalyst come from outside and is one with which it will be able to identify. Otherwise it falls into the inertia of its own actions and efforts to raise its own funds.

The second challenge is the challenge of peace and peaceful coexistence. There was a time when political regimes were playing on fear by having Chadians believe that they are different, that there would be no reason to live together in peace with one another. Reducing the other to a less than human state, speaking of them in closed quarters, and rarely to their faces (which generally gives rise to biases of public scenes of violence). Chadians are increasingly distinguished on the basis of their religious and ethno-political affiliations. They live as foreigners in their own country, a land conquered by the dominant. Their collective imagination was swollen with negative prejudices towards otherness. These community barriers served especially as justification for political stalling techniques. Actions taken by development partners seem, so far, insufficient to overcome the turpitudes of this strategy of divide and rule that has been so detrimental to national convergence.

This is why—and this is the third challenge—it is important to restore confidence in the State by recognizing the primacy of law and social justice. The vast majority of Chadians no longer have faith in the State that continuously oppresses them. Any initiative emanating from the State is received with distrust and denial. For example, they vote by pure formalism: “in any case, whether I vote or not, he will be elected, what good will it do to vote against him or to abstain,” they often wonder. This is because they believe, from experience, that elections will bring little of the proposed change. Similarly, young professionals are tired of working in public administration. More and more, they forgo public administration for the private sector that is deemed more innovative and generally more appreciative of their merits.

We see clearly that not only has enmity come about between various social groups but also between citizens and the State, which is supposed to emanate from them. In all the political regimes that the country has known, common characteristics can be detected, such as making political use of individual feelings of belonging, and therefore the loss of the values associated with national citizenship and a sense of collective community. The system put in place by the regime is even more subtle, because it has even further reduced the dominant group circles (summarizing it to the omnipotence of the ruling clan), which helps to continue exposing disparities within the ethnic sphere: the emergence of a hierarchy between dominant ethnic groups. This change in the foremost clan in power has caused tensions within the hegemonic groups, tensions amplified by the rupture and collapse of consensus that represents the amendment of the constitution by widening the boundaries of the electoral mandate. From this point of view, the MPS has evolved to address change in the ideological continuity of Frolinat.

The establishment of a people's democracy, safe guarding minorities and adapting to regional particularism in the day-to-day management of the State is certainly the fourth challenge to modernize the process of accession to public power, given the entity has been dramatically absent from the political history of Chad, the Chadian people. At no time was it a true agent of change. It has been set aside, forced to the sidelines, watching the protagonists competing in its sad story. The trauma is profound. The Chadian people are a people undergoing the dictates of a few of its sons. These disappointments come sometimes to soften them, forcing them to focus on getting sustenance, making them unable to pursue their dreams for tomorrow. This change of emphasis is not due to a lack of will, but because of the opacity and the slipperiness of the sphere of action available to them. They never had an opportunity to mourn and have no working memory has been undertaken to restore their wounded consciences. The loss of a common reference is undeniable. Mistrust is sustained by accumulated disappointments. But what can a people do when it is not united around an ideal of commonly conceived society, shared values, and when everything is done to keep it divided? Therefore, it is important to again put people at the center of political life and not leave it only in the hands of the political or social elites. Because in this country, as some analyses argue, the disintegration of intellectual and social elites is such that in fact, it is difficult to consider the slightest progress in mentalities among them. These elites, educated by the best African and French universities, do not hesitate to put

their knowledge and skills to the service of the political systems in place, helping to divert public power to their own exclusive benefit. They have acquired and perfected the art of counterfeiting. Their maneuvers are so pernicious that they can portray large scale massacre as a simple quarrel.

In the image of public buildings (roads and buildings) that are built for the short term, their vision of Chad is also short-lived. These elites work and live in a temporary sphere, and this is why they kill or allow the death of the Chadian people's common effort toward unity and cohesion by refusing to organize, to lead, and to participate in citizens' debates. Furthermore, the absence of a political society is flagrant to the point that those who create political parties, for example, do not do so to conquer power through the ballot box, but more to gain access to resources. Those who rise, at times without merit, to positions of power, did everything to remain there, even if this goes against the general interest. Hence the need to work for the emergence of a new political class that is undeterred by the predatory stances inherited from the country's history and which puts itself in the service of the common good and democratic society.

The fifth challenge will be to support education and the emergence of a new Chadian elite by targeting individuals dedicated to the ideal of an political society that embraces difference or structures that are representative of this opening towards modernity of a participatory and public management with incentives to the pool efforts toward the construction of the nation-state. Alongside this critical space for the political and social elite, a sixth challenge emerges which is the need for a deep overhaul of the State structures and public management methods. By practicing systematic criticism acknowledged as indispensable input for the ideal of democracy, it is a matter of rethinking the structures whereby the State's public sphere is prepared and organized.

Indeed, all the Chadian State structures evolve according to patterns that are inherited from colonization and whose aim is the domination of communities for its own purposes. Would it be an exaggeration if we state that today not only do the administrative, political, legal and legislative institutions of Chad not work well, but they are ill adapted to and against the people? These institutions are not in the service of the economy or shared values in terms of the construction of public goods. Agents that make them work are in an attitude of resourcefulness, without a vision of or faith in the future of their country.

So far in our country, the concern of external partners to spare political leaders has often hindered any undertaking or even glimpse of real efforts to change the mental and managerial structures that produce anti-people systems. Without denying the chaology of the political world that is creating itself, let alone calamities and violence of all forms, the promotion of the counter-values by the ruling elites, we believe it is possible, through civil action, through to the daily actions to objectively analyze national and international current events, to objective national and international political situation analyses daily, to instill social change for the duration.

## **Bibliography.**

- ADLER Alfred, *La mort est le masque du roi. La royauté sacrée des Moundang du Tchad*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2011, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Coll. Racines du présent, 427p.;
- ADLER Alfred et Zempleni Andrsa, *Le Bâton de l'Aveugle. Divination, Maladie et Pouvoir chez les Moundang*. Paris, Hermann, 1coll. Savoirs, 972, 223p.;
- ADOUM DOUTOUM, Mahamat, « L'islam à N'Djaména de 1900à 2000 », N'Djaména, Al-Mouna, in Carrefour n°10 pp.20-21;
- ALIS Harry, *A la conquête du Tchad*, Paris, 18891, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 296p. COAM, Bibliothèque SOM, côte C.91
- ALIS Harry, *A la conquête du Tchad*, (1891), Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 296 p.,
- ARDITI Claude, « Des paysans plus professionnels que les développeurs ? L'exemple du coton au Tchad (1930-2002), Paris, 2004, Tiers-Monde, Volume 45 n° 80, pp. 841-865.;
- ARDITI, Claude, *Les conséquences du refus de l'école chez les populations musulmanes du Tchad au 20ème siècle*, Paris, Journal des Africanistes n°73-1, pp. 7-22, 2003;
- ARDITI, Claude, *Les violences ordinaires ont une histoire. Le cas du Tchad*, in *Les violences ordinaires*, Paris, Karthala, Politique Africaine n° 91, October 2003;
- BALANDIER Georges, *Le pouvoir sur scène*, 2006, Paris, Fayard, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. revised and expanded, 172 p.
- BALANDIER Georges, *Afrique ambiguë*, 1971, Paris, Plon, coll. Terre humaine Pocket, 293 p
- BUIJTENHUIS Robert, « Guerre de guérilla et révolution en Afrique Noire. Les leçons du Tchad », in *Politique en Afrique Noire, le haut et le bas*, Paris, Karthala, Politique Africaine n°1, March 1981, pp. 23-33;
- BUIJTENHUIS Robert, « Le Frolinat à l'épreuve du pouvoir. L'échec d'une révolution africaine », in *Le Tchad*, Paris, Karthala, Politique Africaine n° 16, December 1984, pp.15-29;
- BUIJTENHUIS Robert, « Le problème tchadien : rappel historique », in *Le Tchad*, Paris, Karthala, Politique Africaine n° 16, Paris, Karthala, Politique Africaine, 1984, pp.9-14;
- BOUTRAIS Jean, « Une histoire régionale du développement rural. Le Nord du Cameroun », in *Cultures et développement, Revue Internationales des Sciences du développement*, volume XV-4, Paris, 1983 (47p.), pp.654-700;
- BOUTRAIS Jean, « Les contrats entre sociétés », in *Le Nord Cameroun*, Paris, ORSTOM, coll. Des homes, une religion, 1984, 851p., (Mémoires d'ORSTOM) n°103), pp.263-280;
- CAIX Robert (de), « La convention franco-anglaise », *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française* n°4 (April 1899), p.100
- CHAPELLE Jean, *Nomades noirs du Sahara. Les Toubous*. Paris, L'Harmattan, 1982,459p.
- CHAPELLE Jean, *Le peuple tchadien. Ses racines et sa vie quotidienne*, L'Harmattan, 1986, 304p.;

- CABOT Jean et DIZIAIN Roland, Population du Moyen-Logone (Tchad et Cameroun), Paris, 1955, L'Homme d'Outre-Mer, comptes rendus de missions et études, 56p.;
- COQUERY-VIDROVITCH Catherine, « Histoire et perception des frontières en Afrique du XIIème siècle au XXème siècle », in UNESCO, Des frontières en Afrique du XIIème au XXème siècle, Comité international des sciences historiques, Bamako, 1999, pp.38-54.;
- COQUERY-VIDROVITCH, Catherine, L'Afrique et les Africains au 20ème siècle. Mutations, révolutions, crises, Paris, Armand Collin, 1999, 304p.;
- CORDELL D. Denis, « Des "réfugiés" dans l'Afrique coloniale ? L'exemple de la Centrafrique, 1850-1910 », in Réfugiés, exodes et pratiques, Politique africaine n°85, March 2002, Paris, pp.16-28. ;
- CORNEC Jacques (Le), Les milles et un Tchad, Paris, L'Harmattan, April 2003, 513p. ;
- DADI Abdramane, Tchad : L'État retrouvé, Paris, 1988, L'Harmattan, 219p. ;
- DEBOS Marielle, « Tchad, Index chronologique 1900-1960 », online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, Paris, Sciences-po, April 2008. ;
- DOORNBOS, P., La révolution dérapée. Violence dans l'Est du Tchad (1978-1981), in Le pouvoir de tuer, Paris, Karthala, Politique Africaine n° 7, Setember 1982 ;
- DELAFOSSSE Maurice, Les Noirs d'Afrique, Paris, 1922, Payot et compagnies, 139p. ;
- DJARMA KHATIR, Mahamat, « Une mauvaise gestion de l'indépendance. Les méfaits des "Messieurs panse" », in Tchad. Conflits Nord-Sud : Mythe ou réalité ?, N'Djaména, Al-Mouna, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 2005, pp. 79-82;
- GALI NGOTHE Gatta, Tchad. Guerre civile et désagrégation de l'État, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1985;
- GONDEU Ladiba, L'antagonisme des us et coutumes au Tchad, Cahiers d'histoire, Centre Al Mouna, coll. A la découverte du Tchad, 2007;
- GONDEU Ladiba, Mœurs et Pouvoirs dans les États tchadiens précoloniaux, Cahiers d'histoire, Centre Al Mouna, coll. A la découverte du Tchad, 2009
- GONDEU Ladiba, L'émergence des organisations islamiques au Tchad. Enjeux, acteurs et territoires, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2011
- HAGGAR Bichara Idriss, Tchad : Témoignage d'un et combat politique d'un exilé, Paris, L'Harmattan, coll. Pour mieux connaître le Tchad, 2004, 515p. ;
- JALBERT Lisette, « L'État ancré ou les frontières de la démocratie », in Gerard Boisemenu, Pierre Hamel et Georges Labica, Les formes modernes de la démocratie, Paris,1992, PUM et L'Harmattan, coll. politique et économie, tendances actuelles, pp.83-112,
- KASSAMBARA Abdoulaye Abakar, La situation économique et sociale du Tchad de 1900 à nos jours, doctoral thesis, Université de Strasbourg, 2010, 535p. ;
- KHAYAR, Issa Hassan, Le refus de l'école. Contribution à l'étude des problèmes de l'éducation chez les musulmans du Ouaddai, Paris, Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1976 ;
- LAMANA Abdoulaye, L'administration traditionnelle bousculée par la colonisation. L'apport ambigu de la France, in Tchad. Conflits Nord-Sud : Mythe ou réalité ?, N'Djaména, Al-Mouna, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 2005, pp. 23-26 ;

- LANNE, Bernard, Histoire politique du Tchad de 1945 à 1958. Administration, partis, élections, Paris, Karthala, 1998, 352p. ;
- LANNE, Bernard, Le Sud du Tchad dans la guerre civile (1979-1980), Paris, Karthala, Politique Africaine n°3, pp. 75-89 ;
- MADJIRO NAINGARAL Raymond, 1993, Pour une nouvelle solidarité en Afrique, Études, Paris, March, 293-303
- MADOU Nadji, Les Gabris de Kimré, AL Mouna, Cahiers d'Histoire, coll. A la découverte du Tchad, N°Djaména,
- MAHAMAT SALEH, Oumar Ibni et DANA, Abba, « Genèse du Frolinat » (pp. 21-47) in Tchad. Frolinat, Chronique d'une déchirure, N°Djaména, Al-Mouna, 2005, 251p. ;
- MAGNANT, Jean-Pierre (sous la dir.), « La guerre tchadienne, une mise au point », in L'islam au Tchad, Paris, Karthala/CEAN, Politique Africaine n°36, 1992 ;
- MAGNANT Jean-Pierre, « L'identité communautaire dans les États tchadiens précoloniaux », in L'identité tchadienne : L'héritage des peuples et les apports extérieurs, Paris, 1994, L'Harmattan, pp.29-56 ;
- MAGNANT, Jean-Pierre, Terre Sara, Terre tchadienne, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1987 ;
- MARTIN Jean-Yves, « L'implantation des populations du Nord et du Centre », in TARDITS Claude, Contribution de la recherche ethnologique à l'Histoire des civilisations du Cameroun, Colloques Internationaux du CNRS n°551, Volume I, Paris 24-28 September 1973, pp. 309-321. ;
- MONTEIL Lieutenant-colonel, De Saint-Louis à Tripoli par le Tchad, BCAF n°5 (May 1895), p.170
- MOUSSA Zakaria Ali, La place des pratiques populaires de production dans les politiques de développement du Tchad. De la période précoloniale à nos jours, Doctoral thesis in the social sciences (option développement-population-environnement), Université Catholique de Louvain, 2012, 328p. ;
- NEBARDOUM, DERLEMARI, Le labyrinthe de l'instabilité politique au Tchad, L'Harmattan, coll. Études Africaines, Paris, 1998 ;
- NELLI Djimtolala, La constitution de l'espace territorial tchadien, Cahiers d'Histoire, Coll. A la découverte du Tchad, n°20, Centre Al-Mouna, N°Djaména, March-April 2009, 55p. ;
- PODLEWSKI André Michel, « Présentation d'une liste généalogique et chronologique de la chefferie Mboum de Nganha », ORSTOM, Paris, pp.229-254
- PODLEWSKI André Michel, La dynamique de principales populations du Nord-Cameroun. Entre Benoué et Lac-Tchad, Paris, 1964, 189p.
- RONE Beyem, Tchad. L'ambivalence culturelle et l'intégration nationale, Paris, L'Harmattan, coll. Études africaines, 2000, 412p. ;
- SALEH YACOUB, Mahamat, Les populations musulmanes du Tchad et pouvoir politique (1946-1975). Contribution à l'étude des problèmes de construction de l'État au Tchad, Dcotoral thesis, Paris, 1983;



- SAUTTER Gilles, « Notes sur la construction du chemin de fer Congo-Océan (1921-1934), Cahiers d'études africaines, Vol. 7 n°26, Paris, 1967, pp.219-299.;
- SENE Amsata, Les structures anthropologiques de l'imaginaire en Afrique Noire traditionnelle ou vers une archéologie des concepts de pratiques rituelles et de représentations sociales, Doctoral thesis, Université Pierre Mendès France, Paris, 2004, 316p. ;
- SOME Magloire, « Les cultures africaines à l'épreuve de la colonisation », Dakar, 2002, CODESRIA Afrika Zamani, N°S9&10, pp.41-59 ;
- STAMER, Josef, L'islam au Sud du Sahara, Espagne, Esletta (Navarra), Verbo Divino, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1996 ;
- STOJANOV Nina, L'image du Tchad dans la littérature coloniale, 1891-1902, Recherches en Anthropologie et en Histoire de l'Afrique, Coll. « Clio en Afrique », n°16-Winter 2005, CEMAF, MMSH-Aix-en-Provence, 33p. ;
- THERIAULT Joseph Yvon, La société civile ou la chimère insaisissable. Political sociology essay, Montréal, 1995, les Editions Quebec/Amérique, coll. Dossiers-Documents, 160p.
- TORIAÏRA Ronelgué,
- VINCENT Jeanne Françoise, « Données nouvelles sur la fondation et le peuplement de la chefferie de Marva (Nord-Cameroun), SENRI Ethnological Studies, n°31,1992, pp.481-501, Presented in 1980, Rencontres de Valbonne/Alpes Maritimes.;
- ZELTNER Jean-Claude, Les pays du Tchad dans la tourmente. 1880-1903, Paris, 1988, L'Harmattan, Coll. Racines du présent, 285p. ;
- ZELTNER Jean-Claude, Tripoli, Carrefour de l'Europe et des pays du Tchad (1500-1795), Paris, 1992, L'Harmattan, Coll. Histoire et perspectives méditerranéennes, 301p. ;

## Table des matières

Introduction .....	1
0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.....	4
1. Economic factors.....	4
2. The political realities .....	6
3. The socio-cultural realities .....	6
4. Other issues related to living together.....	8
I. From conquest to creation of the Chadian territory.....	10
1. The myth of the Foundation .....	10
2. Exploring and conquering Chad .....	12
3. The creation of Chadian territorial space.....	18
II. The various sociolinguistic groups in Chad.....	22
1. The Nilo-Saharan Languages .....	22
1. The Sub-Families of Afro-Asiatic Languages.....	27
2. The Congo-Kardofanian Languages.....	29
3. The Religious Aspects.....	30
III. Administration and evolution policy in colonial Chad.....	32
1. Preliminary remarks .....	33
2. Deployment of the colonial administration in the Southern region .....	35
3. Ambiguous relations between the colonial administration and the Muslim North.....	36
4. The development policy of the French colony of Chad.....	38
IV. The Rise to independence or "the labyrinths of Chadian political instability. ....	42
1. The policies of Ngarta Tombalbaye.....	42
2. Policy stalled by violence through the regimes of the FROLINAT .....	48
3. Stories and misfortunes of democracy: between the mounting violence and political clientelism of a "crisocratic" State .....	49
V. Relations between the State and civil society in Chad.....	52
2. A problem of definition .....	52
2. Archaeology of civil society in Chad .....	54
3. The Chadian media: quadrupeds of orphan democracy? .....	57
4. An unmistakable dichotomy .....	58
5. Interactions political actors and civil society: Ruptures and Confluences .....	59

VI.	Some overall features for socio-political analysis in Chad .....	60
1.	A political sphere marked by violence .....	60
2.	Dichotomy between speech rallying and political practices on a daily basis.....	62
3.	Courses of action for the future.....	63
	Bibliography.....	67